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In this thesis, we examine the political economy of public finance. I provide a general
introduction to the thesis in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, I examine the determinants and in-
terrelationship of different types of government expenditure using data on 73 countries for
the period 1990-2016. The results show foreign aid receipts and urbanization have raised
total expenditure, but external debt stocks have reduced total expenditure. Also, there is a
substituting relationship between expenditures on social protection and pure public goods,
and education and defence, but complementary relationship between all other categories of
government expenditure.
In Chapter 3, we provide an up-to-date empirical assessment of the relationship between
economic globalisation and government spending for the ‘hyper-globalisation’ period of
the 1990s and 2000s. The results suggest that hyper-globalisation has had divergent and
conflicting effects on consumption spending: while the globalisation of trade has tended to
raise spending, the globalisation of finance and foreign investment has tended to reduce it.
However, the size of the effects is quite small, and there is no evidence that spending has
risen by more in countries which are particularly prone to terms of trade shocks.
In Chapter 4, I examine the mediating effect of democracy in explaining the relationship
between decentralization and government size for the period 1970-2013. I proxy decentral-
ization by fiscal decentralization, use total spending as our primary measure of government
size, and adopt the V-Dem high-level democracy indices as measures of democracy. I use
the fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and the instrumental vari-
able estimation technique. Our main finding is that fiscal decentralization and democracy
in themselves are effective tools to ‘starve the beast’ as they lead to reduced government
size, with the former suggesting support for the Leviathan hypothesis. I find evidence of
the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and govern-
ment size; a positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term with the effect
size largest for participatory democracy. We do not find a non-linear relationship between
decentralization and government size.
In Chapter 5, we examine how local governments’ political alignment with the central
government affects subnational fiscal outcomes. We analyze data from Ghana, which has
a decentralized political structure with substantial political and fiscal powers delegated to
the district level, and high dependency on intergovernmental transfers. Using a regression
discontinuity design for a new dataset for 1994-2014, we find that districts with an aligned
Member of Parliament and District Chief Executive (DCE) receive more transfers and have
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Government spending is an important element of public finance. From as early as Wagner
(1893), government spending has been linked with macroeconomic outcomes such as eco-
nomic growth, equity and welfare. For instance, Ram (1986, 1989), Lucas (1988), Barro
(1990) and Romer (1990) clearly demonstrate the extent to which government spending
may improve or hinder economic growth. In addition, government spending can have posi-
tive welfare effects when it is targeted at providing public goods such as health, education,
social protection, defence, and law and order. Governments may also adopt social welfare
spending as a tool to redistribute wealth to ensure equity. However, given that govern-
ment spending is a reflection of government policy choices and decisions, it may be driven
by considerations other than economic, including political considerations. Therefore, as
long as government spending remains an important tool in the hands of governments, the
centrality of politics and political economy in understanding the determinants of govern-
ment spending cannot be overemphasized. Moreover, in the case of developing countries,
government spending often tends to exceed revenue levels. Such uncontrolled government
spending in developing countries have been a source of macroeconomic volatility which
have been both pro-and counter-cyclical in nature. In reality, rather than having the intended
positive economic growth and welfare effects, government spending in developing countries
have tended to be associated with long-term persistently increasing trends leading to high
deficits and debts, and an excessive spending on debt-servicing. Rightly so, the latter effects
may be explained by the political and institutional structure of many developing countries.
We approach government spending in two broad ways. First, we consider government
spending at the national level. At the national level, we explore the determinants of and
interrelationship of government spending types, as well as the effect of globalization on
both the level and composition of government spending. Further, we determine the effect of
decentralization on government size under varieties of democracy. Second, we focus on the
local government level and explore how political alignment influences fiscal outcomes in
local governments. A detailed description of the contents of each chapter is provided below.
In Chapter 2, I examine the determinants and interrelationship of different types of gov-
ernment expenditure. In theory, different components of government expenditure may have
different effects on macro- and micro-economic outcomes such as economic growth and
production and the differing effects can have implications for resource allocation and redis-
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tribution within an economy. I use data on 73 countries for the period 1990-2016, broken
down by both economic and functional classifications of expenditure, significantly extend-
ing the scope of previous contributions. I use a two-way fixed effect estimator with lagged
independent variables, and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to examine complemen-
tarity and substitutability among components of government expenditure. The results show
foreign aid receipts and urbanization have raised total expenditure, but external debt stocks
have reduced total expenditure. There is a substituting relationship between expenditures
on social protection and pure public goods, and education and defence, but complementary
relationship between all other categories of government expenditure. Hence, disaggregating
expenditure data by category and examining expenditure types within a unified framework
enables a more nuanced test of many theories of government expenditure.
In Chapter 3, we provide an up-to-date empirical assessment of the relationship between
economic globalisation and government spending for the ‘hyper-globalisation’ period of
the 1990s and 2000s. We use data on government consumption spending as well as more
disaggregated spending components (e.g. social welfare). We also use a range of global-
isation measures, including the most recent version of the KOF globalisation index, and a
combination of econometric methods, including fixed effects, Generalised Methods of Mo-
ments (GMM) and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimation. The results suggest
that hyper-globalisation has had divergent and conflicting effects on consumption spending:
while the globalisation of trade has tended to raise spending, the globalisation of finance and
foreign investment has tended to reduce it. However, the size of the effects is quite small,
and there is no evidence that spending has risen by more in countries which are particularly
prone to terms of trade shocks.
In Chapter 4, we examine the mediating effect of democracy in explaining the rela-
tionship between decentralization and government size for the period 1970-2013. We proxy
decentralization by fiscal decentralization, use total spending as our primary measure of gov-
ernment size, and adopt the V-Dem high-level democracy indices as measures of democracy.
We use the fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and the instrumental
variable estimation technique. Our main finding is that fiscal decentralization and democ-
racy in themselves are effective tools to ‘starve the beast’ as they lead to reduced government
size, with the former suggesting support for the Leviathan hypothesis. We find evidence of
the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and govern-
ment size; a positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term with the effect
size largest for participatory democracy. We do not find a non-linear relationship between
decentralization and government size.
In Chapter 5, we examine how local governments’ political alignment with the central
government affects subnational fiscal outcomes. In theory, alignment could be rewarded
with more intergovernmental transfers, or swing voters in unaligned constituencies could be
targeted instead. We analyze data from Ghana, which has a decentralized political structure
with substantial political and fiscal powers delegated to the district level, and high depen-
dency on intergovernmental transfers. Using a regression discontinuity design for a new
dataset for 1994-2014, we find that districts with an aligned Member of Parliament and Dis-
4
trict Chief Executive (DCE) receive more transfers and have higher expenditures. Ghana’s
changeable voting patterns may hinder identification of swing voters, and/or DCEs who fail
to pull their districts towards the central government may be punished. Marginally aligned
districts also raise more own revenues. In a second step, we instrument transfers and esti-
mate a flypaper effect for Ghanaian districts.
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Chapter 2
The Determinants and Interrelationship
of Government Spending Types
In this paper, I examine the determinants and interrelationship of different types of
government expenditure. In theory, different components of government expenditure
may have different effects on macro- and micro-economic outcomes such as economic
growth and production and the differing effects can have implications for resource al-
location and redistribution within an economy. I use data on 73 countries for the period
1990-2016, broken down by both economic and functional classifications of expendi-
ture, significantly extending the scope of previous contributions. I use a two-way fixed
effect estimator with lagged independent variables, and seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) to examine complementarity and substitutability among components of govern-
ment expenditure. The results show foreign aid receipts and urbanization have raised
total expenditure, but external debt stocks have reduced total expenditure. There is
a substituting relationship between expenditures on social protection and pure public
goods, and education and defence, but complementary relationship between all other
categories of government expenditure. Hence, disaggregating expenditure data by cat-
egory and examining expenditure types within a unified framework enables a more
nuanced test of many theories of government expenditure.
∗I would like to thank participants of the internal seminar at the University of East Anglia in general
and Christa Brunnschweiler, Edward Anderson, Peter Moffatt, and Corrado Di-Maria in specific for useful
comments. I would also like to thank participants of the XXI Applied Economics Meeting University of
Alcala, Spain and Juan Tena Horrillo for useful comments. All remaining errors are my own.
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2.1 Introduction
In examining the determinants of government expenditure, it is important to consider both
aggregated (total) and components of government expenditure. Different components of
government expenditure may have different effects on macro- and micro-economic out-
comes such as economic growth and production. The differing effects can have implications
for resource allocation and redistribution within an economy 1. Further, the differences in
the effects of components of government expenditure on politico-socio-economic variables
may be attributed to the differences in their unit of measurement: (a) as shares of GDP or (b)
as shares of total expenditure, and the interrelationship between components of government
expenditure. For instance, for a fixed level of total expenditure, changes in one government
expenditure type are likely to occur at the expense of or complementary to a corresponding
change in another expenditure type.
In this paper, I examine the determinants of government expenditure and its components
and the nature of the interrelationship between components of government expenditure. I
contribute to the existing literature on the determinants of government expenditure in four
main ways. First, we use recent data on government spending and its components for a sam-
ple of countries including developed and developing countries. Our sample size covers 73
countries over the period 1990-2016, significantly extending the scope of previous contribu-
tions. Second, we measure components of government expenditure both as shares of GDP
and as shares of total expenditure to unify the differing approaches in the existing literature
and ensure robustness of our results. Third, in terms of the econometric methods, I use a
two-way fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables, and seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) to examine complementarity and substitutability among components of
government expenditure. These approaches have not been applied together before to pro-
vide a more comprehensive overview of government expenditure. Fourth, I use the IMF
GFS database broken down by both economic and functional classifications of expenditure
to gain a better understanding of the drivers of different types of government expenditure.
I further sub-categorise the functional classification of expenditure into pure public goods,
economic services, merit goods, and social protection in addition to expenditure types such
as education, defence and health spending.
I find that an increase in foreign aid receipts and urbanization is associated with an in-
crease in total spending; an increase in foreign aid receipts however leads to a reduction
in consumption spending. An increase in external debt stock however leads to a reduction
in total expenditure. For components of spending, trade openness has a positive effect on
government spending on subsidies, merit goods, and education following year; inward FDI
stock has a positive effect(negative effect) on government spending on pure(merit) goods;
1See Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990), Devarajan et al. (1996) Tanzi and Zee (1997), as well as Bose et al.
(2007) on the effects of government expenditure on economic growth; Fan and Saurkar (2008) on the effects of
government expenditure on production, resource allocation and redistribution, and economic growth; as well
as Salameh (2000), Fan et al. (2000), Fan and Rao (2008), and Fan et al. (2004) on the effects of government
expenditure on poverty. Other earlier studies include Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Borcherding (1985), and
Scartascini and Crain (2002).
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outward FDI stock has a positive(negative) effect on government spending on merit goods
and education (social benefits); and the KOF overall index of globalisation has a negative
effect on subsidies, merit goods, and education spending. There may be economies of scale
associated with government spending on services, merit goods, defence, health, as well as
education, as I find a negative effect of an increase in total population on the components of
government spending. The results for components of government expenditure as shares of
GDP and as shares of total expenditure are qualitatively similar. In the results for the interre-
lationships, I find substituting relationships between pure public goods and social protection,
and education and defence. I find complementary relationships between current and invest-
ment expenditures, consumption and subsidies expenditures, social benefits and subsidies
expenditures, as well as consumption and social benefits expenditures. There are also com-
plementary relationships between pure public good and merit good expenditures, services
and pure public good expenditures, services and merit good expenditures, social protection
and merit goods expenditures, as well as social protection and services expenditures. Fi-
nally, there are complementary relationships between health and defence expenditures, and
education and health expenditures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A literature review of theoretical and
empirical evidence on the determinants of government expenditure is done in Section 2.
Methodology is examined in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to data description. Estimation
results are presented and discussed in Section 5, while conclusions are given in Section 6.
2.2 Literature Review
Much of the early literature on the determinants of government spending cite national in-
come as a major explanatory variable 2. The effect of national income on government ex-
penditure is explained by the so-called Wagner’s Law - increases in the levels of national
income are expected to lead to increases in government expenditure as a share of national
income (Wagner 1893). Another important determinant of aggregate government expendi-
ture and its components is overall and specific components of the population. For instance,
health, social welfare, and other forms of transfer expenditures are likely to increase as the
share of old population in the overall population increases, while education expenditure in-
creases with increasing share of the young population, changes in total population can affect
aggregated and components of government expenditure. There may be economies of scale
associated with increasing population as the marginal cost of providing public goods may
reduce with increasing total population (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). The latter notwith-
standing, overcrowding and congestion due to increasing urbanization may be associated
with increasing social costs and reduced individual welfare, requiring an increase in govern-
ment expenditure to restore efficiency.
Two important characteristics have been found to provide good explanations for the sizes
2Early literature on the subject matter include Baumol (1967), Musgrave (1969), Borcherding and Dea-
con (1972), Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Musgrave and Musgrave (1984), and Henrekson (1993). See
Facchini (2014) for a detailed list of literature on the subject matter.
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of aggregated and components of government expenditure recently; democracy and global-
ization. For instance, the desire to satisfy the tastes, preferences and needs of voters may
lead to larger government expenditure (both aggregated and components; see Isham et al.,
1997; and Boix, 2001, 2003). Further, the biggest share of government size in any estab-
lished nation are social transfers (or welfare expenditure; see Hicks and Swank, 1992; and
Stasavage, 2005). In addition, relative to other governance types such as autocracies and
anocracies, democracies may be associated with higher consumption expenditure (Shelton,
2007). It is worth noting that inefficiencies and imprudent use of government resources
in autocracies may create bigger government expenditure levels. In the case of globaliza-
tion, the compensation hypothesis suggests a positive effect of globalization on government
expenditure while efficiency hypothesis suggests a negative effect (Gemmell et al., 2008).
Compensation hypothesis argues that globalization increases exposure to external shocks,
leading to uncertainties in the streams of incomes of individual and households, which re-
quires increased government expenditure (particularly welfare spending) to compensate for
such shocks (Rodrik 1998, Garrett 1998). The arguments of efficiency hypothesis are in
twofold: first, purely for efficiency reasons, smaller government size is preferred over big-
ger government size as a country becomes more open. Second, reduced revenues from trade
tax due to a “race-to-the-bottom” approach to trade taxation may lead to lower total revenue,
which reduces the ability of governments to spend (Garrett 1998; and Gemmell et al., 2008;
Benarroch and Pandey 2012).
Given that our sample size includes developing countries, two additional factors remain
important determinants of government expenditure (aggregated and components) in such
countries; foreign and external debts. Foreign aid affects the levels, the evolution, as well
as the composition of government expenditure as it adds to government total revenues to
fund government expenditure (Remmer, 2004; Morrissey, 2015). Foreign aid receipts in
general increases government expenditure (Hudson and Mosley, 2008). However, aid fun-
gibility suggests that an increase in foreign aid receipts for a specific use may(may not) be
additional to spending for that use (e.g. health) although it does not necessarily imply that
total spending does not increase in proportion to aid. This is possible when aid receipts:
(i) daunt domestic revenue generation efforts; (ii) are diverted from their intended use for
example in the presence of corruption, rent-seeking, wastage, weak state and political insti-
tutions (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Similarly, external debts may serve as additional funds
inflow to augment shortfalls in domestic revenues to finance domestic expenditure in de-
veloping countries, and this may explain variations in total and components of government
expenditure (see Mahdavi, 2004; and Obeng and Sakyi, 2017).
A closely related contribution is Shelton (2007), who examines the size and composition
of government expenditure. The paper is similar as it uses data disaggregated by category
of expenditure and tests different hypothesis of government expenditure within a unified
specification. The paper finds a positive effect of total population on health expenditure, a
positive effect of the fraction of young population on defense and consumption expenditure,
a positive of the fraction of old population on total and consumption expenditure, and a
positive effect of income on defense expenditure. The paper also finds trade openness has
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a positive effect on total expenditure, health and transport expenditure, as well as wages
and salaries. The current paper adds to this by introducing other categories such as pure
public goods, merit goods, services and social protection. Also, I consider components
of government expenditure both as shares of GDP and as shares of total expenditure, and
introduce complementarity and substitutability.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Panel Fixed Effect Model Specification
I examine the determinants of government expenditure using a two-way fixed effects esti-
mator. I use one year lagged values of the time varying independent variables to help tackle
some endogeneity problems due to two-way causal relationships between the regressors and
the regressands. The specification here is similar to that of earlier median voter model spec-
ifications such as Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstorm and Goodman (1973) and
Shelton (2007) 3. These specifications are the most popular and relied on in the literature.
The estimation model is therefore given as:
Expenditureit = α + βXit−1 + φYit−1 + γY eart + µi + εit (2.1)
where i and t refer to the country and year respectively. Expenditureit is a vector of
expenditure variables including both total and components of government expenditure. All
expenditure variables are given either as shares of GDP or as shares of total expenditure. The
base variables (X) are real GDP per capita, foreign aid, total population, trade openness, and
external debt stock. Y is a vector of control variables including shares of young and old
population, urbanization, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), overall globalization, as well
as dummies for democracy and autocracy. These covariates are added successively to the
baseline model, and finally all together 4. Year dummies (Y ear) are used to capture time
period effects on government expenditure. Country dummy is given by µi while εit refers to
the error term. All variables (except the dummy variables) are used in the natural logarithm
form 5.
2.3.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Estimation
As stated earlier, we examine the correlations of the residuals of the expenditure categories
to determine the effect of a change in one category of expenditure on other categories of
expenditure using the SUR model.
3I omit tax revenue as I do not find consistent data for most countries.
4For want of space, I only present the results for the full model. All other results are available in an online
appendix.
5I include a dummy which is equal to 1 for OECD countries. However, it is statistically insignificant in all
cases. In addition, the results for the model with an OECD dummy is not significantly different from those for
the model without an OECD dummy. I therefore report the results for the more parsimonious model without
the OECD dummy.
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A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation combines several individual rela-
tionships connected by correlated disturbances, providing simultaneous regression coeffi-
cients in all equations (Moon and Perron, 2006). The estimation procedure adopts the es-
timates of the variances and covariances of the disturbance terms based on the residuals
obtained from an equation-by-equation application of least squares (Zellner, 1962). Two
main advantages of using the SUR estimator are that; (i) SUR provides efficiency in esti-
mation by combining information on different estimations, (ii) SUR allows the imposition
and/or the test of restrictions involving parameters within different equations (Zellner, 1962;
Moon and Perron, 2006). The coefficients of SUR estimations are at least asymptotically
more efficient than those of single equation least-squares estimators. The efficiency gains
can be quite substantial if there are no high levels of correlations between independent vari-
ables in different equations and if there exists high correlations between disturbance terms
of in different equations (Zellner, 1962). In some special cases, the efficiency gains may
disappear (see Kruskal, 1968; Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993; Greene, 2003; Moon and
Perron, 2006). The procedure can be appropriately applied to regression equations where
each equation refers to a given classification category and the observations refer to different
points in space (Zellner, 1962 pp. 349). Hence, it is quite appropriate to adopt a SUR estima-
tion in this case since the use of different components of an overall measure of government
expenditure may imply some level of correlation among the equations’ disturbances, even
though the independent variables may not be highly correlated.
We provide a baseline SUR model as follows. Assume a dependent variable yi and a
vector of Ki independent variables given as xi = (1, xit,1, xit,2, . . . , xit,Ki−1)
′ for each ob-
servable unit i, and an unobserved error term, µit. The index it represents the tth observation
of the ith equation in the system. Where t could represent time dimension or may refer to
a location in space (Moon and Perron, 2006). Hence a typical linear SUR model can be








where i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , and L = K1 + +KN . This can be further
simplified by stacking the observations either in the t dimension or for each i to obtain:
Yt = X̃
′
tβ + Ut (2.2)
where Yt = [y1t, . . . , yNt]
′ , a block-diagonal matrix of the explanatory variables x1t, . . . , xNT
given as X̃t = diag(x1t, x2t, . . . , xNT ) on its diagonal, the vector of the coefficients of the
explanatory variables given as β = [β ′1, . . . β
′
N ]
′ , and the variance matrix of the error vector
defined as V ar(Ut) = Σ.
6Adopted from Moon and Perron (2006). For proofs and further reading, see Zellner and Huang (1962),
Zellner (1963,1972), Kakwani (1967), Kmenta and Gilbert (1968), Phillips (1977), Srivastava and Giles
(1987), Kmenta (1971),Srivastava and Maekawa (1995), and Fiebig (2001)
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The classical linear SUR model stated assumes a full rank Ki for xi = [xi1, . . . , xiT ]
′
for each i = 1, . . . , N . It also assumes that the errors are iid over time with zero mean and
constant variance, conditional on all the explanatory variables. The matrix is also assumed
as positive definite. A SUR model can also be represented as a multivariate regression with
parameter restrictions (see Moon and Perron, 2006). The classical SUR model can be es-
timated using the Ordinary least Squares (OLS) estimator, the Generalized least squares
(GLS) and feasible (FGLS) estimator, the Gaussian quasi-maximum likelihood estimator
(QMLE), the Minimum distance (MD) estimator, the Bayes estimator, empirical Bayes esti-
mator, or shrinkage estimators (cf. Moon and Perron, 2016). Extensions can be made to the
classical linear SUR model if the assumptions on the disturbance terms stated earlier are not
satisfied. Such extensions may be to accommodate autocorrelations and heteroscedasticity,
endogenous regressors, vector autoregressions, seemingly unrelated cointegration regres-
sions, and nonlinear SUR (NSUR) (see Moon and Perron, 2006).
Given that the equations in our system have identical explanatory variables, I adopt
the two-stage least squares approach to the SURE as the results from this approach are
similar to those from a three-stage least squares estimations 7. I determine complementar-
ity/substitutability between government expenditure types from the correlation matrix of the




Total expenditure is defined as the sum of all ‘current’ and ‘capital’ (or investment) govern-
ment spending. In the IMF GFS data, it is given as the sum of ‘total expense’ and ‘net invest-
ment in non-financial assets’. There are two different measures of total expenditure from the
IMF dataset, (i) the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) total expen-
diture measure (g eco1), and (ii) the Economic Classification of Government (ECOG) total
expenditure measure (g cofog). These measures are however highly correlated (r=0.99),
hence it does not matter which one is used although (g eco1) has more observations. I adopt
g eco1 as proxy for total expenditure given that it has more observations. Our measure of
total expenditure is given as shares of GDP.
Components of expenditure measures
We describe our components of expenditure measures with two figures. Figure 2.1 shows
a range of components of spending measures using the economic classification (ECOG). I
adopt six of these measures starting with total expenditure, then current and capital expen-
diture, followed by three components of current spending (subsidies, social benefits, and
7As Gemmell et al. (2008), I find similar results (available upon request) with 3SLS.
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consumption spending) 8. In the figure below, these six measures with their specific individ-
ual components are the shaded ones. All components of expenditure measures are given as
shares of GDP.
Figure 2.1: Components of spending measures: economic classification. Shaded measures are included in
the analysis.
Figure 2.2 shows a range of components of spending measures using the functional
classification (COFOG). Here also, a selection of measures are used starting with total ex-
penditure, the Oxley and Martin (1991) disaggregation (i.e. pure public goods, economic
services, merit goods, and social protection), and a selection of individual components (i.e.
defence, health, and education) 9. Here also, the categories of expenditure included in the
analysis and their individual components are shown by shaded boxes.
8Current spending is referred to more specifically in the IMF GFS dataset as ‘total expense’; capital spend-
ing is referred to as ‘net investment in non-financial assets’. Consumption spending is not directly available
in the GFS dataset; in this paper, it is approximated by the sum of spending on wages and salaries (g21) and
spending on use of goods and services (g22).
9The individual components are selected based on their frequency of use in the literature and their signifi-
cance in terms of size and data availability.
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Figure 2.2: Components of spending measures: functional classification. Shaded measures are included in
the analysis.
I note that, the ECOG and COFOG expenditure data used refer to both general and
central government expenditure. This is significant as most other researchers use data on
general government only; I included data on other levels of government in order to increase
the number of observations 10.
2.4.2 Controls
Income is proxied by real GDP per capita. Foreign aid is measured as net Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) receipts as a percentage of gross national income (GNI)11. External
debt stock is proxied by the total external debt stock to gross national income (GNI). In the
case of the demography variables, young population is measured as the population between
the ages 0-14 years as a percentage of the total population, old population is measured as
population aged 65 years and above as a percentage of the total population, while urbaniza-
tion is measured as the urban population as a percentage of the total population. Total pop-
ulation is based on the de facto definition of total population. Data on real GDP per capita,
foreign aid, total population, young population, old population, urbanization, and external
debt stock are sourced from the World Bank, World Development Indicators dataset, WDI
(2017).
I proxy globalization by trade openness, inward and outward foreign direct investment
stock, and the KOF overall index of globalization. Trade openness is measured as the sum of
10That is, some observations refer to general government, some refer to central government, and some refer
to ‘budgetary central government’.
11It must be noted that the indicator used here does not separate categories of aid which are likely to have
varying impact on government expenditure decisions.
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exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Data on trade openness is
sourced from the World Bank, World Development Indicators dataset, WDI (2017). Inward
and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks are measured as a percentage of GDP
and represent direct investment positions. Data on inward and outward FDI stock is sourced
from the UNCTAD dataset. The overall globalization index used here is the KOF Index of
Overall Globalization (see Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008)12.
Data on democracy and autocracy are derived from dummy variables constructed out of
the Polity2 variable sourced from the PolityIV project (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2014). The
dummies for democracy and autocracy are constructed as follows: polity scales of -10 to -6
are considered autocracies, while polity scales of +6 to +10 are considered democracies.
Polity scales of -5 and +5 are considered anocracies13. Summary statistics of all variables
are provided in Appendix Table A2.1.
2.5 Estimation Results
I discuss the estimation results for the economic classification of government expenditure
followed by the results for the functional classification of government expenditure, all as
shares of GDP. As robustness check however, I present and discuss results for economic
and functional classifications of expenditure as share of total expenditure. I then discuss the
results from the SUR estimations.
2.5.1 Fixed effect estimates
Economic classification-ECOG
From the results in column 2 of Table 2.1, there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between foreign aid receipts and total government expenditure. The size of the
coefficient indicates that one percent increase in foreign aid receipts is associated with a
0.032 per cent increase in total government expenditure. Urbanization shows a positive and
statistically significant relationship with total expenditure. One percent increase in urban-
ization in the previous year is associated with a 0.406 per cent increase in total government
expenditure. However, there is a negative relationship between external debt stock and total
government expenditure. One percent increase in external debt stock is associated with a
0.049 per cent decrease in total expenditure.
From column 3 of Table 2.1, government current expenditure reduces by 0.378 and 0.720
per cent respectively with one percent increase in the proportion of old population and the
proportion of young population. The results for old and young population is puzzling as it
12The overall globalization index aggregates three main dimensions (other sub-indices of the measure exist
too) of globalization measures: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. The in-
dex however differs from the Maastricht Globalization index (see Figge and Martens, 2014) as it excludes
environmental factors.
13Shonchoy (2016) makes use of similar measures of autocracy and democracy. Anocracies feature inherent
qualities of political instability and ineffectiveness in addition to “incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic
traits and practices” (Marshall and Cole, 2011; pp. 9).
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may be difficult to explain the findings using the arguments of economies of scale for non-
rival public goods stated earlier. One percent increase in urbanization is however associated
with a 0.454 per cent increase in government current expenditure.
Interestingly, the results in column 4 of Table 2.1 shows government investment expen-
diture reduces with one percent increase in total population (by -1.053 per cent). It seems fit
to expect that government expenditure on investment will increase with an increase in total
population. However, such a positive relationship may not occur if the increase in total pop-
ulation leads to increase in congestion. This is because an increase in congestion may lead
to a reduction social welfare and an increase in social costs as explained earlier. Hence, gov-
ernments may reduce investment expenditure to finance the increased social costs. I find a
negative relationship between an increase in external debt stock and government investment
expenditure. There is a positive relationship between an increase in foreign aid receipts and
government investment expenditure (a 0.076 per cent increase). There is a negative rela-
tionship between government investment expenditure and inward FDI stock in the previous
year, showing evidence of efficiency hypothesis. That is, one percent increase in inward FDI
stock is associated with a 0.249 per cent reduction in investment expenditure. The results
show a positive relationship between the KOF overall index of globalization and investment
expenditure (0.026 per cent increase), confirming evidence of compensation hypothesis.
I find a positive relationship between an increase in trade openness and government ex-
penditure on subsidies (a 1.649 per cent increase), which suggests evidence of compensation
hypothesis. Interestingly, the coefficient of the lag of the KOF index of overall globaliza-
tion is negative for government spending on subsidies, suggesting evidence of efficiency
hypothesis, albeit small. Given that, subsidies are considered a form of welfare/transfer ex-
penditure the mixed results from the globalization measures confirm that evidence for both
compensation and efficiency of hypothesis may exist concurrently although which domi-
nates may be unclear (Schulze and Ursprung, 1999). Government expenditure on subsidies
however reduces with increases in foreign aid receipts (a 0.140 per cent reduction). There is
also a negative relationship between urbanization and government expenditure on subsides
(a 2.133 per cent reduction), but this may not be worrying where increased urbanization is
associated with increased incomes and a reduction in the gap between the rich and poor. The
results for subsidies are given in column 5 of Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Estimated results for economic classification (ECOG)-fixed effects
VARIABLES Total Current Invest Subsidy Consume Benefits
2 3 4 5 6 7
GDPpc -0.013 -0.011 0.004 0.137 -0.009 0.027
(0.020) (0.021) (0.048) (0.089) (0.020) (0.053)
Aid 0.032** 0.020 0.076** -0.140** 0.012 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.034) (0.066) (0.018) (0.062)
Population -0.355 -0.250 -1.053*** 2.538* 0.140 0.067
(0.221) (0.292) (0.343) (1.503) (0.273) (0.553)
Old -0.145 -0.378** 0.615* -1.348 -0.248 -1.117
(0.162) (0.186) (0.341) (1.134) (0.170) (0.674)
Y oung -0.118 -0.720** 0.927 -0.264 -0.777** -0.763
(0.273) (0.310) (0.559) (1.857) (0.322) (0.888)
Urban 0.406** 0.454** 0.255 -2.133* 0.461** 3.416***
(0.181) (0.195) (0.464) (1.257) (0.224) (1.109)
Debt -0.049*** 0.012 -0.162*** 0.061 -0.044** 0.155*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.059) (0.458) (0.021) (0.0912)
Openness -0.015 -0.024 -0.093 1.649*** -0.002 -0.035
(0.044) (0.064) (0.080) (0.543) (0.061) (0.0848)
FDIi 0.002 0.032 -0.249*** 0.104 -0.017 0.102
(0.036) (0.038) (0.071) (0.250) (0.031) (0.197)
FDIo -0.008 -0.001 -0.020 -0.037 -0.011 -0.064***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.038) (0.009) (0.0239)
KOF 0.008 0.002 0.026** -0.058* 0.001 0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.034) (0.006) (0.0194)
Democracy 0.046 -0.018 -0.044 -0.360 0.026 0.273*
(0.048) (0.060) (0.092) (0.292) (0.038) (0.138)
Autocracy -0.013 -0.044 0.354 -0.096 0.016 0.276**
(0.034) (0.070) (0.318) (0.283) (0.051) (0.137)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 696 715 688 513 686 513
R− squared 0.271 0.281 0.206 0.353 0.166 0.296
Number of countries 73 73 73 63 70 61
Note: Fixed effects models are used. Estimations are done using robust standard errors. Standard errors in
parenthesis below estimates. All regressions include a constant term. ***,**,*, refer to statistical significance
at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. “Total”, “Current”, “Invest”, “Subsidy”, “Consume”, and “Benefits”
refer to total expenditure, current expenditure, investment expenditure, expenditure on subsidies, consumption
expenditure and, expenditure on social benefits respectively.
The results in column 6 of Table 2.1 indicate a negative relationship between an increase
in the proportion of young population in the previous year and government consumption ex-
penditure (a 0.777 per cent reduction).There is a negative relationship between an increase
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in external debt stock and government consumption expenditure (a 0.0438 per cent reduc-
tion). As expected, government expenditure on social benefits increases with one percent
increase in urbanization (by 3.416 per cent). I find a positive relationship between one per-
cent increase in external debt stock and government expenditure on social benefits. I find
that democracies have relatively higher levels of expenditure on social benefits compared
with anocracies. Also, autocracies have higher expenditure on social benefits relative to
anocracies.
Overall therefore, the results in this section may be summarized as follows. Foreign
aid receipts is positively and significantly associated with total and investment expendi-
tures but negatively and significantly related with government expenditure on subsidies.
The relationship between demographic characteristics and ECOG measures of expenditure
is spending-type specific. In particular, total population is positively and significantly re-
lated with government expenditure on subsidies but negatively and significantly related with
expenditure om investment. An increasing share of old population reduces current expen-
diture but increases investment expenditure. An increasing share of young population is
however associated with reduced current and consumption expenditure. Urbanization is as-
sociated with increased expenditure on total, current, consumption, and social benefits but
reduced expenditure on subsidies. External debt stock is detrimental to both aggregate and
most components of expenditure, except government expenditure on social benefits. The
effects of globalization variables on government expenditure is however both globalization-
variable and expenditure-type-specific. Both democracies and autocracies are associated
with increased government expenditure on social benefits.
Functional classification-COFOG
The results for functional classificaion of expenditure are given in Table 2.2. The results
show a negative relationship between an increase in the proportion of old population and
government expenditure on pure public goods (a 0.58 per cent reduction). There is a positive
relationship between an increase in urbanization and government expenditure on pure public
goods (a 0.446 per cent increase). There is a positive relationship between one percent
increase in inward FDI stock and government expenditure on pure public goods (0.0622 per
cent increase), although the coefficient is statistically significant at 10 per cent level.
Government expenditure on economic services reduces with an increase in total popu-
lation (a 1.525 per cent reduction). The results show that one percent increase in external
debt is associated with a 0.241 per cent reduction in government expenditure on economic
services.
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Table 2.2: Estimated results for functional classification(COFOG)-fixed effects
VARIABLES Total Pure Serve Merit Protect Defence Health Educ
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDPpc -0.013 0.002 0.017 0.048 0.100 -0.075 0.075 0.050
(0.020) (0.039) (0.057) (0.040) (0.070) (0.046) (0.049) (0.038)
Aid 0.032** -0.001 0.037 0.012 -0.027 0.010 0.014 -0.004
(0.014) (0.019) (0.031) (0.021) (0.060) (0.051) (0.027) (0.018)
Population -0.355 -0.366 -1.525**-0.945** 0.153 -1.037***-1.013*-1.109***
(0.221) (0.243) (0.639) (0.377) (0.693) (0.204) (0.596) (0.240)
Old -0.145 -0.581* -0.643 0.509 0.402 -0.830** -0.337 0.296
(0.162) (0.318) (0.547) (0.471) (0.827) (0.327) (0.581) (0.370)
Y oung -0.118 -0.109 -0.945 0.271 0.967 0.539 -0.129 0.429
(0.273) (0.477) (0.938) (0.392) (0.607) (0.536) (0.554) (0.434)
Urban 0.406** 0.446* 0.592 -0.173 1.676 1.439*** -0.525 0.714***
(0.181) (0.266) (0.573) (0.461) (1.041) (0.411) (0.316) (0.250)
Debt -0.049*** 0.026 -0.241* 0.020 -0.292* -0.043 -0.034 -0.072*
(0.018) (0.038) (0.125) (0.055) (0.167) (0.105) (0.077) (0.043)
Openness -0.015 0.039 0.110 0.100* 0.087 -0.021 0.104 0.063**
(0.044) (0.032) (0.080) (0.053) (0.081) (0.037) (0.087) (0.030)
FDIi 0.002 0.062* -0.081 -0.150* 0.242 0.054 -0.012 -0.033
(0.036) (0.037) (0.074) (0.086) (0.184) (0.071) (0.067) (0.028)
FDIo -0.008 -0.018 -0.024 0.044** 0.124 -0.004 0.010 0.032**
(0.006) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.077) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
KOF 0.008 -0.004 -0.011 -0.021** -0.014 -0.006 -0.032 -0.016**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.006)
Democracy 0.046 -0.060 0.114 0.047 0.0851 -0.007 0.045 0.018
(0.048) (0.048) (0.089) (0.058) (0.098) (0.076) (0.075) (0.060)
Autocracy -0.013 -0.001 0.038 0.057 -0.162 0.198* 0.130 0.100
(0.034) (0.053) (0.282) (0.067) (0.179) (0.105) (0.105) (0.065)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 696 460 322 460 438 441 460 455
R− squared 0.271 0.218 0.325 0.351 0.343 0.213 0.287 0.355
Number of countries 73 57 48 57 55 56 57 57
Note: Fixed effects models are used. Estimations are done using robust standard errors. Standard errors in
parenthesis below estimates. All regressions include a constant term. ***,**,*, refer to statistical significance
at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. “Serve” “Protect”, and “Educ” refer to economic services, social
protection and education respectively.
There is a negative relationship between an increase in total population and govern-
ment expenditure on merit goods (a 0.945 per cent reduction). I find a negative relationship
between an increase in inward FDI stock (-0.150 per cent), and the level of overall global-
ization (-0.0207 units) and government expenditure on merit goods, suggesting evidence of
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efficiency hypothesis.
Government expenditure on social protection reduces by 0.292 per cent with one percent
increase in external debt stock.
Rather puzzling, there is a negative relationship between increases in total population
and the proportion of old population and defence expenditure. Government defence expen-
diture increases with an increase in urbanization. As expected, autocracies spend more on
defence relative to anocracies.
One percent increase in total population is associated with a 1.013 per cent reduction
in health expenditure. The results show a positive relationship between urbanization, trade
openness, and outward FDI stock and government education expenditure. There is a neg-
ative relationship between total population and government education expenditure. The
coefficient of the first period lag of external debt stock is negative for education expenditure.
I find a negative relationship between an increase in the level of overall globalization and
government expenditure on education.
Overall therefore, the results for COFOG expenditure measures can be summarised as
follows. There is evidence of economies of scale, in that total population is negatively and
significantly associated with government expenditures on services, merit goods, defence,
health, and education. I also see some evidence of economies of scale for the share old
population, in that the share of old population is negatively and significantly associated
with government spending on pure public goods and defence. This confirms that additional
spending on non-rival public goods decrease with increases in total and the share of old pop-
ulation. However, urbanization is positively and significantly associated with government
expenditure on pure public goods, defence and education. That is, urbanization may be
associated with increased congestion which leads to reduced efficiency and social welfare,
and this may require increased government expenditure to restore equilibrium. External debt
stock is negatively and significantly associated with government expenditure on economic
services, social protection, and education. I see some evidence of compensation hypothesis
for trade openness, inward FDI stock, and outward FDI stock in that: (i) trade openness
is positively and significantly associated with merit goods and education expenditure; (ii)
inward FDI stock is positively and significantly associated with pure public goods; and (iii)
outward FDI stock has a positive relationship merit goods and education expenditure. I see
evidence in support of the efficiency hypothesis: (i) there is a negative relationship between
inward FDI stock and government spending on merit goods, and (ii) the KOF overall global-
ization index is negatively and significantly associated with government spending on merit
goods and education. I see that autocracies are associated with relatively higher levels of
defence expenditure.
2.5.2 Robustness check: components of expenditure as share of total
expenditure
I move away from the ‘traditional’ measure of components of government expenditure (i.e.
as share of GDP) and consider components of government expenditure as share of total
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expenditure. I determine whether the explanatory power of the control variables for compo-
nents of government expenditure remain the same with the change in the unit of measure-
ment. Similar conclusion can be gleaned from other literature (see Mahdavi 2004; Lora and
Olivera, 2007). In particular, Gemmell et al. (2008) indicates that measuring components
of expenditure as shares of total expenditure maximizes the chances of finding statistically
significant effects of the explanatory variables. I expect the results to be qualitatively simi-
lar with more statistically significant explanatory variables. The results for the ECOG and
COFOG measures as share of total expenditure are given in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 respectively.
First, I confirm an increase in the number of statistically significant coefficients of the
explanatory variables for ECOG (see Table 2.3). The results are however largely qualita-
tively similar, although there are some differences for current expenditure as share of total
expenditure (old population and KOF index) and government consumption expenditure as
share of total expenditure (foreign aid and external debt stock). Hence, it may not matter
whether components of government expenditure are measured as shares of GDP or as shares
of total expenditure.
Contrarily, relatively fewer explanatory variables show statistically significant results in
the case of the functional classification of expenditure measured as shares of total expendi-
ture. Here also, the results are qualitatively similar, with a few exceptions for government
expenditure on pure public goods and government expenditure on defence.
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Table 2.3: Estimated results for economic classification (ECOG) as share of total
expenditure-fixed effects
VARIABLES Currentsh Investsh Subsidysh Consumesh Benefitssh
2 3 4 5 6
GDPpc -0.003 0.016 0.149* 0.006 0.049
(0.010) (0.051) (0.081) (0.017) (0.048)
Aid -0.014** 0.044 -0.126* -0.025** 0.024
(0.006) (0.029) (0.066) (0.012) (0.057)
Population 0.243* -0.699** 2.405* 0.663*** 0.492
(0.124) (0.325) (1.430) (0.235) (0.565)
Old -0.207*** 0.756** -1.281 0.007 -0.649
(0.067) (0.307) (1.167) (0.175) (0.659)
Y oung -0.478** 1.041** -0.026 -0.684** -0.375
(0.201) (0.479) (1.871) (0.330) (0.883)
Urban 0.150 -0.146 -2.676** 0.111 2.937**
(0.113) (0.360) (1.283) (0.216) (1.150)
Debt 0.056*** -0.113* 0.109 0.005 0.193**
(0.021) (0.057) (0.460) (0.018) (0.0908)
Openness -0.006 -0.079 1.640*** -0.003 -0.071
(0.026) (0.058) (0.549) (0.041) (0.085)
FDIi 0.031* -0.252*** 0.027 -0.015 0.087
(0.017) (0.053) (0.238) (0.029) (0.219)
FDIo 0.005 -0.012 -0.023 -0.005 -0.057**
(0.004) (0.016) (0.036) (0.009) (0.025)
KOF -0.004** 0.018** -0.071** -0.003 0.010
(0.002) (0.009) (0.033) (0.005) (0.019)
Democracy -0.010 -0.088 -0.468* 0.009 0.219
(0.013) (0.119) (0.255) (0.069) (0.142)
Autocracy -0.029 0.368 -0.139 0.034 0.280**
(0.042) (0.339) (0.299) (0.038) (0.133)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 696 688 507 669 507
R− squared 0.287 0.233 0.357 0.292 0.250
Number of countries 73 73 63 70 61
Note: Fixed effects models are used. Estimations are done using robust standard errors. Standard errors in
parenthesis below estimates. All regressions include a constant term. ***,**,*, refer to statistical signifi-
cance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. “Currentsh”, “Investsh”, “Subsidysh”, “Consumesh”,
and “Benefitssh” refer current expenditure, investment expenditure, expenditure on subsidies, consumption
expenditure and, expenditure on social benefits as share of total expenditure respectively.
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Table 2.4: Estimated results for functional classification (COFOG) as share of total
expenditure-fixed effects
VARIABLES Puresh Meritsh Servesh ProtectshDefenceshHealthsh Educsh
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
GDPpc -0.040 0.028 0.016 0.100 -0.004 0.066** 0.032
(0.032) (0.044) (0.051) (0.061) (0.038) (0.031) (0.028)
Aid -0.007 -0.014 0.010 -0.027 -0.044 -0.018 0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.027) (0.049) (0.062) (0.027) (0.013)
Population 0.430 -0.900* -1.009 2.806*** -1.032 -1.134* 0.154
(0.314) (0.523) (0.917) (0.898) (0.656) (0.590) (0.159)
Old -0.562* 1.364** -0.464 0.557 -0.145 1.216* 0.582*
(0.325) (0.583) (0.568) (0.784) (0.561) (0.666) (0.314)
Y oung -0.309 0.731* -1.223 1.305 1.079 0.553 0.676**
(0.427) (0.431) (0.857) (0.788) (0.677) (0.464) (0.272)
Urban 0.171 -0.277 0.331 1.171* 1.151** -0.340 0.175
(0.219) (0.353) (0.635) (0.685) (0.464) (0.246) (0.179)
Debt 0.074 0.041 -0.186* -0.153 -0.063 -0.077 -0.002
(0.047) (0.053) (0.096) (0.127) (0.128) (0.074) (0.041)
Openness -0.047** 0.023 0.038 0.048* -0.050* -0.019 0.004
(0.021) (0.028) (0.050) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021) (0.013)
FDIi 0.091*** -0.149 -0.060 0.454** 0.107 0.060 0.032
(0.027) (0.106) (0.069) (0.212) (0.067) (0.063) (0.031)
FDIo -0.026 0.072*** -0.020 -0.0002 0.032 0.0602** 0.0302**
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.024) (0.025) (0.013)
KOF 0.003 -0.012** -0.007 0.001 -0.020 -0.018 -0.008
(0.011) (0.005) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005)
Democracy -0.055 0.073 0.040 -0.014 -0.097 0.111 0.057
(0.049) (0.063) (0.071) (0.082) (0.112) (0.078) (0.038)
Autocracy 0.050 0.056 0.020 -0.162 0.235* 0.182*** 0.123*
(0.042) (0.064) (0.257) (0.177) (0.124) (0.058) (0.062)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 325 325 267 308 315 325 320
R− squared 0.304 0.425 0.244 0.441 0.302 0.322 0.254
Number of countries 46 46 42 45 45 46 46
Note: Fixed effects models are used. Estimations are done using robust standard errors. Standard errors in
parenthesis below estimates. All regressions include a constant term. ***,**,*, refer to statistical signifi-
cance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. “Servesh”, “Protectsh”, and “Educsh” refer to economic
services, social protection and education as share of total expenditure respectively.
23
2.5.3 Complementary or substituting?-SURE estimates
I obtain results for four sets of components of expenditure measures based on the tiers of
expenditures shown for the ECOG and COFOG classifications in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. These
are: (i) current and investment; (ii) subsidies, consumption, and social benefits; (iii) pure
public goods, merit goods, economic services, and social protection; as well as (iv) defence,
health and education expenditures all as shares of GDP 14. Our choice of independent vari-
ables in the SURE model is similar to those in equation (2.1), namely shares of young and
old population, urbanization, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), overall globalization, as well
as dummies for democracy and autocracy. It is important to state that the matrices reported
and discussed here are the estimates of the error variance matrix Σ defined in Section 2.3.2.
In all cases, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM statistic confirm the validity of the correlation
estimates obtained, that is the coefficients obtained are indeed independent.
The results in Table 2.5 show a complementary relationship between current and in-
vestment expenditure. I find a positive (0.1812) correlation between consumption and in-
vestment expenditures. This suggests increases in current expenditure is associated with
corresponding increases in investment expenditure as share of GDP.





Note: Breusch-Pagan test of independence 22.581 (0.0000)
The results in Table 2.6 confirms complementary relationship between expenditure on
subsidies and consumption, expenditure on social benefits and subsidies, as well as expen-
diture on social benefits and consumption.
Table 2.6: Correlation matrix of SUR estimates for subsidies, consumption and social ben-




Benefits 0.0359 0.3922 1.0000
Note: Breusch-Pagan test of independence 75.642(0.0000)
In Table 2.7 I find complementary relationships between expenditure on merit and pure
public goods, complementary relationship between expenditure on pure public goods and
14I find substituting relationships between expenditure types measured as shares of total expenditure in
most cases. This however may seem more of a mechanical relationship and may be inevitable. For example,
if spending on health goes up, and all other areas of spending remain unchanged, then the share of health will
rise while the other shares will fall. Hence, I do not discuss the results as they do not provide much information
about government spending choices.
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economic services, as well as a complementary relationship between expenditure on merit
goods and economic services. There is also a complementary relationship between expendi-
ture on social protection and merit goods and a complementary relationship between expen-
diture on social protection and economic services. The correlation coefficients in the above
cases are all positive. I however find a substituting relationship between expenditure on
social protection and pure public goods as the correlation coefficient in this case is negative.
Table 2.7: Correlation matrix of SUR estimates for pure goods, merit goods, economic
services, and social protection, as share of GDP
Pure Merit Services Protect
Pure 1.0000
Merit 0.181 1.0000
Services 0.2281 0.3076 1.0000
Protect -0.19 0.2462 0.1566 1
Note: Breusch-Pagan test of independence 93.513(0.0000)
The results for the correlation matrix for defence, health, and education expenditure
are given in Table 2.8. There are complementary relationships between health and defence
expenditures, and education and health expenditures as shown by the positive coefficient of
the correlation matrix. The correlation coefficient for education and defence expenditures is
however negative, implying a substituting relationship.





Education -0.1073 0.501 1.0000
Note: Breusch-Pagan test of independence 114.800(0.0000)
In sum, the correlation matrix provides positive correlation coefficients for most pairs
of components of government expenditure suggesting evidence of complementary relation-
ships. There is however a substituting relationship between expenditures on social protection
and pure public goods, and education and defence since the correlation coefficient from the
correlation matrix is negative. Evidence of complementary relationship for the respective
pairs of expenditure type implies increases(decreases) in either of them may be associated
with simultaneous increases(decreases) in the corresponding pair. Substituting however sug-
gests for each pair of spending, a change in an expenditure type occurs at the expense of the
corresponding pair of expenditure type.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the determinants of aggregate and components of expenditure, and
the interrelationship between components of government expenditure. I measure compo-
nents of government expenditure both as shares of GDP and as shares of total expenditure.
The empirical evidence for aggregate expenditure shows foreign aid receipts and urban-
ization are positively and significantly associated with total government expenditure, but in-
creases in external debt stock reduces total government expenditure. I find that demographic
characteristics such as total population, share of young population, share of old population,
and urbanization, which increase the heterogeneity of preferences are negatively associated
with components of government expenditure (except government spending on subsidies),
perhaps suggesting economies of scale effects on both aggregate and components of govern-
ment size. There is simultaneous evidence of compensation and efficiency hypothesis; trade
openness shows evidence of compensation hypothesis, the KOF overall index of globalisa-
tion shows evidence of efficiency hypothesis, but for the FDI variables, evidence for either
of the two hypothesis varies according to the expenditure category. Government spending
on social benefits is higher for both democracies and autocracies relative to anocracies. Not
surprisingly, autocracies are associated with higher defence spending relative to anocracies.
The effect of external debt stock however depends on the type of expenditure component
in question. Significantly, the results obtained largely remains robust to measuring compo-
nents of expenditure as share of total expenditure. Hence, in examining the determinants
of components of government expenditure, it may not matter if components of government
expenditure are measured as shares of GDP or as shares of total expenditure.
Turning to the interrelationship between components of government expenditure, the
correlation matrix provides positive correlation coefficients for most pairs of components
of government expenditure suggesting evidence of complementary relationships. There is
however a substituting relationship between expenditures on social protection and pure pub-
lic goods, and education and defence since the correlation coefficient from the correlation
matrix is negative.
Notwithstanding the above, I acknowledge that there may be limitations in the use of
annual observations in a pooled fixed effects estimations with some variables following a
trend and some relatively time invariant. Further, it may be limiting to combine OECD and
developing countries in a single regression framework as separating them may be ideal.
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2.7 Appendix
Table A2.1: Summary statistics-expenditures
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total 2193 33.54826 11.8492 5.61727 65.18385
Current 2226 30.07577 12.80393 3.426025 63.844
Investment 2193 4.319748 3.590323 -7.03722 35.67666
Consumption 2408 14.34883 5.533754 2.203775 37.41827
Pure 1684 10.43029 6.480978 1.925588 190.5868
Merit 1684 9.099387 3.887769 0.3523194 17.74093
Economic services 1355 5.902248 2.954602 0.4357183 27.11101
Social Protection 1684 8.546338 7.085642 0 25.58009
Defence 1684 2.071825 4.192692 0 144.593
Health 1684 3.706636 2.3696 0 9.23027
Education 1684 4.42401 1.782599 0 10.75027
Wages and salaries 2422 8.752944 3.514294 0.4560935 18.54611
Goods and services 2415 5.614718 3.242625 0.649056 25.87346
Subsidies 2007 1.408237 1.409929 0 9.180821
Social benefits 1989 8.378565 7.361857 0 26.01253
Real GDP per capita 6243 13149.81 19618.06 4.397576 275265.7
Foreign aid 4499 56.13903 77.80095 -210.3844 816.6744
Population 6485 3.44e+07 1.26e+08 54670 1.39e+09
Population <15 6412 32.22467 10.87201 11.06062 51.88591
Population 65+ 6412 7.02884 4.808392 0.75047 27.04858
Urbanization 6488 54.03892 23.48938 4.339 100
Debt stock 3637 67.96761 80.80172 0.2385863 1380.766
Trade openness 5711 83.3097 54.00852 0.0209992 619
Inward FDI 5680 39.64183 102.7301 2.56e-07 1810.289
Outward FDI 3957 39.64183 102.7301 1.19e-07 889.84
Overall globalization 5803 52.93795 16.34103 18.26765 90.6673
Polity2 5524 2.316618 7.085919 -10 10
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Table A2.2: List of countries
Albania Czech Republic Jamaica Peru
Argentina Germany Jordan Poland
Armenia Denmark Japan Portugal
Australia Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Paraguay
Austria Spain Korea, Rep. Russian Federation
Azerbaijan Estonia Lesotho El Salvador
Belgium Finland Lithuania Serbia
Bulgaria France Luxembourg Slovak Republic
Bosnia and Herzegovina United Kingdom Latvia Slovenia
Belarus Georgia Morocco Sweden
Bolivia Greece Moldova Thailand
Brazil Honduras Mexico Tunisia
Canada Croatia Macedonia, FYR Turkey
Switzerland Hungary Malta Ukraine
Chile India Mongolia United States
Congo Rep. Ireland Mauritius South Africa
Colombia Iran, Islamic Rep. Malaysia
Cabo Verde Iceland Netherlands
Costa Rica Israel Norway
Cyprus Italy New Zealand




Spending: Evidence for the
‘Hyper-Globalisation’ of the 1990s and
2000s
In this paper, we provide an up-to-date empirical assessment of the relationship between
economic globalisation and government spending for the ‘hyper-globalisation’ period
of the 1990s and 2000s. We use data on government consumption spending as well as
more disaggregated spending components (e.g. social welfare). We also use a range
of globalisation measures, including the most recent version of the KOF globalisation
index, and a combination of econometric methods, including fixed effects, Generalised
Methods of Moments (GMM) and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimation.
The results suggest that hyper-globalisation has had divergent and conflicting effects on
consumption spending: while the globalisation of trade has tended to raise spending,
the globalisation of finance and foreign investment has tended to reduce it. However,
the size of the effects is quite small, and there is no evidence that spending has risen by
more in countries which are particularly prone to terms of trade shocks.
∗This paper is co-authored with Edward Anderson. I would like to thank participants of the internal seminar
at the University of East Anglia in general and Christa Brunnschweiler in specific for useful comments. All
remaining errors are my own.
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3.1 Introduction
The 1990s and 2000s were a period of ‘hyper-globalisation’ (Subramanian and Kessler
2013), marked by particularly rapid rises in international trade and capital flows.1. Ac-
cording to many observers, this had a number of benefits, not least much faster rates of
convergence across the developing world, particularly from the late 1990s onward (ibid; see
also Abiad et al 2015, Bourguignon 2015). Nonetheless, the failure to manage some of
the downsides of globalisation has, it is argued, contributed to a growing political backlash
against globalisation since the early 2000s (e.g. Rodrik 2018, Stiglitz 2018). This has in turn
threatened to undermine the benefits of globalisation, through a return to trade protectionism
and economic nationalism.
Changes in the level and composition of government spending are one key way in which
governments can manage the process of globalisation. According to the ‘compensation hy-
pothesis’ (Rodrik 1998, Garrett 1998), governments respond to globalisation by increasing
spending, either as a way of compensating the adversely affected (e.g. workers in import-
competing sectors), or, more generally, as a means of offsetting the volatility and insecurity
resulting from greater exposure to global markets. According to the ‘efficiency hypothesis’
however, globalisation also puts pressure on governments to reduce spending, due for ex-
ample to a reduction in tax revenues resulting from global competition to attract and retain
mobile capital (Garrett 1998, Gemmell et al 2008). These pressures, which arguably became
particularly acute during the 1990s and 2000s, due to higher levels of international capital
mobility, may have prevented governments from providing the compensation required to
make ‘hyper-globalisation’ politically sustainable. It is worth noting that this Chapter is an
extension of Chapter 2. Our choice of data source for consumption spending provides us
with both an increased number of countries and two additional years of data in our sample.
Some prima facie evidence in support of this view can be found in the fact that the rapid
rise in international trade and capital mobility during the 1990s and 2000s coincided with an
aggregate decline in government spending as a share of GDP (Garett 1998; see also Section
5 below). However, simple comparisons of aggregate trends should be treated with caution.
In this paper therefore we provide a detailed empirical assessment of the relationship be-
tween globalisation and government spending for the 1990s and 2000s. Two main questions
motivate our analysis, namely (i) whether there is any robust evidence of a negative rela-
tionship between measures of economic globalisation and government spending during the
1990s and 2000s, which could help explain the emerging political backlash against global-
isation since the early 2000s; and (ii) whether any evidence of a negative relationships is
stronger for measures of ‘financial globalisation’, reflecting the growing international mo-
bility of capital and finance, as opposed to measures of ‘trade globalisation’, reflecting the
international mobility of goods and services. We also explore the extent to which the size
or direction of this relationship varies across countries, e.g. between countries more or less
1The 1990s and 2000s have also been referred to as the period of ‘high globalisation’ (Milanovic 2016),
and ‘New Globalisation’ (Baldwin 2016: 79): roughly speaking, the period beginning with the fall of the
Berlin Wall and ending with the start of the global financial crisis. Further details on trends in trade and capital
flows in this period are provided in Section 5 below.
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exposed to external volatility, as implied by the compensation hypothesis. Although there is
now a substantial empirical literature on the globalisation-spending relationship, reviewed
further below, we are not aware of any studies focusing specifically on the 1990s and 2000s
that use a wide range of government spending and globalisation measures.
We use data on government final consumption expenditure for 1990-2014 from the latest
edition of the Penn World Tables (version 9.0), and data for a range of globalisation mea-
sures, including the most recent version of the KOF globalisation index (Gygli et al 2018),
as well as more commonly-used measures (e.g. trade openness, FDI stocks, capital account
liberalisation index). We also use the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database
to assemble a new dataset on government spending for 169 OECD and non-OECD countries
over the period 1990-2016, disaggregated by both economic and functional classifications of
expenditure. 2 This makes our study the first of which we are aware to study the relationship
between globalisation and detailed sub-categories of spending (e.g. social welfare) in the
2000s. In terms of econometric methods, we use a combination of fixed effects, Generalised
Method of Moments (GMM), and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS).
To give a flavour of the results, we find that the ‘hyper-globalisation’ of the 1990s and
2000s has had divergent and conflicting effects on government spending. While trade global-
isation has tended to raise consumption spending, consistent with the compensation hypoth-
esis, financial globalisation has tended to reduce it, consistent with the efficiency hypothesis.
Nevertheless, the size of these effects is quite small; furthermore, there is no evidence that
consumption spending has risen by more in countries which are particularly prone to ex-
ternal trade risk (as measured by the product concentration of exports) and which for that
reason need compensation most.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section is devoted to re-
viewing the most recent evidence on the relationship between globalisation and government
spending. We discuss methodology and data in sections 3 and 4 respectively. We then
provide some initial exploratory analysis in section 5, before turning to the main results
in section 6. Finally, we present some additional results and robustness tests in section 7,
before turning to conclusions and policy recommendations in section 8.
3.2 Literature Review
In a seminal contribution on the topic, Rodrik (1998) found strong evidence of a robust
positive relationship between openness to trade and government spending, which applied
to almost all categories of spending (the one exception being interest payments), and was
evident among both developed and developing countries. Other studies have found a mixed
picture however. Gemmell et al (2008) reviewed 19 studies published between 1995 and
2006, and found that the number finding a positive relationship between openness to trade
or capital flows and government spending was broadly balanced by a similar number of
2Our dataset is freely available for other researchers to use, and is available on request from the authors. We
have data for slightly more countries for the economic as opposed to functional classification of expenditure
(164 compared to 139; we have data for both classifications for 138 countries).
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studies finding a negative relationship (ibid: 156).3 In this section, we update the results
of Gemmell et al (2008), by briefly reviewing the results of 13 empirical studies published
since 2006.
Basic details about each study are contained in Table 3.1. In terms of the results, we find
a relatively mixed picture, similar to the findings of Gemmell et al (2008). Turning first to
consumption spending, three studies find a consistently positive and statistically significant
relationship with trade openness: Epifani and Gancia (2009), Ram (2009) and Shonchoy
(2016). However, Benarroch and Pandey (2008, 2012) find no evidence of a statistically
significant relationship, while Jetter and Parmeter (2015) find that the results vary depend-
ing on the data used: strong evidence of a positive relationship when using PWT 6.1 data,
but much less evidence when using PWT 7.1, and no evidence when using PWT 8.0 (if
anything, a negative relationship). In terms of the other globalisation measures, Kimakova
(2009) finds a positive relationship between consumption spending and private capital flows,
while Ashraf et al (2017) find a similar relationship with inward ‘greenfield’ FDI. However,
Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) find no evidence of a significant relationship between con-
sumption spending and the KOF index of economic globalisation (which includes openness
to trade and capital flows), although they do find a positive and statistically significant rela-
tionship for both social and political globalisation.
The results for other spending measures are also mixed. For total spending, Shelton
(2007) finds evidence of a positive relationship with trade openness, but Gemmell et al
(2008) and Benarroch and Pandey (2012) find no evidence of a relationship, while Liberati
(2007) finds a negative relationship with openness to trade and capital flows. Kim et al
(2018) find evidence of a positive relationship with the KOF ‘trade globalisation’ sub-index,
but a negative relationship with the financial, social and political sub-indices. When disag-
gregating spending, Epifani and Gancia (2009) find no consistent evidence of a relationship
between trade openness and social security and welfare spending. Benarroch and Pandey
(2012) find evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and education, de-
fence and housing spending among LICs, while Shelton (2007) finds some evidence of a
positive relationship between trade openness and education, defence and transport spending.
For all other categories of spending however, these studies find no evidence of a significant
relationship with trade openness 4. Gemmell et al (2008) also find very little evidence of
a relationship between trade openness and disaggregated government spending. However,
they do find evidence that the stock of inward FDI significantly increases social welfare,
health and general public spending, while it significantly reduces spending on transport,
housing, education and economic services.
Finally, there are again mixed results as to whether the positive relationship between
trade openness and government spending is stronger among countries which are more ex-
posed to external risk, as implied by the compensation hypothesis. Rodrik (1998) found
positive and statistically significant interaction terms between trade openness and two mea-
3All of the studies reviewed by Gemmell et al (2008) use data up to the late 1990s at the latest.
4Shelton (2007) also disaggregates spending according to the IMF economic classification, and finds some
evidence that trade openness increases spending on social transfers, most strongly for OECD countries.
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sures of external risk: the terms of trade volatility and the product concentration of exports.
Benarroch and Pandey (2008) also found a positive and significant interaction term between
trade openness and terms of trade volatility. However, Epifani and Gancia (2009) find that
interaction terms between trade openness and measures of external risk are typically in-
significant or negative, contrary to the compensation hypothesis 5.
To summarise, there remains a wide range of empirical results in the literature, with
as yet no apparent consensus. Similar to Gemmell et al (2008), we find that the number
of studies finding a positive relationship between measures of globalisation and govern-
ment spending is roughly balanced by the number of studies not finding a relationship. It
is worth noting, however, that there is very little evidence specifically examining the hyper-
globalisation period of the 1990s and 2000s, when international trade and capital flows grew
particularly rapidly (see below). The one exception is Meinhard and Potrafke (2012), who
test whether the relationship between KOF globalisation indices and consumption spending
differs between the periods 1970-89 and 1990-2004. However, these authors do not distin-
guish between the trade and financial components of the KOF economic globalisation index,
which were found by Kim et al (2018) to have quite different effects. This paper therefore
adds to the existing evidence by focusing specifically on the 1990s and 2000s, while at the
same time disaggregating between the trade and financial components of economic globali-
sation.
Table 3.1 Literature review: cross-country econometric published since 2006.
Notes: All spending and globalisation measures are expressed as a share of GDP; we do not include studies
looking at the composition of government spending (e.g. Dreher et al 2008). * + indicates a positive and
statistically significant relationship, - a negative and statistically significant relationship; 0 indicates no
statistically significant relationship; / implies that results vary.
5Epifani and Gancia (2009) instead find that the relationship is stronger among countries which export
relatively more differentiated goods, which, they argue, reduces the domestic cost of taxation.
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3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Panel Fixed Effect Model Specification
We examine the relationship between globalisation and government spending using the fol-
lowing basic equation as a starting point:
Expenditureit = α + βGlobit + ρXit + γY eart + µi + εit (3.1)
whereExpenditure is a vector of government spending variables, i and t represent coun-
try and year respectively. We estimate this model using annual data, although we also repeat
the estimations using 5-year averages as a robustness test. Glob refers to a vector of global-
ization variables, and X represents control variables. Year dummy, country dummy and the
error term are given as Y ear, µ and ε respectively. A positive and statistically significant
coefficient on the globalization indices implies evidence of the compensation hypothesis
while a negative and statistically significant coefficient suggests evidence of the efficiency
hypothesis. For the main results, all variables are measured in the natural logarithm form,
with the exception of the KOF globalisation indices (see below).
We make use of three empirical methods: two-way fixed effects, panel dynamic ordi-
nary least squares (DOLS), and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The two-way
fixed effects model helps account for possible biases due to omitted country-specific and
time-invariant factors. There are however three main challenges with the typical two-way
fixed effects estimator in our case, namely: (i) cross-sectional dependence, (ii) persistence
in the dependent variable, and (iii) contemporaneous endogeneity. Cross-sectional depen-
dence is possible in any panel data as panel groups (countries in our case) are independent,
heterogeneous, and susceptible to shocks from each other. We account for cross-sectional
dependence by using two-way fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
(DK-SE, see Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) 6. DK-SEs are heteroscedasticity consistent and
robust to general forms of temporal and cross-sectional dependence, and especially rele-
vant in our case with smaller time dimension. Further, government spending is likely to be
persistent: (a) current levels of spending are likely to be dependent on previous levels of
spending, (b) a government spending item (e.g. spending on infrastructure) may be spread
over more than one period. To account for such persistence in the dependent variables,
we make use of dynamic estimation methods that include the lag of the dependent variable
as an explanatory term, namely the panel dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) and the
system-GMM estimation approaches. 7 Lastly, equation (1) assumes that globalisation is
6Using the typical two-way fixed effect estimator, we find evidence of cross-sectional dependence using
the Pesaran LM tests (Pesaran, 2004).
7We use the Kao and Chiang (2000) Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) for cointegrated panel data
with homogeneous long-run covariance structure across cross-sectional units (STATA command xtdolshm). It
is appropriate for panels with cointegrated I(1) variables. We note that the popular Pedroni (2001) estimator
is not appropriate in our case as our explanatory variables exceed 7. The linear dynamic panel-data estimation
using maximum likelihood and structural equation modelling approach is inappropriate in our case as T > 10
(see Williams et al., 2018). In particular, we note that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is
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exogenous. However, we are aware of the possible existence of contemporaneous endogene-
ity for globalization and address this using a GMM estimator with the lags of the variables
as instruments (see also Liberati, 2007; and Kimakova, 2009).
We note the following about our econometric approaches. First, we examine the station-
arity properties of our panel dataset in order to avoid obtaining spurious regressions. We
use the Fisher ADF and the Fisher PP unit root tests. The Fisher-type tests are appropriate
in our case as they do not require strongly balanced data and allow the individual series to
have gaps. The unit root test results (Table A3.5) suggest that all variables are integrated
of order one. Second, we test for cointegration using the Kao (1999) cointegration test
technique, which assumes a homogenous cointegrating vector across all panels. There is
evidence of a valid cointegration relationship in all cases as shown by the test statistics (see
Table A3.4). Third, for the system-GMM, we adopt three specification tests to determine
the validity of the instruments used, as invalid instruments render the system-GMM estima-
tor inconsistent. In particular, we test for over-identification using the Hansen test and the
difference-in-Hansen test, which determine whether the full set of instruments used, and the
additional instruments used in the levels equations are valid. For both over-identification
tests, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no over-identification. The third test of validity
is the Arellano-Bond AR(2) test for serial correlation which examines second-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced error term, with a null of the absence of second-order
serial correlation. Here also, the results for the three specification tests considered fail to
reject the null hypothesis in all cases, implying the instruments used are appropriate and
valid, the model is correctly specified, the errors do not follow a moving average process,
and the regression results obtained are consistent, reliable and valid. Finally, to avoid instru-
ments proliferation in the system-GMM estimation, we limit our lags to one (1), ensuring
that our instruments are less than the number of countries in our panel (see Roodman, 2009a;
Roodman 2009b; and Benarroch and Pandey, 2012).
3.4 Data
In this section, we describe the variables used in the analysis and sources of data. A full list
of all variables and definitions, together with the descriptive statistics for each variable, and
the correlation matrix, is provided in the Appendix (Tables A3.1-A3.3). In particular, Table
A3.2 provides detailed description of how the variables are measured and the data sources.
3.4.1 Government spending
The compensation hypothesis suggests that the relationship between globalisation and gov-
ernment spending should be strongest for spending in two areas: consumption spending and
(particularly in OECD countries) social welfare spending.8 We concentrate on consumption
statistically significant in all cases across different estimations, confirming our argument of persistence in the
dependent variable.
8That is,“If government spending played a risk-mitigating role, we would expect to see this primarily re-
flected in income transfer programs and in social security and welfare spending. In most developing countries,
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spending in our main results (Section 5); we then consider social welfare spending, along-
side other disaggregated measures of spending in our additional results (Section 6). We
proxy consumption spending by the Penn World Table (PWT) government final consump-
tion expenditure measure given its advantage over other measures (see Rodrik, 1998; pp.
1001). With regard to the social welfare spending data, we use and report the results for
the IMF ECOG classification (‘social benefits’)9. All spending variables are measured as
share of GDP. The PWT data is available for a larger number of countries compared with
the IMF and World Bank data. The PWT has reduced biases with respect to cross-country
differences in the relative price of government purchases. A weakness with the PWT dataset
however seems to be that same variables may differ significantly across versions of the Penn
World Tables with changes in the benchmarked prices (see Breton 2012; Johnson et al.,
2013; and Jetter and Parmeter, 2015). Moreover, while PWT only includes data for con-
sumption spending, the IMF and World Bank datasets provide us with more disaggregated
measures of government spending.
Moreover, given that globalisation may generate pressures for governments to spend
more in certain areas, (e.g.“productive investment”: infrastructure etc. to attract mobile cap-
ital; see Gemmell, et al. 2008), we consider other categories of spending. We follow Oxley
and Martin (1991) and categorise spending into pure public goods (general public services
plus defence plus public order and safety spending), merit goods (housing and community
amenities plus health plus education spending), as well as economic services (economic
affairs plus environment protection plus recreation, culture and religion spending).
3.4.2 Globalisation
We use a range of measures to capture the different aspects of a country’s openness that may
affect government spending. The first is the KOF Globalisation Index.10 This is a composite
index, which spans three different dimensions of globalisation (economic, social, and politi-
cal). We focus on the sub-indices for ‘trade globalisation’ and ‘financial globalisation’ (sub-
categories of the economic dimension), which are designed to measure countries’ openness
to international trade and capital flows respectively. According to the compensation hypoth-
esis, greater exposure to international trade implies higher external exposure to external risk
and volatility, which in turn generates demands for higher spending. By contrast, greater
exposure to international capital flows implies greater pressure on governments to reduce
spending, due to lower tax revenues (as suggested by the efficiency hypothesis). Since the-
ory suggests that they may have different effects on spending, we include them separately
income transfer schemes tend to be rudimentary for reasons of administrative capacity. Consequently, their
governments tend to rely on public employment, in-kind transfers, and public-works programs— all of which
show up in government consumption—in order to broaden safety nets. But in advanced countries with social
welfare programs in place, it should be primarily spending on social security and welfare that is correlated
with exposure to external risk, not government consumption.” (Rodrik 1998: 1019).
9This measure of social welfare spending is highly correlated with the alternative IMF COFOG classi-
fication (‘social protection’); the correlation coefficient is 0.957 in the full sample. Hence, their regression
estimates tend to show qualitatively similar results; we report in the text any substantive differences.
10The original KOF index was produced by Dreher (2006). The latest version is Gygli et al (2018); this
includes data for over 200 countries between 1970 and 2015.
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in our regressions. They are also not that highly correlated: the correlation coefficient is
approximately 0.68 in the full sample.
There are fewer grounds in theory for expecting that the other dimensions of globali-
sation included in the KOF index will affect spending; nonetheless, we still include these
as control variables (see Section 4.3 below). We also test separately for the effects of the
‘de-facto’ trade and financial globalisation indices, which reflect actual flows of goods and
services or capital that cross national borders, and ‘de-jure’ indices, which reflect the extent
of government policies that, in principle, either restrict or enable these flows. These are
again not that highly correlated: the correlation coefficient is just 0.29 between the de facto
and de-jure trade globalisation indices, and 0.44 between the de facto and de jure financial
globalisation indices (Appendix Table A3.3). We also use three separate indicators of eco-
nomic globalisation widely used in the literature, namely the ratio of trade to GDP (‘trade
openness’), from the PWT, the ratio of inward and outward stocks of FDI to GDP (from
UNCTAD), and the Chinn-Ito index of capital account liberalisation (Chinn & Ito 2006).
3.4.3 Controls
Baseline controls
We refer to the control variables in our main results as our baseline controls. These are real
GDP per capita, dependency ratio, urbanization, total population, as well as price ratio.
The Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0) provides data on expenditure-side real GDP at chained
PPPs and price ratio. We therefore obtain real GDP per capita by dividing the PWT real
GDP measure by total population from PWT (for consistency), as in Gemmell et al. (2008)
and Benarroch and Pandey (2012). Following Musgrave’s (1969) interpretation of Wag-
ner’s Law (Wagner, 1893), increases in the levels of GDP per capita are expected to lead
to increases in government expenditure as a share of GDP, hence, we expect a positive re-
lationship between real GDP per capita and government consumption spending as a share
of GDP. Price ratio from PWT is the ratio of the price level of government consumption
to the price level of household consumption. It is a measure of the relative public sector
and private sector prices, and an appropriate control for changes in relative prices over time
(Gemmell et al. 1999). However, its effect on spending may be positive or negative.
Data on dependency, urbanization, and total population are obtained from the World
Bank, World Development Indicators dataset (WDI, 2018). We follow similar studies and
use these variables as controls 11. We measure dependency as the sum of the population in
the ages 0-14 years and the population in the ages 65+ as a percentage of the total popula-
tion. An increase in dependency ratio will likely be associated with an increase in demand
for higher government consumption spending (since dependents are usually economically
inactive and are likely to be reliant on government consumption spending). Hence, we
expect a positive relationship between consumption spending and dependency ratio. We
measure urbanization as the urban population as a percentage of total population. We expect
11Dependency- Rodrik (1998) and Benarroch and Pandey (2008); urbanisation- Rodrik (1998) and Benar-
roch and Pandey (2012); and total population- Shelton (2007).
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government spending on consumption to increase with an increase in urbanization. The ar-
gument here is simple: an increase in urbanization may create congestion, which is likely
to lead to a reduction in the welfare of the citizenry. Such welfare loss may need to be
compensated for by increased government spending. Notwithstanding, additional spending
on non-rival public goods such as roads and street lighting may decrease with increasing ur-
banization due to economies of scale. With regard to total population, Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998) indicate that countries with large population are associated with small government
consumption spending as a share of GDP for varying reasons. First, the per capita cost of
providing non-rival goods is lower for larger populations (larger economies of scale,see Ro-
drik, 1998; and Jetter and Parmeter, 2015). In addition, preferences over the provision of
public goods are more heterogeneous in larger populations. The net effect therefore depends
on the trade-off between the costs associated with greater heterogeneity in preferences and
the benefits due to lower per capita cost in public goods provision, although the latter may
outweigh the former (see Shelton, 2007). Hence, total population may have a positive or
negative effect on spending (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; and Rodrik, 1998).
Additional controls
Our robustness test includes introducing additional controls in equation (1) to check if the
estimates of the globalisation variables remain consistent in the sign and direction of their
effects. These additional controls are in two forms: (a) two measures of potential sources
of additional revenue for governments (i.e. external debt stock and foreign aid), and (ii) a
measure of institutional quality (polity2).
We obtain data on external debt stock and foreign aid receipts from WDI (2018). Exter-
nal debt stock is external debt stock as a percentage of gross national income, and foreign
aid is the net official development assistance (ODA) receipts as a percentage of gross na-
tional income (GNI).The idea is that, in the face of limited resources, governments may find
external debt (true for both developed and developing countries) and foreign aid (especially
true for developing countries) appropriate sources of external inflows to augment domes-
tic revenue shortfalls to finance government activities. Hence, government consumption
spending may increase with increases in both external debt stock and foreign aid inflows.
However, in the case of foreign aid, while flypaper effects argue that increases in foreign aid
receipts lead to more than proportionate increases in consumption spending, aid fungibility
arguments suggest increases in foreign aid receipts will be associated with less that propor-
tionate increases in spending, or rather a redistribution of spending. Rodrik (1998) controls
for external debt stock while Shonchoy (2016) controls for foreign aid receipts.
We adopt the Polity2 index from the PolityIV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2014) as a
measure of political regime strength. Although other studies generate democracy and autoc-
racy measures from this index (see Shonchoy, 2016), we consider the distinction between
democracy and autocracy less relevant in our case since most of the countries in our sam-
ple were democratic in the period of our study. We examine the influence of the existing
political regime strength on government spending. The argument here is that, government
spending is likely to vary over a spectrum of political regime strength. Polity2 provides
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a political regime strength spectrum that ranges from hereditary monarchy to consolidated
democracy.
Interaction terms
To examine whether there is any evidence that the size or direction of the relationship be-
tween globalization and spending varies between advanced countries (OECD countries here)
and developing countries (non-OECD countries here), we introduce an interaction term be-
tween the globalization variables and a dummy variable for OECD. We consider OECD
countries that existed at the start of the period (i.e. OECD countries in 1990). Our interac-
tion term is similar to Shelton (2007).
We test whether the size or direction of the effect of globalization varies between coun-
tries more exposed to external risks. We measure a country’s external risk by an interaction
between the globalization variable and the export concentration index. The export concen-
tration (or diversification) index is from the WITS Trade Data. For the missing years, we
complement the data by its related measure from the UNCTAD, the concentration index or
Hirschman (H) index. It is a measure of the extent to which a country’s exports are concen-
trated (based on a single or few goods) or diversified (based on a lot more goods). It gives
an indication as to whether a large share of a country’s exports is accounted for by a small
number of commodities or vice versa. The index ranges between zero for a country with no
exports to 1 for a country with a single export commodity. Therefore, the lower the index,
the less concentrated (hence more diversified) are a country’s exports. Countries that export
only a few commodities are more exposed to external risk – in particular, to changes in the
prices of those commodities on world markets – than countries which export a wide range
of commodities. Hence, countries with lower export concentration index face lower external
risk while countries with high concentration index face higher levels of external risk.
3.4.4 Sample sizes
Due to missing observations for some of our control variables, the sample used for main
estimations is between 101 and 169 countries, covering the period 1990-2017. There are
up to 25 OECD countries and 144 non-OECD countries. We consider OECD countries at
the start of 1990. The sample therefore includes both developed and developing countries.
Our estimations exclude observations for which population is less than 500,000 people,
trade openness values exceeding 500 percent of GDP, negative trade openness values, FDI
stocks exceeding 1000 percent of GDP, as well as observations with negative government
expenditure values. The advantage of such exclusions is to ensure outliers do not drive our
results.
3.5 Exploratory analysis
Prior to the formal econometric analysis we carry out some exploratory analysis of the
data. We first discuss aggregate trends in globalisation and government spending over time;
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we then look at trends at the country level, using simple bivariate correlations to establish
whether there is any prima facie evidence of the compensation or efficiency hypothesis dur-
ing the 1990s and 2000s.
Figure 3.1 shows trends in a range of measures of economic globalisation since 1970. We
plot the (unweighted) mean value of each measure over time, for a constant sample of coun-
tries. The evidence confirms that the 1990s and 2000s were indeed marked by particularly
rapid rises in international trade and capital mobility. The KOF trade globalisation indices
(both de facto and de jure) rose gradually during the 1970s and 1980s and then accelerated
in the early to mid-1990s, reaching a peak around the time of the global financial crisis in
2008. Similar patterns are observed in the trade openness measure, and in the Chinn-Ito
index of capital mobility, which both rose rapidly during the 1990s, again reaching a peak
in the late 2000s. The one exception is the KOF indices of financial globalisation, which
show either a relatively constant increase until the early 2000s before slowing down in the
mid-2000s (de facto), or no trend at all (de jure). However, if we disaggregate these indices
between OECD and non-OECD countries, we do see a clear acceleration of financial glob-
alisation in the 1990s for non-OECD countries; among OECD countries, the acceleration
began slightly earlier, in the 1980s, and reached a peak by the mid-1990s 12.
Figure 3.2 shows trends in government spending since 1970. Here we plot the annual
(unweighted) mean value of government consumption spending as a share of GDP, taken
from two different sources (the PWT and the WDI), for a constant sample of countries in
each case. Here, the overall pattern is almost the reverse of Figure 3.1: spending rises as a
share of GDP during the 1970s and early 1980s, before falling substantially during the late
1980s and 1990s, and then stabilising and recovering slightly during the 2000s. Note that
the WDI measure of spending appears to start rising slightly earlier than the PWT measure,
although the magnitude of changes over the period is smaller than for the PWT measure. If
we disaggregate between OECD and non-OECD countries, the trends are very similar in the
1970s and 1980s, but spending stabilised and began rising again from the late 1990s among
OECD countries, as opposed to the mid to late 2000s among non-OECD countries 13.
12For the KOF trade globalisation indices and trade openness, the acceleration in the 1990s also mainly
reflects trends in non-OECD countries; among OECD countries, the rise is more constant over time, with
some evidence of an acceleration only in the 2000s.
13Note that we were unable to produce a similar graph using the IMF spending data, since these data are
more patchy: there are relatively few countries which provide a complete set of observations over the whole
period.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in economic globalisation, 1970-2016
Source: PWT, KOF, WDI. The sample of countries in each graph is constant over time: 24 OECD and 127
non-OECD countries for the PWT, 24 OECD countries and 97 non-OECD countries for the KOF indices, 21
OECD countries and 71 non-OECD countries for the Chinn-Ito index, and 24 OECD and 93 non-OECD
countries for the WDI data.
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Figure 3.2: Trends in government consumption spending, 1970-2016
Source: PWT, WDI. The sample of countries in each case is constant over time: 24 OECD and 127
non-OECD countries for the PWT, and 24 OECD countries and 83 non-OECD countries for the WDI. WDI
data for the 1970s are only available for a much smaller number of countries.
Overall therefore, the evidence in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 might be considered to support the
‘efficiency hypothesis’, in that the rapid rise in international trade and capital mobility dur-
ing the 1990s and 2000s coincided with an aggregate decline in government consumption
spending as a share of GDP 14. Of course, various other factors might account for the trends
shown in Figure 3.2. Furthermore, there is substantial variation across countries. For exam-
ple, while the mean rise in the PWT trade openness measure between 1990 and 2008 was 27
percentage points, it rose by less than 10 percentage points in one quarter of countries, and
in fact fell in 10 percent of countries. The interesting question therefore is whether countries
experiencing larger increases in trade or financial openness during the period experienced
different trends in government spending.
Some initial evidence on this question is shown in Figure 3.3. Here we plot, for as many
countries as possible, the change in each measure of economic globalisation between 1990
and 2008 against the change in government consumption spending as a share of GDP over
the same period (from the PWT). The results show no evidence of a significant correlation
between changes in government spending and changes in either trade or financial openness,
positive or negative 15. We also tried re-running the scatter plots shown in Figure 3.3 using
14Garett (1998:18) makes a similar point, comparing trends in international trade, capital mobility and
government spending in the decade before and after 1985: “spending growth slowed down at precisely the
point when market integration took off”.
15We acknowledge that the estimation results in Table 3.2 however show statistically significant effects of
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other measures of spending: consumption spending from the WDI, and social spending from
the IMF. We also tried plotting the change in globalisation between 1990 and 1999 against
the subsequent change in government spending between 2000 and 2008, thereby allowing
for possible lag effects. In each case however, there were again no significant correlations.
Overall, the results could therefore be taken to suggest that neither the efficiency nor the
compensation hypothesis was significant over this period; trends in government spending
were instead driven by other factors. However, these results must be treated with caution,
since they fail to control for other possible influences on spending. In the next section
therefore we extend the analysis to more powerful multivariate analysis.
Figure 3.3: Simple correlations between changes in globalisation and changes in govern-
ment consumption spending, 1990-2008
Source: PWT, KOF, Chinn-Ito. The vertical axis in each plot shows the change in government consumption
spending as a share of GDP, taken from the PWT database. The number of countries included in each plot
varies from 134 to 158. None of the correlations are statistically significant at conventional levels.
3.6 Main Results
In this section we look at the effect of globalization on government consumption spending,
using the PWT dataset (version 9.0). The results are shown in Table 3.2. We sub-categorize
the results for the de facto globalization measures, the de jure globalization measures, and
the other indicators of economic globalization referred to earlier.
Turning first to the economic globalisation variables, the de jure trade globalisation in-
trade and financial openness on government spending in some cases.
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dex has a positive and statistically significant effect on consumption spending according to
all three estimation methods (columns 2, 5 and 8). The de facto trade globalisation index
also has a positive and statistically significant effect for the DOLS estimates (column 4),
although not for FE or GMM (columns 1 and 7). By contrast, both the de facto and de jure
financial globalisation indices have a negative and statistically significant effect on spending
for the DOLS and GMM estimates (columns 4-5, 7-8), although not for the FE estimates,
where the relationships are not significant (columns 1-2). The other measures of economic
globalisation support these results to some extent, in that the Chinn-Ito index and inward
stocks of FDI both have a negative and statistically significant effect on spending, at least
according to the DOLS and GMM estimates (columns 6 and 9) 16. However, trade openness
does not have a statistically significant effect on consumption spending, according to all
three sets of estimates (columns 3, 6 and 9).
Thus, despite some differences across econometric methods and across measures of eco-
nomic globalisation, the results in Table 3.2 provide evidence that increased openness to
trade during the 1990s and 2000s increased government consumption spending, while in-
creased openness to capital and financial flows reduced it. This supports the results of Kim
et al (2018), who found a similar pattern for their sample of 53 countries between 1980
and 2011. Table 3.2 also shows that the evidence is stronger when using DOLS and GMM
rather than standard FE; for trade, the evidence is also stronger for the ‘policy’ measures of
openness (i.e., the de jure KOF index) as opposed to the ‘outcome’ measures (i.e., the de
facto KOF index, and the trade-GDP ratio) 17.
How large are the effects? For trade globalisation, the results suggest that a one standard
deviation increase in the de jure KOF index would increase spending by between 2.5 and
10 per cent (the DOLS estimates show the largest effect, followed by the FE and GMM).
For financial globalisation, a one standard deviation increase in the de jure KOF index would
reduce spending by between 2.5 and 15 per cent; a one standard deviation increase in inward
FDI or the Chinn-Ito index would reduce spending by between 1.7 and 8.6 per cent (the
DOLS estimates again showing a larger effect than GMM). It is worth stating the marginal
effects of the globalization indices on government spending. On the average a 10-point
increase in the de jure trade globalization index is associated with between 5 and 22 per cent
increase in government spending. On the other hand, on the average a 10-point increase
in de jure KOF financial globalization index is associated with between 4 and 28 per cent
increase in government spending. In the case of the Chinn-Ito index, its marginal effect is
that a 10-point increase in the index is associated with between 1 and 2 per cent reduction
in government spending. These amounts are clearly not trivial, although they might easily
be swamped by other influences on spending, especially in non-OECD countries where the
median absolute deviation in government consumption spending is just under 6 per cent per
16Note that FDI stocks are one component of the KOF de facto KOF financial globalisation index, while the
Chinn-Ito index is one component of the de jure index.
17It is perhaps surprising that trade openness measure has no statistically significant impact on spending,
given that it is a component of the de facto trade globalisation index, which does have a statistically significant
impact (at least, according to the DOLS estimates). One possible explanation is differences in samples. How-
ever, when we re-estimate the regression in column 6, this time excluding the financial globalisation variables
(as a way of increasing sample size), trade openness is again not statistically significant.
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year.
The results for the control variables in Table 3.2 are somewhat mixed, depending mainly
on the estimation method. GDP per capita has a negative effect and statistically signifi-
cant effect on consumption spending according to the FE and GMM results, which directly
refutes Wagner’s Law, but is not significant according to the DOLS results. As expected,
dependency ratios and urbanisation rates both have a positive and statistically significant ef-
fect on spending according to the FE results, but the results are not significant for the GMM
results nor for DOLS in the case of urbanisation. Similarly, population has a negative effect
on spending for the FE results, supporting the results of Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), but
the effect is not statistically significant for the DOLS or GMM results. Only two control
variables are consistently statistically significant across all regressions: first, the price ratio
of government consumption to household consumption, which has a negative effect, and the
KOF social globalisation index, which has a positive effect. The former result is consistent
with Gemmell et al (2008), while the latter is consistent with Meinhard and Potrafke (2012).
We now turn to the results for the interaction terms, designed to test for possible dif-
ferences across countries in the relationship between economic globalisation and spending.
We re-estimated each of the regressions in Table 3.1, including interaction terms for each
measure of economic globalisation, first with a dummy variable for OECD countries, and
then with a measure of export concentration, an indicator of exposure to external shocks.
The results are summarised in Table 3.3. Turning first to the results for the OECD inter-
action term, there is some evidence from the FE results that the de jure trade globalisation
index and trade openness have a stronger (more positive) effect on consumption spending in
OECD as opposed to non-OECD countries, while the de jure financial globalisation index
more negative effect. However, the DOLS and GMM results show no significant differ-
ences in the effect of either trade or financial globalisation between OECD and non-OECD
countries, which casts doubt on the robustness of the FE results. For export concentration,
the DOLS and GMM results show that the effects of the de jure trade index and the trade
openness measure have in fact been more negative in countries with higher export concen-
tration, which directly contradicts the compensation hypothesis (since export concentration
is a proxy for external risk).
In summary therefore, the results in this section suggest that the ‘hyper-globalisation’
of the 1990s and 2000s has had divergent and conflicting effects on government spending.
While there is evidence that trade globalisation has raised spending, consistent with the com-
pensation hypothesis, financial globalisation appears to have reduced it, consistent with the
efficiency hypothesis. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that the size of these effects is
quite small, with one standard deviation changes in the globalisation measures being associ-
ated with changes in consumption spending of up to 10 percent, which is not a large amount
given the relatively large amount of variation in levels of spending over time, particularly
in non-OECD countries. In addition, there is no evidence that consumption spending has
risen by more in countries which are particularly prone to external trade risk (as measured


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This section contains the results for our robustness tests (Section 6.1), and the other expen-
diture measures (Section 6.2). We present the summary of results for our robustness tests
in Table 3.4 and the summary of results for the other measures of spending in Table 3.5.
The ‘main’ column in each case refers to the corresponding fixed effects, DOLS, and GMM
results in Table 3.1.
3.7.1 Robustness tests
Turning to our robustness tests, we estimate results for 5-year averages, additional controls
and for a sub-sample of OECD countries, and non-OECD countries. We estimate robust-
ness results with two-way fixed effect with DK-SE, panel DOLS, and GMM (except 5-year
averages) and compare them with their corresponding main results in Table 3.1.
We begin with the fixed effects results in Part A of Table 3.4. The results for the two-way
fixed effect with DK-SEs are robust to varying specifications and across different country
groupings. However, unlike the main annual results however, we find a positive relationship
between outward FDI stock and consumption spending in OECD countries, and a positive
and statistically significant effect of the Chinn-Ito index on consumption spending in non-
OECD countries.
We turn to the DOLS results in Part B of Table 3.4. Relative to the ‘main’ results, we find
a positive and statistically significant relationship between the de facto financial globalisa-
tion and consumption spending in the results for Controls 2. There is a positive (in all cases)
and statistically significant relationship (except for Controls 2) between the de jure trade
globalisation and consumption spending. Trade openness is negatively and significantly as-
sociated with consumption spending in the Controls 2 results. Contrary to the main DOLS
results, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between outward FDI
stock and consumption spending for OECD countries, and a negative and statistically sig-
nificant relationship between outward FDI stock and consumption spending in non-OECD
countries. The OECD results show a positive relationship between the Chinn-Ito index and
consumption spending. In sum, the DOLS results is generally robust and consistent in most
cases, to the introduction of additional controls and to sub-sampling into country groupings.
The GMM results are in Part C of Table 3.4. The GMM results are robust and consistent
for non-OECD countries and to additional controls but differs for OECD countries. In par-
ticular, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the de facto trade
globalisation index and consumption spending in OECD countries. The de facto financial
globalisation index, the de jure financial globalisation index, and the Chinn-Ito index are
positively and significantly associated with consumption spending in OECD countries. We
find no statistically significant relationship between all other measures of globalisation and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.7.2 Other expenditure measures
We show the summary of results for other expenditure measures in Table 3.5. As noted ear-
lier, in addition to our social welfare measures (i.e. IMF COFOG social protection and IMF
ECOG social benefits spending measures, SW COFOG and SW ECOG respectively), we
follow Oxley and Martin (1991) and Saunders (1993) to categorise IMF functional classifi-
cation of spending into pure public goods, merit goods, and economic services. We estimate
the results using fixed effects with DK-SEs 18.
We begin with the results for pure public goods. We find that the de facto trade globali-
sation index, the de facto financial globalisation index, the de jure trade globalisation index,
and inward FDI stock are positively and significantly associated with government spending
on pure public goods. There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between
the de jure financial globalisation index and government spending on pure public goods.
There is however no statistically significant relationship between trade openness, outward
FDI stock and the Chinn-Ito index, and pure public goods.
Turning to merit goods, the de facto trade globalisation index and FDI stocks have a
negative and statistically significant link with government spending on merit goods. Trade
openness has a positive and statistically significant relation with government spending on
merit goods. There is no statistically significant relationship between all other measures of
globalisation and government spending on merit goods.
Table 3.4: Summary of results for other expenditure measures-fixed effects with DK-SEs
Globalisation variable Pure Merit Services SW COFOG SW ECOG
KOFTrGIdf + - No No No
KOFFiGIdf + No - + No
KOFTrGIdj + No + - No
KOFFiGIdj - No - + No
TO No + No - -
FDIi + - - No -
FDIo No - - No No
Chinn− Ito No No No + +
Note: Summary of results for the globalization variables. Here, + (-) (No) refer to positive effect, negative
effect, and no effect respectively. In the SW COFOG estimation, the functional form used (which gives the best
results) has the dependent variable measured as share of GDP, dependency ratio as share of total population,
urbanization as share of total population, trade openness as share of GDP, while all other variables are in
natural logarithm form except the indices.
Turning to economic services, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship
between the de facto financial globalisation index, the de jure financial globalisation index,
inward FDI stock, and outward FDI stock and government spending on economic services.
The de jure trade globalisation index is however positively and significantly associated with
18In the DOLS results, the number of countries reduces significantly. The GMM estimation results fail the
AR(2) test in most cases.
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government spending on social services. There is no statistically significant relationship
between the de facto trade globalisation index, trade openness, and Chinn-Ito index and
government spending on economic services.
From column 5 of Table 3.4, there is no statistically significant relationship between the
de facto trade globalisation index, inward FDI stock, and outward FDI stock and COFOG
social welfare spending. The de facto financial globalisation index, the de jure financial
globalisation index, and the Chinn-Ito index are positively and significantly associated with
COFOG social welfare spending. The de jure trade globalisation index and trade openness
are however negatively and significantly associated with COFOG social welfare spending.
Finally, we turn to ECOG social welfare spending. There is a negative and statistically
significant relationship between trade openness and ECOG social welfare spending. The
Chinn-Ito index is positively and significantly associated with ECOG social welfare spend-
ing. No statistically significant relationship exists between other measures of globalisation
and ECOG social welfare spending.
In sum, the effects of the globalisation variables here largely depend on the type of
government spending under consideration. What is obvious is that there is more evidence
for compensation for pure public goods and social welfare spending, while evidence of
efficiency occurs more for economic services spending. For government spending on merit
goods however, governments may either opt to compensate for increases in outcomes of
trade (trade openness) by increasing spending on merit goods, or reduce spending on merit
goods with increases in the policy measures of trade (de jure trade globalisation index).
With respect to similar literature, our findings for inward FDI stock are qualitatively similar
to those of Gemmell et al. (2008) in all cases except that for SW COFOG.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an up-to-date empirical assessment of the relationship between
economic globalisation and government spending for the ‘hyper-globalisation’ period of the
1990s and 2000s. We use the most recent available data on government consumption spend-
ing from the Penn World Tables, and more disaggregated spending measures from the IMF
Government Financial Statistics. We also use the most recent version of the KOF globalisa-
tion index (Gygli et al, 2018), alongside a range of more commonly-used globalisation mea-
sures. Our study is to our knowledge the first to focus specifically on the hyper-globalisation
period, while at the same time testing for effects of globalisation on disaggregated as well as
aggregate government spending, and disaggregating between the trade and financial compo-
nents of economic globalisation.
Our main finding is that the ‘hyper-globalisation’ of the 1990s and 2000s has had diver-
gent and conflicting effects on government spending. While trade globalisation has tended
to raise consumption spending, financial globalisation has tended to reduce it. The former
is consistent with the ‘compensation hypothesis’, according to which governments respond
to globalisation by increasing spending, as a means of offsetting the volatility and insecurity
resulting from greater exposure to global markets. The latter, by contrast, is consistent with
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the ‘efficiency hypothesis’, whereby globalisation also puts pressure on governments to re-
duce spending, due for example to pressures on tax revenues resulting from the increasing
mobility of capital. Thus, rather than choosing between these two hypotheses, our results
provide support for both – once we disaggregate between the trade and financial dimensions
of economic globalisation.
A number of caveats and qualifications must be noted. First, the size of these effects
is quite small, with one standard deviation changes in the globalisation measures being as-
sociated with changes in consumption spending of up to 10 percent, which is not a large
amount given the large variation in levels of spending over time, particularly in non-OECD
countries. This suggests the extent of any ‘compensation’ provided by increased govern-
ment consumption spending in response to trade globalisation in the 1990s and 2000s has
been limited in size, and quite easily undermined by other influences on spending. In addi-
tion, there is no evidence that consumption spending has risen by more in countries which
are particularly prone to external trade risk and which for that reason need compensation
most. This suggests that the positive relationship between trade globalisation and consump-
tion spending may be driven by forces other than compensation (see for example Jetter and
Parmeter 2015).
Second, although we have used a range of estimation methods, and a range of glob-
alisation measures, some of our results differ according to the precise method used. For
consumption spending for example, the evidence is stronger when using DOLS and GMM
rather than standard FE, and (at least for trade) when using the ‘policy’ measures of open-
ness (i.e., the de jure KOF index) as opposed to the ‘outcome’ measures (i.e., the de facto
KOF index, and the trade-GDP ratio). Finally, it is interesting to note that the KOF index
of social globalisation in fact has a larger effect on consumption spending than either trade
or financial globalisation, across almost all of our estimations. This result is unexpected,
and merits further investigation in future work (for similar findings on the effect of social
globalisation, see Meinhard and Potrafke 2012). In addition, we acknowledge that panel
unit root and cointegration tests have lower power, hence the equilibrium relationship may
vary in significance across countries. Given the heterogeneity in the sample and apparent
sensitivity to data and specification, the power of GMM may be overstated. Finally it may
be insufficient to apply an OECD interaction to a limited number of variables.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, our results provide some implications for policy.
Our paper was motivated by the evidence of a growing political ‘backlash’ against globalisa-
tion since the early 2000s, which has threatened to undermine the benefits of globalisation,
through a return to trade protectionism and economic nationalism. Our results suggest that
the combination of rapid trade and financial globalisation, which characterised the hyper-
globalisation of the 1990s and 2000s, may have been at least partly to blame. While fi-
nancial globalisation is unlikely to have been the main driving force behind the declining
levels of government spending as a share of GDP shown in Section 5, higher levels of inter-
national capital mobility do appear to have offset the ability of governments to provide the
compensation required to make the globalisation of trade politically sustainable. To avoid
this outcome in future, governments should either proceed more cautiously with financial
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globalisation, or instead seek to manage the damaging effects of capital mobility through
greater steps toward international tax co-operation and co-ordination.
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3.9 Appendix
Table A3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Spending variables
Consumption spending 4,516 0.206 0.181 0.017 7.675
Baseline controls
Real GDP per capita 4,520 14702.26 17103.32 142.3924 159825.7
Dependency 5,426 38.507 7.104 14.128 54.367
Urbanization 6,014 56.61354 24.548 5.416 100
Total population (WDI) 4,644 3.84e+07 1.35e+08 501566 1.39E+09
Total Population (PWT) 3,851 40.199 138.448 0.501 1369.436
Price ratio 4,520 0.925 0.721 0.011 27.346
Globalization variables
KOFTrGIdf 4,922 54.518 19.729 3.597 98.611
KOFFiGIdf 4,755 57.941 20.223 3.199 99.988
KOFSoGI 5,130 53.19443 20.087 8.111 90.730
KOFPoGI 5,130 55.177 25.404 2.187 99.544
KOFTrGIdj 4,044 55.330 23.057 7.783 98.939
KOFFiGIdj 4,392 47.5349 25.149 1 96.059
Trade openness 4,501 0.608 0.561 0.0001 4.791
Inward FDI stock 5,005 39.277 68.802 2.56E-07 998.4862
Outward FDI stock 4,009 22.280 120.698 1.19E-07 3416.549
Chinn-Ito index 4,615 0.216 1.566 -1.910 2.360
Additional controls
Debt stock 3,126 66.546 84.721 0.239 1380.767
Foreign aid 3,664 7.7656 11.560 -2.629 192.026
Polity2 4,493 3.202 6.595 -10 10
Export concentration 4,744 0.354 0.219 0.045 0.983
Other expenditure measures
Pure public goods 1,777 11.747 23.549 1.923 524.783
Merit goods 1,777 9.236 4.136 0.352 31.379
Economic services 1,472 6.175 3.302 0.436 27.111
Social benefits 1,916 8.898 7.188 0.002 26.013
Social protection 1,721 8.549 7.022 0.006 25.580
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Table A3.2: Variables and definitions
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Table A3.3: Correlation matrix of some variables
Variable KOFTrGf KOFFiGf KOFTrGj KOFFiGj KOFSoGI KOFPoGI
KOFTrGIdf 1.0000
KOFFiGIdf 0.5464 1.0000
KOFTrGIdj 0.2947 0.5584 1.0000
KOFFiGIdj 0.1178 0.441 0.6117 1.0000
KOFSoGI 0.382 0.6326 0.799 0.5284 1.0000
KOFPoGI -0.1975 0.1371 0.3786 0.3763 0.2283 1.0000
Variable Chinn-Ito Inward FDI Outward FDI Trade openness
Chinn-Ito index 1.0000
Inward FDI stock 0.1685 1.0000
Outward FDI stock 0.2325 0.9896 1.0000
Trade openness 0.3376 0.1642 0.1572 1.0000
Variable Social benefits Social protection Consumption
Social benefits 1
Social protection 0.9572 1








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3.5: Fisher-type unit root tests
Variable Fisher ADF Fisher PP
PWT -39.8549*** -81.9247***












Trade Openness -57.5928*** -114.7427***
Inward FDI stock -43.3828*** -84.0061***
Outward FDI stock -37.6419*** -74.3931***
Chinn-Ito index -35.1330*** -78.2329***
Debt stock -26.2668*** -59.3730***





SW COFOG -3.2477*** -4.0537***
SW ECOG -4.4627*** -8.6957***
Note: Fisher ADF and PP unit root tests for the differences of the variables. *** represent statistical signifi-
cance at 1 per cent level of significance. Inverse chi-squared (433.0710, p-value 0.0567) and modified inverse
chi-squared (1.6180, 0.0528) statistics for Fisher PP show evidence of unit root for dependency at lag 4.
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Table A3.6: List of countries
Afghanistan Denmark Lao PDR Russian Federation
Albania Djibouti Latvia Rwanda
Algeria Dominica Lebanon Samoa
Angola Dominican RepublicLesotho Sao Tome and Principe
Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Liberia Saudi Arabia
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Libya Senegal
Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Serbia
Australia Equatorial Guinea Luxembourg Seychelles
Austria Eritrea Macao, China Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Estonia Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Bahamas, The Ethiopia Madagascar Slovak Republic
Bahrain Fiji Malawi Slovenia
Bangladesh Finland Malaysia Solomon Islands
Barbados France Maldives Somalia
Belarus Gabon Mali South Africa
Belgium Gambia, The Malta Spain
Belize Georgia Mauritania Sri Lanka
Benin Germany Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis
Bermuda Ghana Mexico St. Lucia
Bhutan Greece Micronesia, Fed. Sts.St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bolivia Grenada Moldova Sudan
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Mongolia Suriname
Botswana Guinea Morocco Swaziland
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Sweden
Brunei Darussalam Guyana Namibia Switzerland
Bulgaria Haiti Nepal Syrian Arab Republic
Burkina Faso Honduras Netherlands Tajikistan
Burundi Hungary Netherlands Antilles Tanzania
Cambodia Iceland New Zealand Thailand
Cameroon India Nicaragua Togo
Canada Indonesia Niger Tonga
Cape Verde Iran, Islamic Rep. Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Central African RepublicIraq Norway Tunisia
Chad Ireland Oman Turkey
Chile Israel Pakistan Turkmenistan
China Italy Palau Uganda
Colombia Jamaica Panama Ukraine
Comoros Japan Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates
Congo, Dem. Rep Jordan Paraguay United Kingdom
Congo, Rep Kazakhstan Peru United States
Costa Rica Kenya Philippines Uruguay
Cote d’Ivoire Kiribati Poland Uzbekistan
Croatia Korea, Dem. Rep. Portugal Vanuatu
Cuba Korea, Rep. Puerto Rico Venezuela, RB
Cyprus Kuwait Qatar Vietnam
Czech Republic Kyrgyz Republic Romania Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Note: OECD countries are in bold.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal Decentralization, Democracy and
Government Size: Disentangling the
Complexities
In this paper, we examine the mediating effect of democracy in explaining the relation-
ship between decentralization and government size for the period 1970-2013. We proxy
decentralization by fiscal decentralization, use total spending as our primary measure
of government size, and adopt the V-Dem high-level democracy indices as measures of
democracy. We use the fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and
the instrumental variable estimation technique. Our main finding is that fiscal decen-
tralization and democracy in themselves are effective tools to “starve the beast” as they
lead to reduced government size, with the former suggesting support for the Leviathan
hypothesis. We find evidence of the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship
between decentralization and government size; a positive and statistically significant
effect of the interaction term with the effect size largest for participatory democracy.
We do not find a non-linear relationship between decentralization and government size.
∗I would like to thank Christa Brunnschweiler and Edward Anderson for useful comments. All remaining
errors are my own.
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4.1 Introduction
Fiscal decentralization has become an increasingly common feature of both developed and
developing countries in recent decades (Garman, et al., 2001; Hooghe et al., 2010). De-
centralization may be welfare-improving and enhance government accountability (Tiebout,
1956). Sub-national governments are seen to be efficient and effective at resource allocation
given that they are closer to the citizenry and are likely to better determine and anticipate
the needs and preferences of their residents. Hence, in a heterogeneous context, decentral-
ization enables sub-national governments to better match the needs and preferences of the
population with the available bundle of goods and services (Golem, 2010). Further, fiscal
decentralization assumes that sub-national governments possess the needed autonomy both
to raise revenues and fund their expenditures with little or no central government interfer-
ence.
Changes in the levels of government size (spending) is one key way in which govern-
ments can manage the effect of decentralization. Hence, I acknowledge that this Chapter
related to Chapters 2 and 3, although the sample differs. However, the effect of decentral-
ization on government size depends on whether the government is a ‘benevolent agent’ or a
monolithic ‘Leviathan’. As a benevolent agent, government is assumed to act in the interest
of the citizenry (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Weingast, 2009). The improved efficiency
and accountability due to fiscal decentralization therefore encourages the citizenry to de-
mand more public goods, leading to larger government size (Golem, 2010). The Leviathan
hypothesis assumes that greater decentralization leads to smaller government size. Govern-
ments (both central and local governments) are assumed to be monolithic Leviathans with
public servants driven by their self-interest to maximize revenues. Fiscal decentralization
provides constraints in the form of mobile tax bases and tax competition among sub-national
governments, with a possible “race to the bottom” which reduces total government intrusion
into the economy, hence the ‘beast’ is starved, and government size is reduced (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980).1
Does democracy play any role in the relationship between decentralization and govern-
ment size? First, it may be easier for decentralization to be a political decision under a
democracy as it involves reducing the concentration of power with the central government.
One of the most valued assets of non-democracies or authoritarian governments is the con-
centration of power at the center (Beyani, 2000), which is at variance with the motivations
for decentralisation. Therefore, there is likely to be a minimal preference for decentralisation
in non-democracies (see Karlström, 2015 and Qiao et al., 2019). Second, the assumptions
of both the benevolent and Leviathan hypotheses seem plausible under a democracy. For
instance, the incentive of a government to be benevolent may be borne out of a desire to
meet the tastes, preferences and needs of voters in order to retain power in a democracy (see
Hicks and Swank, 1992; Isham, et al., 1997; Boix, 2001). It is important to note that the
differences between benevolent and Leviathan cases may be understood when we clearly
1Note that residents are also assumed to possess information advantages in addition to being mobile (see
Qiao et al., 2019).
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distinguish central from total (central plus local) government size. Such distinction gives
room to appreciate the role of voter preferences for public goods in explaining the effect of
democracy on government size. An example of how this works is a comparison between
Scandinavia with greater voter preference for public goods relative to the USA. Further-
more, information advantages, demand for efficient provision of public goods and services,
and ‘voting with the feet’, may require conditions such as free elections, freedom of speech,
fundamental human rights, public demand for accountability, effective institutions among
others, which are essential characteristics of a democracy (Karlström, 2015). Also, democ-
racy in itself may be an effective tool to “starve the beast” under a Leviathan. Therefore,
assuming the earlier arguments are valid, examining the intermediating role of democracy
in the decentralization-government-size relationship may provide an explanation for the di-
vergent and conflicting empirical evidence on the effect of decentralization on government
size.2
Crucially, any attempt to consider the role of democracy in explaining the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and government size must note the importance of the dif-
ferent conceptions of representative democracy. In that case, measures of democracy in its
broad since (such as a simple binary 0,1 indicator of democracy and autocracy), a simple
measure of a country’s political regime, or using institutional quality to gauge the level of
democracy may not be enough as the relationship may be more nuanced than direct. Var-
ious conceptions of democracy may have varying implications given the differences in the
characteristic principles of democracy they measure; electoral, liberal, participatory, de-
liberative and or egalitarian democracy. While the electoral principle of democracy is an
essential component of any other conception of representative democracy, such conceptions
retain their unique characteristics in principle which likely have implications for the re-
lationship being considered here. For instance, one bedrock of the electoral principle of
democracy is the delegation of authority to representatives which is not exactly the same as
a preference for, where practicable, a direct involvement of the citizens in decision making
under a participatory democracy. Added to this, a more liberal democracy may provide lim-
its on central government power, allowing devolution of power to local governments. The
egalitarian principle of democracy expects that resources are distributed equally among all
social groups. These and other characteristics are essential not only for decentralization but
to demonstrate voter preferences for public goods and its consequent effect on government
size.
This paper looks beyond just the broad concept of democracy and uses varieties of
democracy indices for 76 developed and developing countries for the years 1970-2013. We
adopt the V-Dem high-level of democracy indices (see Coppedge et al., 2020) in measuring
democracy; electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian democracy indices.
We introduce an interaction term of fiscal decentralization and the varieties of democracy
indices to capture the mediating effect of democracy. This is a unique approach compared to
2Note that, variations in the extent of both decentralization and democracy can affect the decentralization-
government-size relationship. Such variations may be in the form of transitions within or between political
regime types which create changes in political constraints (e.g. fiscal rules, independent central banks) and in
the behavior of public servants (Marlow, 1988)
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a similar study on the mediating effect of democracy in the relationship between decentral-
ization and government size discussed later in the literature review. Our primary measure of
government size is real per capital total (central plus local) government expenditure to GDP
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. We proxy decentralization by fiscal
decentralization-expenditure decentralization measured as the ratio of state and local gov-
ernment spending to general government spending from the World Bank’s Decentralization
indicator database. We make use of the fixed effects estimation technique with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors to account for cross-sectional and time dependence. Our robustness
analysis includes an estimation with a sub-sample of developed and developing countries,
an estimation with the log of public sector employment as an alternative measure of govern-
ment size, an estimation in first differences with regime change lag as an alternative measure
of democracy, and an instrumental variable estimation to take care of any endogeneity con-
cerns.
Finally, in another unique contribution, we examine non-linearity to determine if the
extent (intensity) of decentralization matters for the effect of decentralization on govern-
ment size. Conceptually, if intensity matters, then both the direct and indirect effects of
decentralization on government size may differ at both higher and lower levels of either
decentralization or democracy. For instance, if indeed decentralization “starves the beast”,
then at the peak of decentralization, government size should be smaller. However, given
that government welfare spending increases as a country becomes more democratic, there
is likely to be a higher demand for bigger government size in advanced democracies. These
two scenarios although contradictory suggest that, if the rate of change in the degree of de-
centralization differs from the rate of change in the size of government, then the relationship
between decentralization and government size may be non-linear or non-monotonic and may
have peaks or troughs.
To summarize our results, our baseline results clearly establishes effects of fiscal de-
centralization and democracy on government size; negative for both variables and for all
measures of democracy, and this is confirmed by our main results. However, the magnitude
of the effect of fiscal decentralization is largest in the regression with electoral democracy
index as control while participatory democracy has a more negative effect on government
size compared to other concepts of democracy. The findings for fiscal decentralization and
democracy is consistent across the sub-sample of developed and developing countries. The
results is also consistent for the robustness check; (i) with employment as a measure of gov-
ernment size, (ii) with regime change as a measure of democracy, and (iii) when we control
for endogeniety. We find similar results for the interaction term in the estimation to deter-
mine non-linearity. Most importantly, we find evidence of a mediating effect of democracy
in all cases; a positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term with the
effect size largest for the participatory principle of democracy. The positive effect of the
interaction term in the main results is consistent for all estimations except the sub-sample of
developing countries, although only statistically significant for egalitarian democracy in the
IV estimation, but statistically insignificant for employment and regime change. However,
an increase in fiscal decentralization in a developing country under a liberal democracy is
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associated with a reduction in government size. We do not find a non-linear relationship
between decentralization and government size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section is devoted to
reviewing evidence of the relationship between decentralization and government size, and
evidence of the mediating role of democracy in that relationship. We discuss methodology
and estimation results in sections 3 and 4, before turning to conclusions and policy recom-
mendations in section 5.
4.2 Literature review
Empirical evidence on the relationship between government size and fiscal decentralization
is mixed, although the balance seems to tilt in favor of the Leviathan hypothesis (Stegarescu,
2005; and Golem, 2010). Oates (1985) in a seminal contribution to the Leviathan hypothesis
does not find support for the Leviathan hypothesis for 48 US states and 43 countries. Nelson
(1986) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989) fail to find evidence for the Leviathan hypothesis
for US states. However, these early studies have some deficiencies. First, their definition of
decentralization does not consider ‘total government intrusion’, as it omits central govern-
ment activity.3 Second, they measure the relative size of government in terms of tax receipts
as against total expenditure. Total expenditure is however a more complete measure of gov-
ernment size as it accurately measures total government resource absorption (see Marlow,
1988; Golem, 2010).4 Other studies that find evidence for the Leviathan hypothesis using
total government expenditure as a measure of government size include Grossman (1989),
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990), Joulfaian and Marlow (1991), Ehdaie (1994), Grossman and
West (1994), Shadbegian (1999). However, Stein (1999) finds evidence for benevolent agent
hypothesis, i.e. that decentralization is associated with larger government size.
In terms of recent literature, Wu and Lin (2012) and Jia et al. (2014) find evidence of
a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size for China at the
provincial-and national-level respectively. Casette and Paty (2010) find a negative effect
of tax decentralization on central government expenditure, a positive effect of tax decen-
tralization on sub-national government expenditure, and a positive effect of tax decentral-
ization on aggregate public expenditure.5 Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) examine the
decentralization-government-size hypothesis using the number of public sector employees
as proxy for government size and find that the number of public sector employees increases
with the country’s level of fiscal decentralization.
More closely related to the current paper, Qiao et al. (2019) provides empirical evidence
for the mediating role of democracy in the decentralization-government-size relationship.
3They define decentralization as the ratio of local government activity over the sum of state and local
government activity, thereby omitting central government activity (see Marlow, 1988).
4Recent empirical studies that use revenue as a measure of government size include Prohl and Schneider
(2009) and Feld et al. (2010). Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden (2003) and Fiva (2006) find support for Leviathan
hypothesis, specifically revenue decentralization using sub-national own-source revenue as a measure of de-
centralization and total government expenditure as share of GDP as a measure of government size.
5Liberati and Sacchi (2013) indicates it may be easier to reduce government size with tax restrictions as
against tax decentralization.
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The paper finds a positive effect of the interaction term, implying that at higher levels of
democracy, fiscal decentralization is associated with bigger government size. The results
are robust across alternative measures of government size, decentralization, and democracy,
alternative data frames, alternative specifications, and accounting for endogeneity issues.6
The paper however uses an average of political right index and civil liberties index as a
primary measure of democracy and the Polity2 index of political democracy and autocracy
as secondary measure of democracy; these indices do not capture the nuances of the concept
of democracy described earlier. The paper does not also take into consideration the possible
effects of cross-sectional and time dependence in the panel data estimation. The current
paper is therefore superior in both measures of democracy and in the fixed effects estimation
approach, and also differs in the examination of non-linearity.
4.3 Empirical strategy and data
4.3.1 Model specification
We examine the fiscal-decentralization-government-size relationship considering the medi-
ating role of democracy as follows:
Govsizeit = α + σFDit + υDEMit + ρ(FD ∗DEM)it + τXit + µi + ηt + εit (4.1)
where Govsize refers to to government size: our primary measure of government size
is total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP; used in natural logarithm form.
Later, we introduce the log of total public sector employment as an alternative measure of
government size. Country and year are represented as i and t respectively. The fiscal decen-
tralization indicator is given as FD and is measured in natural logarithm,DEM refers to the
democracy measure, while FD ∗DEM represents the interaction term between decentral-
ization and democracy. The coefficients of interest are σ, υ and ρ. In the respective cases, we
expect negative effects of fiscal decentralization and democracy on government size, but a
positive effect of the interaction term on government size a priori. The latter suggests that as
the level of democracy increases, fiscal decentralization will be associated with an increase
in government size. X represents control variables; real GDP per capita, urbanization, the
share of young population, and the share of old population given in natural logarithms; oth-
ers are the KOF globalization index, central bank independence, monetary union, as well
as fiscal rules. Year dummy, country dummy and the error term are given as µi, ηt, and
εit respectively. We adopt the two-way fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors to account for general forms of temporal and cross-sectional dependence since panel
6Baskaran (2011) examines whether the relationship between decentralization and government size is me-
diated by the ideology of the central government. The study finds that decentralization increases government
size irrespective of the ideology of the government, although the magnitude of the effect is larger for left-
as against right-wing governments. The interest of the current paper is however in examining whether the
decentralization-government-size relationship is mediated by the broad concept of democracy.
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datasets are prone to incidents of cross-sectional dependence (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).
This makes the fixed effects estimation results more robust.
4.3.2 Data
Summary statistics of all variables are provided in the Appendix (Table A1). We show the
correlation between the varieties of democracy variables in Appendix Table A2. Clearly,
the varieties of democracy variables are highly correlated which lends support to individual
estimations with each of them as proxy for democracy in their respective cases.
Dependent variable
The primary measure of government size is total expenditure measured as the share of total
government expenditure to GDP, which is sourced from the World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) database. The spending measure used here is comprehensive as it
captures all local and central government spending, making it an appropriate measure of
government size in this case. As an alternative measure, we use the log of total public sec-
tor employment from the International Labour Organization (ILO) as proxy for government
size (See Martinez-Vazquez and Yao, 2009 and Qiao et al., 2019)
Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal decentralization is proxied by expenditure decentralization measured as the ratio of
sub-national (state and local) government spending to general government spending. It is
the measure commonly used in the literature as it adequately accounts for total government
intrusion (see Marlow, 1988; Oates, 1985; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; and Golem, 2010).
Data on expenditure decentralization is from the World Bank’s Decentralization Indicator
database.
Democracy
As noted earlier, similar studies fail to capture the various conceptions of democracy. Hence,
we adopt an approach which encompasses the varieties of democracy. We account for elec-
toral democracy, liberal democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, as
well as egalitarian democracy. Data on our democracy indices are sourced from the V-Dem
dataset (see Coppedge et al., 2020; and Pemstein et al., 2020).
The electoral principle of democracy captures the principle that democracy creates an
enabling atmosphere for rulers to be responsive to citizens, which can be achieved through
competition for citizenry vote of approval in an election, a process that must allow an exten-
sive level of usual suffrage. The electoral democracy index is constructed with an interval
of low to high, represented as 0-1 respectively. 7
7It takes the average of, or the weighted average of indices measuring freedom of association thick, clean
elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, and on the other, the five-way multiplicative
interaction between those indices (see Coppedge et al., 2020).
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The concept of liberal democracy considers the extent to which democracy successfully
limits the power of governments, providing room for the protection of individual and mi-
nority rights against the ‘tyranny’ of the majority. At the core of the liberal principle of
democracy are constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent
judiciary, and effective checks and balances which must succeed in limiting the excessive
use of executive power. The index is calculated taking the level of electoral democracy into
consideration. It is an index with an interval 0-1 representing low to high respectively.
The participatory principle of democracy has at its core value, an active citizenry partic-
ipation in all political processes which may be electoral or non-electoral. Here, delegating
authority to elected representatives may not be enough as it is expected that where possible,
other platforms are created for citizenry direct involvement. This could be ensured through
engagement with civil society organisations, direct democracy, and elected bodies at the
sub-national level. The index is on an interval of 0-1 representing low to high participatory
democracy respectively, and takes electoral democracy into account.
The deliberative democracy index is an index of the process of decision making in a
polity. The expectation is that political decision making is driven by public reasoning aimed
at ensuring common good as against emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial
interests or coercion. Hence, democracy must involve respectful dialogue at all levels of the
decision making process; from conceptualization to implementation rather than a summation
of known preferences. The deliberative democracy index is given on an interval of 0-1
representing low to high respectively and considers the level of electoral democracy.
Finally, the egalitarian democracy index measures the extent to which the ideal of egali-
tarian democracy is achieved. The egalitarian principle of democracy considers the potential
of material and immaterial inequalities to limit the enjoyment of formal rights and liberties,
placing limits on the ability of citizens from diverse social groups to participate in the demo-
cratic process. To ensure egalitarian democracy, the rights and freedoms of all individuals
must be protected regardless of their social group, there must be equal distribution of re-
sources across all such groups, as well as equal access to power for all individuals and
groups. It is given on an interval of low to high (0-1) and considers electoral democracy.
Control variables
The control variables are; real GDP per capita (GDPpc), urbanization (Urban), the share
of young population (Young), and the share of old population (Old) given in natural loga-
rithms; the KOF index of globalization (KOFGI), an index for central bank independence
(CBI), a dummy for monetary union (EMU), as well as a dummy for fiscal rules (Fiscal
rule). According to Wagner’s law (Wagner, 1893), government spending as share of GDP
increases with increases in national income, hence we use real GDP per capita as proxy for
national income. Urbanization is introduced to capture government consumption and invest-
ment (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and is measured as urban population as share of total
population. The share of the young and old population in the total population of any coun-
try represents the size of its dependant non-working population. The size of the dependant
population matters; young population demands higher spending on education while old pop-
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ulation demands higher spending on health care. Hence, countries with larger share of the
dependant population are likely to have bigger government size. The current paper captures
the share of young population as the population in the ages 0-14 as share of total population,
and old population as the population 65+ as share of total population. Where there is central
bank independence (CBI), there is limited central bank financing of government budgets
either directly or indirectly, and government size is likely to be smaller (Fischer, 1995). The
dummy variable for a monetary union is equal to 1 if a country participated in an Economic
and Monetary Union in years t and afterwards, or 0 otherwise. The strict requirements of a
monetary union implies members are less likely to have huge deficits and this helps restrain
government expansion (Qiao et al., 2019). Fiscal rules are likely to improve fiscal outcomes
especially when it succeeds in coordinating an effective fiscal decentralization (Alesina and
Bayoumi, 1996; Neyapti,2013). Fiscal rules is therefore given as a dummy variable equal to
1 if a country has at least one fiscal rule (e.g. expenditure rule, revenue rule, budget balance
rule, or debt rule) in place, and 0 otherwise. Globalization may lead to governments in-
creasing spending to compensate for trade-related risks or to offset volatility and insecurity
(‘compensation hypothesis, Rodrik, 1998), or governments reducing spending due for ex-
ample to a reduction in tax revenues which may be caused by a ‘race to the bottom’ resulting
from global competition to attract and retain capital (‘efficiency hypothesis’ Garrett 1998).
We proxy globalization by the KOF overall globalization index.
Data on real GDP per capita, urbanization, the share of young population, and the share
of old population is obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI,
2018). Data for monetary union and central bank independence are sourced from the Eu-
ropean Union and Garriga (2006) respectively. The fiscal rules dummy is sourced from the
IMF Fiscal Rules Database (2016). Finally, data for the KOF overall globalization index is
sourced from Gygli et al. (2018).
4.4 Estimation results
4.4.1 Baseline results
The baseline results sets-out to determine the individual effects of both fiscal decentraliza-
tion and democracy on government size (as measured by government spending). Hence, the
results are without the interaction term. The results are given in Table 1.
From Table 1, fiscal decentralization has a negative and statistically significant effect
on government size when we control for all forms of democracy. Thus, increased fiscal
decentralization is associated with increased government size irrespective of the variety of
democracy controlled for. In terms of magnitude, increased fiscal decentralization is asso-
ciated with between 4.8 and 5.0 per cent reduction in government size. The amounts are
clearly not trivial, although they might be easily be swayed by other influences on govern-
ment size, especially in developed countries. We therefore find evidence for the Leviathan
hypothesis similar to Grossman (1989), Joulfaian and Marlow (1990), Joulfaian and Marlow
(1991), Ehdaie(1994), Grossman and West (1994), and Shadbegian (1999).
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The results also show negative and statistically significant effects of electoral and par-
ticipatory democracies on government size. Hence, electoral and participatory democracies
are associated with reduced government size, with an effect size of 10 and 21 per cent re-
spectively.
For the control variables, we find no evidence of Wagner’s Law, rather real GDP per
capita has a negative and statistically significant effect on government size when we control
for electoral and participatory democracies. An increased share of old population is associ-
ated with reduced government size in all cases; the share of old population has a negative
and statistically significant effect on government size. The KOF overall globalization index
and the share of young population however have a positive and statistically significant effect
on government size.
Hence, the baseline results provides a hint of the possible effects of both fiscal decentral-
ization and democracy on government size; generally negative for the former and negative
for the latter for electoral and participatory democracy.
Table 4.1: Baseline results: Fiscal decentralization and government size
VARIABLES Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD -0.0491*** -0.0491*** -0.0500*** -0.0480*** -0.0478***
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0125)
DEM -0.0955* -0.0770 -0.205** -0.0385 0.00563
(0.0527) (0.0554) (0.0900) (0.0603) (0.0630)
GDPpc -0.163* -0.156* -0.171* -0.151 -0.142
(0.0909) (0.0896) (0.0953) (0.0918) (0.0885)
KOFGI 0.0140*** 0.0137*** 0.0140*** 0.0135*** 0.0133***
(0.00420) (0.00412) (0.00420) (0.00416) (0.00406)
Urban 0.0442 0.0469 0.0248 0.0514 0.0581
(0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.127) (0.128)
Y oung 0.357** 0.371*** 0.339** 0.376*** 0.388***
(0.135) (0.134) (0.134) (0.137) (0.131)
Old -0.467*** -0.446*** -0.481*** -0.432*** -0.412***
(0.148) (0.145) (0.153) (0.145) (0.135)
CBI -0.0511 -0.0508 -0.0535 -0.0498 -0.0463
(0.0513) (0.0521) (0.0519) (0.0509) (0.0519)
EMU 0.00729 0.00574 0.00681 0.00377 0.00182
(0.0396) (0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0391) (0.0384)
Fiscalrule -0.0107 -0.0118 -0.00917 -0.0125 -0.0133
(0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0231) (0.0226) (0.0221)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
***(**)(*) represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
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4.4.2 Main results
For our main results, we re-estimated each of the regressions in Table 1, including interaction
terms for each measure of democracy with fiscal decentralization to determine the mediating
effect of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and government size. The
results are given in Table 2.
Similar to the baseline results, we find a negative and statistically significant effect of
fiscal decentralization on government size, irrespective of the variety of democracy. The
negative effect of fiscal decentralization suggests that fiscal decentralization on its own may
be an effective tool to “starve the beast”. 8 Electoral, liberal, as well as participatory democ-
racies have a negative and statistically significant effect on government size, but the effects
of deliberative and egalitarian democracies are not statistically significant.
8In the sense of reducing the amount of resources available to the central government to finance its spend-
ing; some taxes may be localised and there may be central government grants to local governments. The term
as used here may not strictly define - ‘starving the beast” - the concept or political strategy of deliberating
cutting taxes to reduce central government revenues and limit its ability to spend. See for instance Buchanan
and Wagner, (1977), Buchanan, (1984), Niskanen (2006) and Romer and Romer (2007).
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Table 4.2: Main results: The mediating effect of varieties of democracy
VARIABLES Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD -0.113*** -0.0873*** -0.103*** -0.0980*** -0.101***
(0.0319) (0.0272) (0.0267) (0.0280) (0.0316)
DEM -0.236** -0.215* -0.410** -0.204 -0.171
(0.0996) (0.120) (0.160) (0.125) (0.127)
FD ∗DEM 0.00674** 0.00643* 0.00881** 0.00723** 0.00735*
(0.00285) (0.00372) (0.00371) (0.00331) (0.00374)
GDPpc -0.138 -0.131 -0.149* -0.123 -0.124
(0.0832) (0.0822) (0.0868) (0.0830) (0.0819)
KOFGI 0.0151*** 0.0144*** 0.0151*** 0.0146*** 0.0140***
(0.00413) (0.00410) (0.00420) (0.00413) (0.00391)
Urban -0.0287 0.00193 -0.0497 -0.000147 0.0123
(0.133) (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) (0.129)
Y oung 0.444*** 0.440*** 0.419*** 0.461*** 0.445***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114)
Old -0.448*** -0.436*** -0.480*** -0.428*** -0.406***
(0.141) (0.139) (0.151) (0.138) (0.132)
CBI -0.0397 -0.0440 -0.0414 -0.0400 -0.0379
(0.0533) (0.0534) (0.0548) (0.0528) (0.0530)
EMU 0.00902 0.00639 0.0123 0.00693 0.00400
(0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0385) (0.0380) (0.0373)
Fiscalrule -0.00323 -0.00516 0.000821 -0.00311 -0.00610
(0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0251) (0.0243) (0.0237)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
***(**)(*) represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
We now turn to the results for the interaction term designed to test for the mediating
effect of democracy. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant in all cases,
showing that increasing fiscal decentralization under the varieties of democracy is associated
with increasing government size. There is however evidence that the interaction term has a
stronger (more positive) effect on government size in participatory democracies compared
to other varieties of democracy. This is quite significant as the target of every decentraliza-
tion effort is to among others increase the direct participation of citizens and civil society in
the democratic decision making process. The results suggests that such increased participa-
tion may be associated with increasing government spending. Nevertheless, the results also
suggest that the size of the effects is quite small, with a percentage increase in fiscal decen-
tralization under a participatory democracy being associated with a 0.88 per cent increase
in government size as proxy by government spending. Our results here contradict those of
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Qiao et al. (2019) who find a positive effect of the interaction term, albeit with a different
measure of democracy.
4.4.3 Additional Results
This section contains the summary results for our sub-sample of developed vrs. developing
countries, the results for our alternative measure of government size, and the results for
our alternative measure of democracy (regime change). We represent the summary results
for the sub-sample of countries in Table 3, the full results for our alternative measure of
government size in Table 4, and the full results for our alternative measure of democracy in
Table 5.
Sub-sample: Developed vs. Developing countries
Turning to our results for the sub-sample of countries, Panel A represents results for devel-
oped countries, and Panel B the results for developing countries.
The results for the developed countries are qualitatively similar to those for the main re-
sults; negative and statistically significant effects of fiscal decentralization and the varieties
of democracy on government size, and a positive effect of the interaction term on govern-
ment size. The effect size of fiscal decentralization is largest for deliberative democracy
while the effect sizes of both democracy and the interaction term is largest for participatory
democracy. The results for the interaction term suggests that increasing fiscal decentral-
ization is associated with increasing government size in developed countries irrespective of
the variety of democracy. The results for the interaction term may not be surprising as de-
veloped countries have high fiscal decentralization. The positive effect of the interaction
term suggests that if the process of decision making in a developed country is driven by a
desire to meet the common good as against a mere attempt to aggregate observable pref-
erences, then fiscal decentralization could be associated with even bigger government size;
suggesting a willingness of governments to provide more public goods - perhaps, benevolent
governments.
However, for developing countries, there is a negative and statistically significant effect
of participatory democracy on government size and a negative and statistically significant
effect of the interaction term on government size for liberal democracies. Therefore in
the presence of constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent
judiciary, and effective checks and balances, fiscal decentralization could be an effective
tool to reduce government size in developing countries. This is significant as developing
countries are noted to struggle with unnecessarily large government sizes.
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Table 4.3: Sub-sample: Developed versus Developing countries
Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
Panel A: Developed
FD - - - - -
DEM - - - - -
FD ∗DEM + + + + +
Panel B: Developing
FD No No No No No
DEM No No - No No
FD ∗DEM No - No No No
Summary of results for the sub-sample of developed and developing countries. Here, +(-)(No) refer to positive
effect, negative effect, and no effect respectively.
Employment: An alternative measure of government size
As noted earlier, we follow Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) and Qiao et al. (2019) and
use the log of total public sector employment (simply referred to as employment) as an
alternative measure of government size. The pairwise correlation between employment is
however low (0.05) which may suggest that the former may not be an appropriate proxy for
the latter. However, we argue that, we use employment not necessarily as an alternative mea-
sure of spending but as an alternative measure of government size. Employment provides
a measure of government size in terms of numbers; the number of people in public sector
employment. Further, it may be suggestive of the extent of government spending on public
sector wages and salaries (a part of total spending), which may explain the low correlation
coefficient. Hence in principle, it is an appropriate measure of government size and perhaps
suggestive of the cost to government spending in terms of wages and salaries paid to public
sector employees.
Turning to the results in Table 4, there is no statistically significant effect of fiscal de-
centralization and the interaction term on public employment. However, there is a negative
and statistically significant effect of all varieties of democracy on public employment. The
findings here may be explained as follows; electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and
egalitarian democracies provide opportunities for private sector involvement in the econ-
omy, increasing private sector employment and perhaps reducing public sector employment,
hence, government size. Here also, the effect size is largest for participatory democracy and
least for deliberative democracy.
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Table 4.4: Employment as an alternative measure of government size
VARIABLES Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD -0.00173 -0.00371 -0.0143 -0.0113 -0.00889
(0.0184) (0.0132) (0.0201) (0.0195) (0.0160)
DEM -0.295** -0.308** -0.543*** -0.189* -0.342*
(0.108) (0.110) (0.133) (0.0955) (0.183)
FD ∗DEM -0.000394 -0.000994 0.000405 0.000292 0.000149
(0.00101) (0.000943) (0.00154) (0.00140) (0.00122)
GDPpc -0.00607 -0.00635 0.00155 -0.0257 -0.0125
(0.126) (0.125) (0.128) (0.135) (0.127)
KOFGI 6.17e-06 -0.000372 -0.000598 -0.000928 -0.000405
(0.00258) (0.00246) (0.00247) (0.00256) (0.00265)
Urban 1.044*** 1.067*** 1.030*** 1.136*** 1.104***
(0.160) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155) (0.151)
Y oung 0.312 0.322 0.297 0.212 0.275
(0.470) (0.464) (0.491) (0.510) (0.464)
Old -0.105 -0.0861 -0.0854 -0.100 -0.0619
(0.207) (0.196) (0.200) (0.208) (0.188)
CBI -0.000501 0.00190 -0.00636 0.000619 -0.00448
(0.0380) (0.0406) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0392)
EMU 0.0276** 0.0268** 0.0306** 0.0274** 0.0293**
(0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0132)
Fiscalrule -0.0301* -0.0284 -0.0262 -0.0319* -0.0318*
(0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0173)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 546 545 545 546 546
Countries 49 48 48 49 49
Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
***(**)(*) represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
Regime change: An alternative measure of democracy
As an alternative, we adopt a regime change measure of democracy to capture changes in
regime. This is important as transitions within or between political regime types may create
changes in political constraints (such as fiscal rules, central government independence) and
in the behaviour of bureaucrats and public servants (Marlow, 1988). Such changes may
have implications for both decentralization and government size, and hence, the relationship
between them. Marlow (1988) argues that where political constraints remain invariant over
time, government policies and the behaviour of bureaucrats and public servants do not also
change; policy decisions of governments, and bureaucrats or public servants are in part
restricted by political constraints. Therefore, changes in the behavior of public servants and
governments are likely to be linked to the changes in the political constraints they face or
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even changes in the political regime.
We account for regime change by introducing a measure of regime change (regime
change lag) and estimating equation (1) in first differences.9 The advantage of using the
regime change lag indicator is that it proceeds from a less restrictive definition of institu-
tional democracy as a concept, maximizing observations on regime transition phases (Bjorn-
skov and Rode, 2019). A first difference estimation therefore rightly captures the switch
from 0 to 1 between any regimes and its direct effect on government size, in addition to its
indirect effect on government size through fiscal decentralization.
Turning to the results in Table 5, changes in fiscal decentralization is associated with
a reduction in government spending. The coefficient of the fiscal decentralization vari-
able is negative and statistically significant. There is however no direct effect of changes
in regime on government spending. Also, changes in fiscal decentralisation between any
regime change has no statistically significant effect on government size; the coefficient of
the interaction term is statistically insignificant.
9The regime change variable in Bjornskov and Rode (2019) differs from that of Cheibub et al. (2010) by
applying a different timing rule; it “count all regime changes before July 1 of year x as pertaining to year x,
and all regime transitions after that date as pertaining to year x+1”. pp. 4 Bjornskov and Rode, 2019Hence,
relative to the original data in Cheibub et al. (2010), the regime change data in Bjornskov and Rode (2019)
are lagged by half a year. What we adopt here-Regime change lag-is a regime change indicator of whether a
regime transition occurred in the second half of the year, as it easily enables us to restore the original timing
rule in Cheibub et al. (2010).
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Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
***(**)(*) represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
Endogeneity concern
It is possible to contemplate issues of endogeneity from equation (1) and this may be due
to reverse causal relationship between decentralization and spending, omitted variable bias,
and or measurement error. Such endogeneity concerns have been raised in the literature (see
Xhang and Zou, 1998; Jin et al., 2005; and Qiao et al., 2008) although they do not explicitly
control for it. We follow Qiao et al. (2019) and adopt an instrument which is given as the
“weighted average of fiscal decentralisation from the neighbouring countries(weighted by
the contiguity matrix) as instrument for fiscal decentralization in an instrumental variable
estimation framework. The instrument is valid as fiscal decentralization policies may be
similar between neighboring countries and their design may be influenced by the experiences
of neighboring countries. However, the size of government in any country is not expected
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to significantly influence the fiscal decentralization policy of its neighbors (see Qiao et al.,
2019). The test statistics for the validity of the instruments used and the reliability of the
results do not reject that our instrument is valid and reliable. Our estimations pass the tests of
under-identification and weak identification in all cases. The F-statistic from the first-stage
regression is slightly below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 in all cases, but there seems
no glaring problem of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
Table 4.6: Robustness check: Instrumental variable estimations
VARIABLES Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD -0.338*** -0.323*** -0.307*** -0.325*** -0.360***
(0.123) (0.0994) (0.104) (0.100) (0.115)
DEM -0.491** -0.516** -0.564** -0.507** -0.737***
(0.214) (0.209) (0.270) (0.213) (0.269)
FD ∗DEM 0.0114 0.0119 0.0136 0.0129 0.0174*
(0.00869) (0.00794) (0.0107) (0.00833) (0.0101)
GDPpc -0.0611 -0.0555 -0.0498 -0.0648 -0.0770*
(0.0464) (0.0435) (0.0439) (0.0457) (0.0464)
KOFGI 0.0170*** 0.0164*** 0.0163*** 0.0174*** 0.0170***
(0.00338) (0.00325) (0.00328) (0.00336) (0.00330)
Urban 0.0110 -0.00176 -0.000857 -0.00533 0.0279
(0.0946) (0.0903) (0.0912) (0.0894) (0.0952)
Y oung 0.107 0.136 0.133 0.101 0.157
(0.153) (0.154) (0.154) (0.152) (0.154)
Old 0.348*** 0.370*** 0.358*** 0.345*** 0.387***
(0.108) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110)
CBI -0.570*** -0.557*** -0.540*** -0.573*** -0.547***
(0.113) (0.111) (0.109) (0.114) (0.112)
EMU 0.408*** 0.404*** 0.393*** 0.406*** 0.408***
(0.0579) (0.0567) (0.0567) (0.0567) (0.0562)
Fiscalrule -0.140*** -0.141*** -0.156*** -0.148*** -0.126***
(0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0448) (0.0454) (0.0462)
R-squared 0.306 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.306
F-statistic 8.13 8.05 7.97 7.97 8.09
Anderson(under) 91.746 112.655 108.493 118.391 94.23
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C-D(weak) 96.179 121.101 116.04 128.161 99.075
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 935 935 935 935 935
Note: The dependent variable is government spending. The instrument used is the weighted average of fiscal
decentralization from the neighbouring countries (weighted by the contiguity matrix, see Qiao et al., 2019).
All regressions include a constant term. ***(**)(*) represent statistical significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels
respectively.
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Turning to the estimation results in Table 6, we find similar effects of our variables of
interest on spending; negative and statistically significant effect of fiscal decentralization and
democracy on spending in all case, and positive effect of the interaction term on government
spending but only statistically significant for egalitarian democracy.
4.4.4 Non-monotonic relationship
The argument for the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between decentralization
and government spending may be explained as follows. A linear relationship implies the
variables involved increase(decrease) in the same direction and at the same rate. In ad-
dition, a monotonic relationship suggests that decentralization and government size in-
crease(decrease) in the same direction, although not always at the same rate.10 On the other
hand, a non-monotonic relationship implies that the rate of increase(decrease) in the vari-
ables may change with a change in one variable. This produces a ‘curved patter’ within the
data, requiring a non-linear modelling. Thus, while a monotonic relationship suggests the
relation between the variables considered is positive or negative at all levels of the variables,
this is not so for a non-monotonic relationship.
The argument above suggests that, whether or not the relationship between decentral-
ization and government size via democracy is positive or negative, it may not stay positive
or negative over time if it is non-linear. There are likely to be some points in time where
it will be positive and others where it will be negative. For instance, the relationship at the
beginning of a democracy may not be the same as that for an advanced democracy. As gov-
ernment size varies with the level of democracy, so is the expected effect of decentralization
via democracy on government size. The relationship is likely to be U-shaped; start high,
hit a trough and rise again. That is, at initial levels of democracy, decentralization may be
associated with reduced government size; democracy is expected to lead to efficient spend-
ing, which implies initially lower levels of spending compared to say autocracy. It may then
reach a minimum over time. However, given that increased democracy comes with it an in-
crease in heterogenous preferences among the citizens and an improved ability of citizens to
demand higher government spending, the welfare state is required to meet such preferences
with increased spending. Hence, advanced democracies are often associated with bigger
government size and high fiscal decentralization.
10A monotonic inverse relationship is equivalent to a negative correlation, while monotonic direct relation-
ship is equivalent to a positive correlation. Note that while all linear relationships are monotonic, not all
monotonic relationships are linear (cf. Yitzhaki and Schechtman, 2012).
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Table 4.7: Non-monotonic relationship
VARIABLES Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
FD -0.125** -0.111** -0.115** -0.111** -0.107**
(0.0515) (0.0465) (0.0440) (0.0464) (0.0511)
DEM -0.407** -0.397* -0.619** -0.354* -0.356
(0.198) (0.226) (0.285) (0.207) (0.251)
FD ∗DEM 0.0167* 0.0175* 0.0214* 0.0166* 0.0175
(0.00913) (0.0103) (0.0120) (0.00894) (0.0117)
FD2 -1.66e-05 4.97e-06 -7.26e-06 -3.44e-06 -1.80e-05
(2.65e-05) (2.48e-05) (2.14e-05) (2.44e-05) (2.52e-05)
FD2 ∗DEM -7.78e-05 -0.000115 -0.000114 -8.94e-05 -6.96e-05
(7.55e-05) (8.14e-05) (9.99e-05) (7.41e-05) (8.68e-05)
GDPpc -0.101 -0.104 -0.120 -0.0923 -0.0930
(0.0765) (0.0706) (0.0774) (0.0739) (0.0747)
KOFGI 0.0154*** 0.0146*** 0.0154*** 0.0149*** 0.0141***
(0.00421) (0.00412) (0.00427) (0.00418) (0.00394)
Urban -0.0210 -0.00596 -0.0496 0.0143 0.0322
(0.125) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120) (0.117)
Y oung 0.473*** 0.466*** 0.439*** 0.483*** 0.462***
(0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115)
Old -0.464*** -0.440*** -0.497*** -0.437*** -0.427***
(0.144) (0.147) (0.156) (0.142) (0.139)
CBI -0.0462 -0.0499 -0.0470 -0.0452 -0.0436
(0.0520) (0.0509) (0.0524) (0.0511) (0.0524)
EMU 0.00601 0.00505 0.0122 0.00526 0.00260
(0.0369) (0.0377) (0.0389) (0.0377) (0.0370)
Fiscalrule -0.00107 -0.00277 0.00415 -0.000662 -0.00325
(0.0256) (0.0262) (0.0270) (0.0259) (0.0258)
Constant 3.604*** 3.533*** 4.088*** 3.227*** 3.248***
(1.114) (1.076) (1.237) (1.019) (1.052)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Fixed effects estimations with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.
***(**)(*) represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
The estimation results for the non-monotonic relationship in Table 7 shows similar ef-
fects of fiscal decentralization, democracy and the interaction term on government size;
negative and statistically significant for fiscal decentralization and democracy on govern-
ment size (except for egalitarian democracy) and a positive effect of the interaction term
on government size (except for egalitarian democracy). However, the coefficients of the
squared-term of fiscal decentralization (FD2) and the interaction of the squared of FD and
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Figure 4.1: Non-monotonic plot of varieties of spending under varieties of democracies
democracy (FD2 ∗DEM ) are statistically insignificant.
We provide a plot of the non-monotonic relationship in Figure 1.11 Figure 1 seems to
show non-linear relationship between decentralization, democracy and government size un-
der varieties of democracies. The plot of spending suggests a non-linear relationship, gener-
ally of the inverted-U-shape type. This is however by no means conclusive as the coefficients
of the relevant variables - decentralization squared and the interaction term of the square of
decentralization and democracy - in Table 6 are statistically insignificant. Therefore, there
is no conclusive evidence of a non-monotonic relationship in this case; the mediating effect
of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and government size is likely to
be more linear. Any non-linearity would not be captured by a squared term, as found. It may
11To examine non-monotonicity, I make use of the “lowess” command in STATA. As noted earlier, if the
graphs show a non-monotonic effect, then I need to include fiscal decentralization squared and the interaction
term of fiscal decentralization squared and democracy in equation (1). I explicitly specify a bandwidth of 0.3,
meaning 30 per cent of the data is used in smoothing each point. I use smaller bandwidth in order to follow the
original data more closely. Lowess is desired due to its locality, as it tends to follow the data. Hence, it gives
locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. Polynomial smoothing methods are global; i.e. what happens on the
extreme left of a scatterplot can affect the fitted value in the extreme right.
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be the case that the non-linearity is addressed when conditioning on controls, but it suggests
heterogeneity, which for instance including say an OECD interaction would not account for.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the mediating effect of democracy in explaining the relationship
between decentralization and government size for the period 1970-2013. We proxy decen-
tralization by fiscal decentralization, use total spending as our primary measure of govern-
ment size, and adopt the V-Dem high-level democracy indices as measures of democracy.
Our study is to our knowledge unique as it considers the mediating effect of varieties of
democracy as against the use of an institutional proxy for democracy or a binary variable as
measure of democracy. Our indices provide an interval of between 0-1 which measures high
and low democracies for specific concepts of democracies such as electoral, liberal, par-
ticipatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy. The current paper also accounts for the
influence of regime change and examines the effect of non-linearity. Our robustness tests
are; (i) using sub-sample of developed and developing countries, (ii) an estimation with
employment as an alternative measure of government size, (iii) an estimation with regime
change as an alternative measure of democracy, and (iv) an instrumental variable estimation
to take care of endogeneity.
Our main finding is that fiscal decentralization in itself is an effective tool to “starve
the beast” as it leads to reduced government size suggesting support for the Leviathan hy-
pothesis. Fiscal decentralization seems to have more negative effect when we control for
electoral democracy. The negative effect of decentralization on government size is consis-
tent across all estimations. Democracy is associated with a reduction in government size,
and the largest effect seems to be participatory democracy. We find evidence of the mediat-
ing effect of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and government size; a
positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term with the effect size largest
for the participatory principle of democracy. The positive effect of the interaction term in
the main results is consistent for all estimations except the sub-sample of developing coun-
tries, although only statistically significant for egalitarian democracy in the IV estimation,
but statistically insignificant for employment and regime change. However, an increase in
fiscal decentralization in a developing country under a liberal democracy is associated with
a reduction in government size. We do not find a non-linear relationship between decentral-
ization and government size.
A number of caveats and qualifications must be noted. First, while the effect size of
fiscal decentralization and democracy are by no means small, with a percentage in fiscal
decentralization being associated with changes in spending up to 36 per cent, the interaction
term has a magnitude of effect of a maximum of 1.7 per cent. The joint effect of fiscal
decentralization and democracy on government size is therefore lower than the individual
effects of these variables.
Notwithstanding, our results provide important implications for policy. Fiscal decentral-
ization may be an effective tool for citizens to bargain for increased public goods provision in
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a democracy in general, more so where the core characteristic of the democracy is participa-
tory. For a developed country, all concepts of democracy could be important as government
size is likely to increase in all cases. Given the struggles of developing countries to control




Table A3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Spending 3,419 25.72921 12.57706 1.877688 210.2051
Employ 1,132 1845.236 4226.855 1.4 38063
FD 1,615 25.30753 17.90808 0.018681 98.75611
GDPpc 7,893 8.2243 1.509572 4.751814 11.87928
KOFGI 7,696 48.93902 16.55902 14.2923 90.39829
Urban 10,166 51.21273 25.17438 2.845001 100
Young 9,242 34.4939 10.32543 11.13134 51.88591
Old 9,242 6.302605 4.23739 0.75047 24.62983
CBI 5,832 0.491597 0.202769 0.016667 0.979
EMU 10,296 0.019911 0.1397 0 1
Fiscal rule 10,296 0.129274 0.335519 0 1
Electoral 7,358 0.425893 0.289686 0.009 0.924
Liberal 7,295 0.329997 0.276637 0.003 0.891
Participatory 7,326 0.263908 0.215059 0.005 0.808
Deliberative 7,358 0.332631 0.272712 0.003 0.899
Egalitarian 7,358 0.336598 0.246317 0.015 0.887
Regime change lag 3,344 0.010467 0.101784 0 1
Table A3.2: Pairwise correlation for varieties of democracy
VARIABLES Electoral Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
Electoral 1.0000
Liberal 0.9748 1.0000
Participatory 0.9682 0.9683 1.0000
Deliberative 0.9713 0.9798 0.9640 1.0000
Egalitarian 0.9481 0.9733 0.9466 0.9595 1.0000
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Table A3.3: List of countries
Albania Czech Republic Jamaica Peru
Argentina Germany Jordan Poland
Armenia Denmark Japan Portugal
Australia Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Paraguay
Austria Spain Korea, Rep. Russian Federation
Azerbaijan Estonia Lesotho El Salvador
Belgium Finland Lithuania Serbia
Bulgaria France Luxembourg Slovak Republic
Bosnia and Herzegovina United Kingdom Latvia Slovenia
Belarus Georgia Morocco Sweden
Bolivia Greece Moldova Thailand
Brazil Honduras Mexico Tunisia
Canada Croatia Macedonia, FYR Turkey
Switzerland Hungary Malta Ukraine
Chile India Mongolia United States
Congo Rep. Ireland Mauritius South Africa
Colombia Iran, Islamic Rep. Malaysia
Cabo Verde Iceland Netherlands
Costa Rica Israel Norway
Cyprus Italy New Zealand




Alignment and Fiscal Outcomes in Local
Government
In this paper, we examine how local governments’ political alignment with central gov-
ernment affects subnational fiscal outcomes. In theory, alignment could be rewarded
with more intergovernmental transfers, or swing voters in unaligned constituencies
could be targeted instead. We analyze data from Ghana, which has a complex de-
centralized system: District Chief Executives (DCEs) are centrally-appointed local ad-
ministrators loyal to the ruling party, while district MPs may belong to another party.
A formula for transfer distribution aims to limit the influence of party politics. Using a
new dataset for 1994-2014 and a regression discontinuity design, we find that despite
this system, districts with aligned MP and DCE receive more transfers, have higher
district expenditure, and more internally generated funds. Results are strongest for a
subsample of constant districts over the period, suggesting that municipal fragmenta-
tion has weakened political alignment effects. We also show strong electoral cycle
effects, and find a crowd-in effect for Ghanaian districts.
5.1 Introduction
Fiscal policy outcomes in decentralized systems are often influenced by political factors
such as political alignment between the central and local governments, and electoral cycle
pressures. Given politicians’ primary aim of securing re-election, Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) proposed that intergovernmental transfers (i.e. fiscal transfers from the central to the
local government level) would be targeted primarily at swing voters in order to convince
them to cast their vote for the incumbent party candidate in the next election. Cox and
McCubbins (1986) instead contended that transfers would aim at rewarding core supporters
∗This paper is co-authored with Christa Brunnschweiler. We thank Edward Anderson, Oana Borcan, Rag-
nar Torvik, and seminar participants at UEA for valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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in constituencies that chose the incumbent party with a larger vote share. A sizeable em-
pirical literature now exists on the political motivations behind intergovernmental transfers.
The evidence generally, but not exclusively, supports the core-voter-targeting explanation
for politically-motivated intergovernmental transfers.1
The present paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of how political factors af-
fect a range of fiscal outcomes in a complex, developing-country context. Specifically, we
look at Ghana and answer three related questions: how does political alignment influence
subnational fiscal outcomes, including intergovernmental transfers, and local expenditure
and internally generated funds? Second, are there electoral cycle effects in local fiscal out-
comes? And finally, is there a crowding-in effect (often called a flypaper effect), i.e. do in-
tergovernmental transfers lead to disproportionate increases in local expenditure compared
to similar-sized internally generated revenues?
Ghana is a stable multi-party democracy with regular elections that are deemed free and
fair. It has seen six national-level elections and three peaceful changes in power between
ruling parties since the return to democracy in 1992. The country has a decentralized system
of government, with substantial powers delegated to the Metropolitan, Municipal and Dis-
trict Assemblies – what we call District Assemblies (DAs) for simplicity (see section 5.3 for
more details). Crucially, Ghana’s system adds a layer of complexity to the conventional po-
litical alignment setup, where one key local figure (e.g. a mayor of a municipality or a state
governor) is either aligned or unaligned with the central government. Ghana’s DA member-
ship is made up of both locally-elected and centrally-appointed officials, in addition to the
Member(s) of Parliament (MP) representing the local constituency.2 The most powerful po-
litical appointee is the District Chief Executive (DCE), the head of the DA directly appointed
by the President. DCEs are viewed as party cronies and owe their allegiance to the central
government, whose policies they are expected to promote and for whom they should garner
support among the district electorate (Ahwoi 2010; Ayee and Dickovick 2010; Mohammed
2015). This means that in principle, all districts are aligned with the central government to
the same degree. Nevertheless, political differences can and do arise from the fact that MPs
instead may be of an opposition party, and that DCEs and MPs are often at odds with each
other.3 Political alignment of a district in the Ghanaian system is therefore determined in
practice by the political affiliation of the local MP(s).
All districts are heavily reliant on central government transfers to carry out their duties,
and both the DCE – as the head of the DA – and the MP(s) are viewed by the general public
as responsible for district-level policies. In a context where showing that one can ‘get things
done’ is very important, MPs however have limited (public) financial means at their disposal
1The empirical evidence spans countries across the world, from the United States (Larcinese et al. 2006),
to India (Rodden and Wilkinson 2004), Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini 2012), and Italy (Bracco et al. 2015), to
name a few recent contributions.
2Each district has at least one constituency. The more populous Municipal and Metropolitan districts have
more than one constituency and MP.
3Ghana has a multi-party system, but politics are dominated by the two largest parties, the New Patriotic
Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). All Presidents so far have been members of either
of these two parties. The two parties are generally characterized as center-right and center-left, respectively,
with only loose ethnic group identifications (see e.g. Boylan 2016).
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to directly target their constituency, giving DCEs the upper hand when it comes to exploit-
ing the possibilities of politically-motivated transfers. The Ghanaian system seeks to prevent
such patronage by making the allocation of the main central transfer – the District Assembly
Common Fund (DACF) – subject to a mathematical formula, approved annually by Parlia-
ment, that considers a district’s population size and comparative development factors.4 Yet,
Banful (2011) finds evidence of political motivation in the relative size of transfers of DACF
moneys, and of the weights given to the criteria in the formula: transfers tend to be targeted
at swing districts, and the formula appears to be amended with this aim prior to national
elections.
This paper looks beyond just the DACF and uses a unique, broad set of measures of
district-level fiscal outcomes for the years 1994-2014, covering five national-level elec-
tions. We apply a careful causal identification approach to analyze whether Ghana’s com-
plex system shows any evidence of political influences, despite the built-in hurdles to party
favouritism in intergovernmental transfers. The peculiar political pressures and rivalries at
the local constituency level would lead us to expect that, if anything, there is targeting of
swing voters through increased transfers to (marginally) non-aligned districts. We first ex-
amine variations in district fiscal outcomes over the entire electoral cycle and show that there
is a marked increase on average across districts and fiscal measures in (pre-) election years,
but no clear evidence for political alignment effects.
We then apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) – which has been frequently em-
ployed in the recent empirical literature on political alignment effects – and instead find clear
evidence of political targeting of core supporters, particularly in intergovernmental transfers
and district expenditure, and to a lesser degree also in internally generated funds (IGF). Our
treatment variable is an alignment dummy that takes the value of one if the district is aligned
with the central government, and 0 otherwise. Our assignment variable is the difference be-
tween the percentage of vote share of the parliamentary candidate of the party that wins the
national elections, and the percentage of vote share of the parliamentary candidate of the
main opposition party that loses the national elections.5 Hence, a positive margin denotes
an aligned, while a negative margin implies an unaligned district. Results from an extension
using time-differences-in-differences point in the same direction. A plausible explanation
is that it is difficult to successfully identify and target ‘swing’ voters and districts in a con-
text where district-level voting patterns in national elections seldom persist for more than
two electoral cycles. In addition, the flip-side of core supporter reward implies that DCEs
who fail to bring their district close to the governing party line might be ‘punished’ with
relatively lower transfers.6
Finally, we demonstrate that transfers crowd-in both local government expenditure and
4There is an ongoing debate on whether the small share of the DACF transfers devoted to MPs’ district
development projects is unconstitutional. There are numerous calls for revising the current policy and having
MPs focus on their core job of legislating at the national level, though it is recognized that this will necessitate
a change in people’s perceptions of MPs’ responsibilities and the extent of their power (see Ahwoi 2010).
5We use the vote shares of NPP and NDC in determining vote margin. We assign winner or loser according
to which of these two parties win the national presidential elections.
6Robinson and Torvik (2009) focus on the possibility that swing voters are severely punished, potentially
to the point of disenfranchisement. There is no evidence of the use of such ‘sticks’ in Ghana.
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own revenues, using the instrumental variables (IV) approach proposed by Bracco et al.
(2015), with our alignment dummy as the exogenous instrument for transfers.
Our main sample includes a balanced panel of the 39 districts that have been present
throughout the period under analysis (what we term “constant” districts). There has been a
remarkable process of municipal fragmentation in Ghana since the current Constitution was
passed in 1992, which has led to a stepwise increase in the number of districts from 110
in 1994, to 216 at the end of our sample period. Our results are broadly consistent when
we vary the sample size, including all districts in the sample, or districts with only one MP,
where political alignment is most clear-cut. However, results are strongest for our main sam-
ple, suggesting that municipal fragmentation in Ghana has in effect weakened any attempts
at political targeting of transfers to date, in spite of recent criticism of gerrymandering in the
setting of new district boundaries (see Riedl and Dickovick 2014; Mohammed 2015). Our
results suggest that it is in fact this continued fragmentation, rather than the complex politi-
cal system, that has played the biggest role in curtailing the influence of political favouritism
in subnational fiscal outcomes in Ghana.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review;
Section 3 gives more details on the Ghanaian context; Section 4 presents the methodology
and data; Section 5 discusses the political alignment results and Section 6 the flypaper effect
results; and Section 7 draws conclusions.
5.2 Literature review
The modern debate on the decentralization of government goes back to Buchanan (1950),
Musgrave (1959), and Oates (1972, 1977), who argued that decentralization leads to greater
political participation, accountability, and administrative and fiscal efficiency. Critics of
decentralization instead point out that it leads to soft budget constraints, macroeconomic
instability, clientelism, and greater government size (e.g. Rodden 2006).
A vast literature has since developed on the merits and demerits of a decentralized sys-
tem. One aspect that has received particular attention is the importance of intergovernmental
transfers for the provision of public goods and for political competition at the local level. In
theory, these transfers could be used to increase politicians’ re-election chances, either by
convincing swing voters (e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull 1987), or by rewarding core supporters
(e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1986; and Dixit and Londregan 1996). Political alignment – i.e.
whether the local politician is of the same party or coalition as the central government – is a
central concept in this strand of the literature.
Our study contributes to the large body of evidence that seeks to estimate the impact
of political alignment on central transfers. Empirically, most studies have found a positive
effect of political alignment with the center on the size of intergovernmental transfers –
especially discretionary grants – in line with the hypothesis of rewarding core supporters.
Examples include Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Larcinese et al. (2006) for the U.S.; Aru-
lampalam et al. (2009) and Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) for India; Brollo and Nannicini
88
(2012) for Brazil; and Bracco et al. (2015) for Italy.7 There is also evidence of electoral
cycle effects in fiscal outcomes, with an increase in the expenditure and the budget deficit
in election years which can differ across countries (.e.g, Shi and Svensson 2006), or which
may be driven by party politics (e.g., Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2011). The present paper
examines a decentralized system in Africa over a period of twenty years and five election
cycles, and finds evidence of electoral cycle effects, and of core-supporter reward not only
in the size of central government transfers, but also in district expenditures and internally
generated funds, which have not received much attention so far.
Another common finding in the decentralization literature is that of a crowding-in or so-
called flypaper effect: central government transfers increase the level of local government
spending more than an equivalent amount of extra locally-generated revenues.8 We follow
the strategy in Bracco et al. (2015), who isolated this effect in Italy by instrumenting central
government grants with political alignment, and we find some evidence for a crowding-in
effect in Ghana.
Although few contributions examine the effects of decentralization in Africa, we are not
the first to do so. Mbate (2017) reviews the literature that shows how decentralization has
spread throughout the continent and how it has affected governance.9 Appiah-Agyekum et
al. (2013) present a qualitative analysis of how the Ghanaian decentralized political system
influences the use of local government finance. More closely related to our paper, Miguel
and Zaidi (2003) find evidence of ‘patronage targeting’ at the district level in Ghana’s ed-
ucation spending between 1996 and 2000, applying a regression discontinuity design to a
random sample of schools. Mogues and Benin (2012) use a panel dataset for Ghana from
1994-2004 and show that central government transfers crowd out locally-generated rev-
enues, in spite of incentives for raising own funds that are built into the criteria for alloca-
tion of the DACF. Banful (2011) extends the same dataset to 1994-2005 to examine whether
the formula for the allocation of DACF moneys eliminates politically-motivated targeting
of transfers. In fixed-effect estimations, she finds that transfers follow the swing-voter hy-
pothesis: districts with lower vote margins in the previous election receive relatively more
transfers, and the criteria for funding allocation change in line with this prediction. Using a
longer time period of official data than all previous contributions and applying an RD design,
we instead find evidence for the core-supporter hypothesis in Ghana.
5.3 The local governance structure of Ghana
5.3.1 The institutional framework
Our focus is on Ghana, so it is worth describing the country’s decentralized political and
fiscal system in some detail before turning to the empirical analysis. Ghana has been a
7In a related paper, Borcan (2020) looks at the links between political alignment and electoral fraud in
Romania.
8See Inman (2008) for a review of the literature on the flypaper effect.
9Riedl and Dickovick (2014) instead look at how political party systems have affected decentralization in
Africa, and include Ghana in their case studies.
89
stable, multi-party presidential democracy since the new Constitution of 1992 signalled the
end of the last military government. The new Constitution included a decentralized structure
of government, with substantial powers delegated to sub-national entities; fiscal decentral-
ization was added in 1994 to formalize central government transfers to local authorities.10
In practice, the current decentralized governance system has four tiers below the center,
operating – starting at the top of the hierarchy – at the regional, district, zonal, and Unit
Committee levels. In this article, we concentrate on the District Assemblies (DAs), which
act as the crucial links between regional and central governments above, and Zonal Councils,
Unit Committees and the general population below.11
The Constitution of Ghana specifies that the DAs are the highest political, legislating,
budgeting, and planning authorities at the local level.12 In order to carry out its plans, a
District authority has three sources of revenue: central grants directed to the District As-
semblies Common Fund (DACF); ceded revenue;13 and internally generated funds (IGF)
raised through local taxation, fees, fines, and charges. The DACF and ceded revenue are
both central government transfers, but the DACF constitutes the main source of funding of
district authorities. It has a constitutionally stipulated minimum share of central govern-
ment revenue of at least 5%; it is distributed between DAs according to a formula approved
annually by Parliament, and in turn its allocation by DAs must be approved by the central
government.14
The DACF allocation formula is calculated as a weighted linear combination of four cri-
teria, which adds up to 100%. The most important is the ‘Equality’ criterion, which ensures
that each district benefits from a substantial amount of the DACF by providing an equal
base sum to every district. The ‘Need’ criterion is targeted at bridging the gap between
rich and poor districts. It considers factors such as income or wealth, population, health
facilities, doctor-to-population and nurse-to-population ratios, education facilities, pupils-
to-teacher ratio, water coverage, tarred roads mileage, and number of dilapidated schools.
The ‘Responsiveness’ criterion serves as an incentive for districts to raise their own rev-
enues, although the indicators used to measure own revenue generation have greatly varied
10Decentralization was further strengthened in 2010 under the Decentralization Policy Framework.
11The Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) have little real power beyond coordinating activities and
strategies, while the two lowest levels are mainly responsible for carrying out at the local level the policies
decided above, and for conveying concerns from the population to the higher government levels.
12Among their most important tasks are the preparation of annual district Development Plans, which should
be subjected to public hearings to ensure alignment with local needs; and of annual budget estimates. Both
require approval by a majority of District Assembly members. Development is prescribed to be pro-poor
and cover basic infrastructure, the provision of municipal works and services, the management of human
settlements and of the natural environment in the district (FES 2016). In particular, DAs are responsible for
fire protection; the civil status register; the maintenance of a statistical office; education services including
pre-school, primary, and junior secondary education; social welfare services including family welfare services
and welfare homes; public health services including primary care and health protection; water and sanitation;
refuse collection and disposal; self-help projects; cemeteries and crematoria; slaughterhouses; and parks and
open spaces, sports and leisure facilities.
13Ceded revenue is redistributed to DAs by the Internal Revenue Service via the Ministry of Local Govern-
ment and Rural Development. It includes some specialized funding sources (e.g. natural resource royalties).
14Since 1997, a small share of each district’s DACF funds – around 4-5% – is allocated to the DA’s MP(s).
See the ”Guidelines for Utilisation of 50% of the District Assemblies’ Common Fund Contingency Factor
Allocation to be Shared on Constituency Basis”, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Ref.
No. SCR/ADM.250/VOL.3, 18th November 1997.
90
over the years (Banful 2011). Finally, a measure of the intensity of use of public facilities in
a district — ‘Service Pressure’ – is included in the formula to account for the implications of
population density for public facilities. We control for district population and the number of
private schools in our regression estimations to take some of the main DACF allocation cri-
teria into account. Note that the weight assigned to these criteria frequently varies, although
the ‘Equality’ criterion has always maintained the largest weight. Banful (2011) argues that
formula changes are politically motivated; on the flipside, the frequent changes in the DACF
formula imply that districts cannot easily influence future grant allocations, especially since
allocation formula details are only communicated with a two-year delay (see also Mogues
and Benin 2012).
Although DAs can set local tax rates, the potential for fiscal revenue from local taxation
is limited, as the most lucrative sources of taxation – income tax, sales tax, and import and
export duties – go to the central Internal Revenue Service. Moreover, local tax collection is
ineffective (Dickovick and Riedl 2010).15 Instead, district authorities overwhelmingly rely
on central government transfers for their revenue, with grants and DACF funds combined
making up on average over 80% of DAs’ revenue sources. Figure 5.1 clearly confirms the
huge reliance of districts on central government transfers.
Figure 5.1: Mean shares of grants and IGF in districts’ total revenue in Ghana, 1994-2014
Since the Constitution of 1992, Ghana has gone through four rounds of district govern-
ment fragmentation, which have successively increased the number of districts from 110 to
138 (after the creation of new districts in 2004), to 173 (2008), 216 (2012), to currently 254
(2018). In the early phases, fragmentation gave due consideration to the idea of economic
15There is one other potential source of revenue, which however has uneven usage across districts and time:
revenue may come from outside the national framework, for example from the IMF/ World Bank’s Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative debt relief programme (FES 2016). Note that District Assemblies
are not allowed to set deficit budgets, and any loans require prior approval by the Ministry of Finance. The
Auditor General audits the annual accounts of DAs and presents a report to parliament.
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viability of the new districts and the creation of effective local institutions; however, critics
argue that since the 2000’s, fragmentation has actually worsened central public spending in-
efficiencies and weakened local fiscal accountability (e.g., Mohammed 2015).16 In order to
avoid bias driven by politically-motivated district boundaries as much as possible, our main
results rely on a restricted sample of 39 districts that remain unaltered in our sample from
1994-2014.17
The DAs’ huge reliance on central government moneys to carry out their duties poten-
tially opens up avenues for politically motivated transfers. To better assess this possibility,
we next describe Ghana’s local government politics in more detail.
5.3.2 Local government politics
A unique feature of local governance in Ghana is that membership of the District Assemblies
is determined though a combination of centrally-made appointments and locally elected rep-
resentatives. 70% of Assembly Members are elected; these elected members are also mem-
bers of the Unit Committee in their local electoral area. The DA further includes the mem-
ber(s) of parliament (MPs) representing the constituency(-ies) within the district; MPs are
ex officio members with no voting right in general assembly meetings of DAs. Elections for
DA members – but not MPs – are on a non-partisan basis; the elections are state-sponsored
and conducted by the electoral commission. Finally, 30% of the DA members are directly
appointed by the president, (theoretically) in consultation with chiefs and interest groups in
the district.
Crucially, the appointed members include the District Chief Executive (DCE), who is
the political-administrative head of the DA with the power to initiate, design and implement
policies, and tasked with managing the district’s resources (FES 2016; Debrah 2016). The
approval of the government’s DCE nominee depends on a two-thirds majority of the vote
in the general DA. Those in favor of the system argue that it is necessary for the President
to be given the opportunity to mobilize so-called competent and experienced individuals to
complement elected assembly members, who may not always have technical knowledge of
the issues (Debrah 2016). However, appointees tend to be seen as party cronies rather than
technicians (Afrobarometer 2008; Ayee and Dickovick 2010; Mohammed 2015). In fact,
DCEs are subject to “centripetal forces of central control” that pull their districts towards
the central government (Ahwoi 2010: 7), and they are highly aware of being accountable to
the President, who can “sack [them] at any time” (Ahwoi 2010: 15). The outcome of this
mixed model of political appointees (heavily linked to the central government) and elected
members (who may be aligned with the opposition) is ‘administrative politicking’: DCEs are
16The motives behind the creation of new districts have also come under scrutiny, as the increase in con-
stituencies and MPs that accompanies fragmentation has raised accusations of ‘gerrymandering’, i.e. the
manipulation of constituency boundaries to favor one party (Riedl and Dickovick 2014; Mohammed 2015).
While this strategy works sometimes in Ghana, our data show that newly created districts are no more loyal to
one party over time than districts that have existed since 1992. Few districts in Ghana can truly be regarded as
‘safe’ for any political party for more than two electoral cycles.
17We cannot exclude that the reasons why these districts remain ‘constant’ introduce their own bias into our
estimations. They are mainly rural districts with no large urban center. However, in robustness tests using
different sample variations (discussed below), we find similar results.
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often accused of breaking administrative rules, interfering with MPs’ local political roles,
distrusting civil servants, and generally contributing to chaotic local government (Debrah
2016).
DCEs and MPs frequently clash due to a peculiarity in the system mentioned above: MPs
receive a share of a district’s DACF for own projects and ‘monitoring’, and the allocation
and disbursement of this share must be approved by the DCE.18 Tensions between the two
sides also arise from extreme partisanship and the desire to score political points; from per-
sonality conflicts; and from low transparency and trust – all of which are likely exacerbated
by the appointee’s often being the unsuccessful candidate in the last parliamentary race, es-
pecially in districts won by the opposition.19 In fact, though influential, the DCE’s position
is precarious because it depends on presidential favor, and it is subject to a two-term limit. If
the DCE has ambitions for a more secure and prominent political career, they will typically
run for MP (Ahwoi 2010). Competition is always likely to be high in districts where there
is differing party allegiance between DCE and MP(s), but if DCEs show an interest in the
parliamentary seat, tensions arise even when both sides are in the same party (Boylan 2016;
Debrah 2016).
In sum, no matter the outcome of the district-level parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions, the local DCE is always likely to owe allegiance to the party in power in the central
government, and may have their own political career at heart during their agenda-setting
and decision-making process. A district MP, on the other hand, may be aligned or unaligned
with the ruling party. The decentralized system in Ghana therefore offers an interesting case
study of politically motivated intergovernmental transfers and local government expenditure
patterns.
5.4 Data and Methodology
5.4.1 Effects of political alignment on fiscal outcomes
Electoral cycles
We first examine the effects of political alignment on fiscal outcomes in Ghana. We focus
on central government grants as the main fiscal outcome, but also discuss results for district
expenditure and internally generated funds (IGFs) in the extensions and robustness analysis
below. To begin with, we look at systematic variation over time in local fiscal outcomes and
explore the existence of electoral cycles using a panel fixed-effects estimator as follows:
18There are numerous reports of delays in approval and disbursement, or even appropriation by the DCE
to undertake projects without the knowledge of the MP (see Boylan 2016; Debrah 2016). The Minister of
Local Government and Rural Development and DACF Administrator are regularly called upon to intervene in
cases of conflicts over disbursements of MPs’ shares. In cases of ”actual sabotage”, the DACF Administrator
can directly disburse the small part of an MP’s DACF share that is allocated to ‘monitoring and evaluation’.
This advance is then deducted from the next quarterly DACF tranche (personal interview with a former DACF
Administrator, Accra, May 2019).
19On the tensions and clashes within DAs, see Ayee (1999); Daddieh and Bob-Milliar (2012); Boylan
(2016); Debrah (2016).
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lnGrantsit = α + σEYit + βXit + µi + εit, (5.1)
where lnGrantsit refers to the natural logarithm of real per capita central government
grants to district i in year t; EY refers to the election year dummy; and Xit represents
a vector of control variables, including the total number of private schools in the DA – a
proxy for district income – and the total population in the DA, which are given in natural
logarithms. The district fixed effects and the error terms are shown as µi and εit, respectively.
In an extension, we introduce dummy variables for one and two years before the election
year, with the latter dummy variable coinciding with the second year after the previous
election in the four-year term. We also include an interaction term between the election
year and a dummy for political alignment between DAs and central governments (described
below), to determine whether the effect of elections differs between aligned and unaligned
districts. We expect σ to be positive for the election year and a year before the election year,
but negative for two years before the election year, signalling an electoral cycle effect.
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
We next examine the average causal effect of political alignment on central government
grant allocations to local governments. We measure district alignment by considering the
political alignment between local government political agents and the center, with the DCE
and MP as our local political agents. Given that DCEs are appointed by the central gov-
ernment, if the elected MP in the district and the central government belong to the same
party, then the DCE and MP are automatically aligned with the central government. Hence,
alignment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the DCE and MP are from the same party as
the central government, and 0 otherwise. We consider parliamentary election results, be-
cause parliamentary and presidential election results in Ghana are to a large extent identical.
With the unit of observation for election results at the constituency level, we aggregate the
parliamentary election results to the district level as constituencies are units within districts
20. Ghana has a first-past-the-post electoral system, so a party is considered to have won a
district if it captures a relative majority of the parliamentary vote share. For districts with
more than one MP, alignment is determined using the difference between the average of
the sum of votes for the parliamentary candidates of the winner of the national election and
the average of the sum of votes of the parliamentary candidates of the loser of the national
elections 21. The RDD approach has been adopted in similar contexts by recent studies such
as Brollo and Nannicini (2012), Bracco et al. (2015), Bonilla-Mejı́a and Higuera-Mendieta
20Banful (2011) adopts a similar approach to aggregating constituency-level election results to district-level
results. She also notes that presidential and parliamentary results in Ghana are virtually the same, as candidates
of the two major parties win in both the presidential and parliamentary elections held in any given district.
21Since Ghana is effectively a two-party state, assume two parties in an election, Party A and Party B.
Assume further that there are 3 constituencies in district i at time t. Both parties field candidates for each
constituency. Hence, we aggregate the percentage of votes obtained by all candidates of Party A and divide by
3 and do same for Party B. If Party A’s presidential candidate wins the national elections, then we assign Party
A as the winner and Party B as the loser, and construct Margin and Align as described later.
94
(2017), and Borcan (2020). These studies use close elections or ‘marginal winners/losers’
for identification in examining concepts such as alignment and transfers, alignments and
electoral advantages, and alignment and electoral outcomes. In addition to this, the RDD
technique is largely popular in examining causality in Economics and related fields in social
science and business and in other scientific fields such as epidemiology among others.
We adopt the continuity-based Regression Discontinuity design as our identification
strategy to determine the causal effect of political alignment on central government grants
to local governments in Ghana. Our estimation is based on testable continuity assumptions
(Cattaneo et al. 2018). We estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of political align-
ment based on the discontinuity in observed outcomes at the cut-off. Stated differently, the
continuity approach assumes that in the absence of treatment, potential outcomes are chang-
ing smoothly across the threshold; treatment alone then produces a discontinuity. An RD
design is particularly suitable in our case given that local governments in Ghana are rela-
tively homogeneous in nature, having a similar administrative, budgetary, fiscal, political,
and institutional structure. The estimated model is stated as follows:
lnGrantsit = ρ0Alignit + f(Alignit ∗Marginit) + βiXit + ςt + µi + εit (5.2)
where lnGrantsit refers to the natural logarithm of real per capita central government
grants to district i in year t. Our treatment and assignment variables are Alignit and
Marginit, respectively. Our control function, Alignit ∗ Marginit, is a pth-order poly-
nomial in Marginit interacted with our treatment variable Alignit. Xit represents a vector
of time variant control variables (i.e. total population and number of private schools) which
are given in natural logarithm, ςt refers to the year dummy, µi represents the district fixed
effect, and the error term is given as εit. Our coefficient of interest is ρ0 which measures our
alignment effect at the zero threshold; a positive coefficient would indicate core-supporter
targeting. We assume triangular kernel weights with bandwidth selected using the Mean
Square Error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth choice. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level (see Cattaneo et al. 2018).
5.4.2 Crowd-in or crowd-out: The effect of transfers
In a second step, we examine the effect of transfers on local government expenditures and
own revenues (IGFs), following the approach of Knight (2002) and Bracco et al. (2015). The
expectation for local expenditure is that there is a flypaper effect when a dollar of central
government grants is associated with relatively higher levels of public spending compared
with an equivalent dollar of citizen income (Inman 2008). What about IGFs or own-tax
revenues? The basic median-voter model argues that central government grants will be
associated with lower local taxes, since local governments will now be able to optimally
mix revenue sources to fund spending. In effect, it is expected that central government grant
receipts will crowd-out local government own-tax revenue generation, resulting in reduced
local tax revenues (Scott 1952; Bradford and Oates 1971 a,b; and Dahlberg et al. 2008).
95
Arguments on crowd-out and crowd-in effects of grants on local government spending
and local government internally generated funds assume an exogenous distribution of grants
(Knight, 2002). However, grant allocations are determined through a political process and
are the outcome of a bargaining game at the central government level. Grant allocations are
therefore likely to reflect underlying constituent preferences expressed through their elected
representatives (Besley and Case 2000). Hence, ignoring the link between preferences and
grant receipts may reduce any possibility of finding evidence for a crowd-in or crowd-out
effect of grants on spending or local government own-revenues (Knight 2002). For instance,
local government spending could increase simply because of a political decision to increase
grant allocations to a local government. This makes it difficult to solely attribute any evi-
dence of a crowd-in effect to increased grants without considering the political decision to
increase such grants. Knight (2002) suggests such endogeneity could be corrected by using
measures based on the political power obtained from having a legislative or parliamentary
representation such as partisan affiliation (political alignment in our case), committee rep-
resentation and tenure. Therefore, we follow Knight (2002) and Bracco et al. (2015) and
examine the effect of central government grants by instrumenting central government grants
in the following specification:
Yit = α1Grantsit + βiXit + ϑt + µi + εit (5.3)
where Yit is a vector measuring the natural logarithm of real per capita local government
expenditure and internally generated funds (i.e. own-tax revenue). We use similar control
variables Xit as in equation (1), which are given in natural logarithms. Grantsit represents
the natural logarithm of real per capita central government transfers to local government.
We instrument grants by (i) the alignment dummy only, and (ii) the alignment dummy and
the fourth order polynomial function in the alignment-margin interaction term, given that
grants are endogenous and grants and alignment are correlated 22. The a priori expectation
is that α > 0 for local government expenditure shows evidence of a crowd-in or flypaper
effect, and α < 0 for local government own-tax-revenue shows evidence of a crowd-out
effect. The estimations include district fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at
the district level.
5.4.3 Data description
We make use of data for up to 216 districts in Ghana over the period 1994-2014 covering
five elections in our full sample. Since the number of districts varies over the period of the
study due to district fragmentation, our main results refer to the 39 districts that remained
throughout our sample period (constant districts). As robustness checks, we consider the
(unbalanced) full sample of districts and districts with only one MP, where alignment is
easiest to assign.
22See Knight (2002) and Bracco et al. (2015) for theoretical proofs.
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Our dependent variable(s) in each case remain as described earlier. Data on all our de-
pendent variables is sourced from the various issues of the districts’ budget. Data for the
period 1994-2004 is from Mogues and Benin (2012), data for 2005-2010 is from the Min-
istry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) in Ghana, and 2011-2014 is
compiled by the authors from the various issues of the individual district assemblies’ com-
posite budget for the years 2011-2015 by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning,
Ghana.
As noted earlier, our treatment and assignment variables are the alignment dummy
Alignit and Marginit, respectively.
Our control variables are the total population of the residents in the district and the total
number of private schools in the district. Total population is constructed from the census
data and population projections for the districts by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). We
use the total number of private schools as a measure of district-level income/wealth, due
to the lack of consistent local income data. 23 Data on total number of private schools in
the district is sourced from the various rounds of the Ghana Annual Schools Census (Basic
Schools Information) by the Ministry of Education (MOE), Ghana.
We present our descriptive statistics in Table 5.1. From the table, districts have relatively
higher levels of expenditure than revenue, suggesting they are likely to incur budget deficits
on average. The mean central government grant received by the districts is relatively higher
than the mean internally generated funds of the districts. The latter is confirmed by the de-
scriptive statistics of central government grant as share of total revenue and IGF as share
to total revenue (Grant share and IGF share respectively). In particular, central government
grants constitute 83.78% of local government total revenues on average, while local govern-
ment IGFs make up approximately 16.60% of local government total revenues. The bigger
share of central government grants to local government total revenue suggests local govern-
ments in Ghana have low levels of fiscal autonomy, and are largely dependent on central
governments (see also Figure 5.1).
23Banful (2011) uses the total number of schools in the district (both private and public) as a proxy for
district income/wealth. We argue that the total number of private schools is a better measure of district wealth,
as they are closely linked to local demand and hence local wealth.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics: Full sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure 2296 35558.04 79807.03 0.5254759 2078311
Revenue 2727 29799.09 61383.56 0.2290661 773438.4
Grants 2714 25320.48 55758.13 0 765464.8
IGF 2727 4574.653 10354.1 0.0540525 190906.7
Grants share 747 83.780 13.746 4.783 100
IGF share 751 16.596 14.967 0.594 100
Margin 695 4.848 32.001 -86.1 90.26
Align 2943 0.894 0.307 0 1
Unalign 2943 0.091 0.287 0 1
Number of MPs 2929 1.473 1.642 1 13
Private schools 1665 97.040 166.556 0 1571
Population 2929 146375.5 186606.9 21346 1900000
Note: Descriptive statistics for all variables using the full sample of districts.
5.5 Results on the effects of political alignment on fiscal
outcomes
5.5.1 Electoral cycles
The results for the electoral cycle effect of central government grant allocations to DAs
are given in Table 5.2. Columns 1-3 of Table 5.2 show results for the constant districts;
columns 4-6 results for the full sample of districts; and columns 7-9 the results for the one-
MP districts.
The coefficient of the election year dummy (EY ) is positive in all cases and statistically
significant for the constant DAs and for the full sample of DAs. The estimated coefficients
are however larger for the constant districts. Central government grants to local govern-
ments in Ghana therefore increase in election years. Moreover, central government grant
allocations to DAs increase in the year immediately preceding the election year (see the
coefficient of EY 1), as well as in the election year. As the coefficient magnitudes of EY
and EY 1 suggest, the effect is bigger in the election year itself than the year before (note
that parliamentary and presidential elections in Ghana are held in November or December).
Hence, it may be said that the predilection of central governments of all political ideologies
to increase grant allocations to DAs is enhanced in election years relative to non-election
years. Instead, results show that there is a slight dip in grant allocations two years prior to
elections (EY 2), though the effect is not significant. In sum, grant allocations to DAs by
central governments follow an electoral or a political business cycle: (i) grant allocations are
lower in the mid-term of the government’s four-year mandate; (ii) grant allocations increase



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The large coefficients suggest that grant allocations are delayed until election years, with
DAs receiving almost three times as much in that year as they receive in other years. This is
plausible in a developing country context, and echoes the results of Shi and Svensson (2006)
for a large sample of countries, and of Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) for Brazil.
Finally, in columns 3, 6 and 9 we examine whether the election year effect on grants
differs between aligned and unaligned DAs, by introducing an interaction term between
election year and political alignment (EY ∗ Align). The coefficient of EY ∗ Align is con-
sistently negative but statistically insignificant for central government grants, which suggests
that political alignment does not play a salient role in central government grant allocations
during the electoral cycle. However, we cannot rule out more systematic differences in fiscal
outcomes between aligned and unaligned districts. To examine this issue in more detail, we
next turn to the RDD approach.
5.5.2 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
Design validity
We first show evidence on the design validity of our RDD approach, and then discuss the
estimation results. Our design validity is in two forms; (a) a graphical analysis and (b) a
series of regression design validity tests.
Graphical analysis We carry out a graphical analysis to examine the density and distribu-
tion of our assignment variable and show evidence of discontinuity. We discuss a histogram
and a density plot of Margin showing its distribution along the zero cut-off (Figures 5.2
and 5.3). We then plot the margin of alignment, Marginit, on the horizontal axis and the
per capita central government grants of each district on the vertical axis in Figure 5.4. Re-
call that the results derive from the continuity-based RD design proposed by Cattaneo et
al. (2018), with MSE-optimal bandwidth choice. For easier interpretation of the plots, the
margin of vote is restricted to the range [-40, 40], and estimates include the 95% confidence
intervals. We make use of 40 bins in all our plots. The plots shown are those for the main
sample of constant districts.
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Figure 5.2: Histogram: Distribution of margin around zero for constant districts
Note: A histogram of margin of alignment for 39 constant districts for the period 1994-2014. The histogram
is constructed for margin in the range [-40, 40]. The central line splits the distribution at the cut-off point of
zero(0).
Figure 5.3: RD density plot of margin for constant districts
Note: A density plot of margin of alignment for 39 constant districts for the period 1994-2014. The central
line splits the margin of alignment in the range [-40, 40] at the cut-off point of zero(0). The shaded lines are
the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 5.2 clearly shows that the margin of alignment, which is measured as the differ-
ence between win and lose vote share (i.e. margin of victory), is distributed around zero(0),
with some districts barely aligned, other districts barely unaligned and more districts clearly
won or lost. Figure 5.3 illustrates the discontinuity in margin of alignment with the density
distribution along the cut-off of zero (0), clearly shown with a 95% confidence interval. This
justifies our use of margin as the assignment variable.
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Figure 5.4: Grants and Margin
Figure 5.4 shows the RD plot of central government grants to DAs in real per capita
terms. There is clear discontinuity in grants at the margin of alignment, with the distribution
of grants along the cut-off of zero (0) shown with a 95% confidence interval. Also evident is
that – as we move away from the cut-off – unaligned districts (on the left side of the cut-off)
tend to have higher grants compared to aligned districts (on the right side). However, the
estimation fit – denoted by the length of the vertical lines or ’whiskers’ extending from the
sample average points – is less precise among unaligned districts, and decreases the further
we move from the cut-off. Instead, on the right side of the cut-off we clearly see that central
government grants tend to increase the larger the positive margin of alignment, which gives
some preliminary evidence of core supporter reward. The strength of any alignment effect
is tested below.
Regression-based design validity analysis For our other design validity test, we examine
whether alignment exhibits discontinuity. We have already included pretreatment covari-
ates in our specifications above, and the results are qualitatively similar. Another way of
testing if political alignment exhibits discontinuity is to run a regression akin to our RDD
model with each covariate as dependent variable and alignment and the control function as
explanatory variables and examine whether the coefficients are significantly different from
zero. The regression results are shown in Table A1 of the Appendix. None of the coeffi-
cients of the covariates is individually statistically significant. The individual F-statistics are
statistically insignificant, as is the joint F -statistic (0.54 with a p-value of 0.46). We also
test for discontinuity in the pretreatment characteristics, given the expectation that the pre-
treatment covariates are similar to the left and right of the cut-off. The results are given in
Table A2 of the Appendix; they clearly show no discontinuity in the pretreatment character-
istics, since the RD estimates for both total population and our income proxy are statistically
insignificant 24.
As a third regression validity test, we follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Bracco et
al. (2015) and simultaneously test the null of discontinuities in all covariates, by estimating
24The difference between the results in Tables A1 and A2 is that the former is a fixed effect estimation while
the latter is a continuity-based RD estimation.
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regressions with each covariate as dependent variable and alignment and the control func-
tion as explanatory variables and using higher order polynomials. The test is performed
using a single system of equations within a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) frame-
work. Using SUR provides efficiency in estimation by combining information on different
estimations. We then perform a Chi-square test for the joint hypothesis that alignment is
statistically insignificant in all regressions, implying zero discontinuity. The results in Table
A3 in the Appendix show that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity in all
covariates in all polynomial orders of the margin of alignment. Hence, there is no evidence
of discontinuity in our covariates.
In sum, our three additional specification tests have shown that political alignment ex-
hibits discontinuity, since alignment has no effect on the pretreatment characteristics; the
pretreatment characteristics do not have any influence at the discontinuity; and the pretreat-
ment characteristics are similar to the left and to the right of the cut-off (i.e. there are no
discontinuities in the covariates).
RDD estimation results
We present the RDD results in Table 5.3 for the constant districts (columns 1-2), full sample
(columns 3-4) and one MP districts (columns 5-6). We show results for two variations of the
RDD specifications, namely the RDD with year dummies only, and RDD with year dummies
and controls 25. Including additional covariates should however not have any significant
effect on the estimation of the alignment effect, as such covariates only help to determine if
alignment exhibits discontinuity (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008).
The RDD estimate shows a positive effect of alignment on grants for the constant dis-
tricts in both the estimations with year dummies only and the estimations with year dummies
and controls. That is, constant districts that are aligned receive between 4.9 and 6.3 times
more central government grants. We therefore find clear evidence of political targeting of
core supporters using intergovernmental transfers26. The result is consistent and robust with
or without the additional covariates, which proves that the addition of covariates becomes
redundant when a control function is present. Our large RD estimates are not unusual, at
least in the context of less-developed countries, as Brollo and Nannicini (2012) estimate
similar coefficients for the effect of alignment on federal government transfers to munici-
palities in Brazil. Migueis (2013) and Bracco et al. (2015) find positive effects of alignment
on central government transfers for Portuguese and Italian municipalities respectively, but
25We do not report the results with neither year dummy nor controls as they are qualitatively similar to those
with year dummies.
26To confirm these results, we estimate an RD for ‘swing’ districts - districts in the full sample with
0 < margin ≤ 10. The results in Appendix Table A4 show a negative but statistically insignificant ef-
fect on grants for districts that are just aligned (swing districts). This is consistent with the argument advanced
earlier that ‘swing voters’ are difficult to identify in a system with regular large shifts in voting patterns like
Ghana. Accordingly, choosing districts that are aligned with a wide margin of votes is likely the safer bet for a
government in power that is considering political targeting of transfers. Further, we try some sensitivity anal-
ysis at lower margins. That is given an optimal bandwidth of 40%, we determine the point between 10-40%
margins at which the results turn positive. We use h(15), h(20), h(25), h(30), and h(35), and find the results
remain positive at all these bandwidths except when controls are introduced for h(35). The results are given in
Appendix Table A4.
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their coefficients are smaller.
Table 5.3: RDD estimations for central government grants
Constant districts Full sample One MP districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDEstimate 4.887** 6.335* 0.539 0.034 1.152 -0.461
(2.143) (3.454) (1.127) (1.720) (1.280) (1.695)
Observations 175 101 622 373 505 324
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls no yes no yes no yes
Note: Estimations are done using the fourth order polynomial. All regressions include a constant term. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured in real per capita terms. ***(**)(*)
represent statistical significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.
Using our full, unbalanced sample of districts over the whole period of study, there is
no statistically significant effect of political alignment on central government grants to DAs,
although the signs are consistent. The lack of statistically significant results in this larger
sample is probably due to the presence of ‘noise’ in the data. Given that the number of dis-
tricts increased over the period of study due to the creation of new districts, our estimations
are being affected by the addition of new districts and the dropout and/or split of existing
districts. Any political alignment effect that existed in the full sample is likely cancelled out
by these major changes in district size and number (recall that the number of districts nearly
doubled from 110 at the start of our period to 216 at the end in a multi-step fragmentation
process).
The RDD result for the districts with one MP shows no statistically significant effect of
alignment on central government grant allocations to such DAs, although the sign of the RD
estimate in the estimation with year dummy only is similar to the corresponding results for
the constant districts. However, the result proves not to be robust to the addition of further
covariates and even changes sign. Note that districts with one MP are typically more rural
districts; the lack of causal evidence for political targeting of transfers may speak in favor
of the efforts of successive governments to foster development across the country.
In general, the lack of robustness across sample sizes in the causal effects of politi-
cal alignment on intergovernmental grant allocation suggests that concerns over politically-
motivated district fragmentation and gerrymandering (see Riedl and Dickovick 2014; Mo-




We have found evidence of electoral cycles and political targeting in intergovernmental grant
allocations, but what about other district fiscal outcomes such as total expenditure and inter-
nally generated funds (IGFs)?
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The electoral cycle effect for local government total expenditures is similar to that found
for grants (see Table A5 of the Appendix): there is an increase in national election years and
in the year preceding the national election year, but a reduction in the mid-term of the four-
year mandate of the central government. However, the coefficient of EY ∗ Align is now
negative and statistically significant for district total expenditure, suggesting that aligned
DAs have relatively lower levels of total expenditures in election years, perhaps because
of targeting of swing districts in the crucial lead-up to elections. Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho (2011) find similar results for total expenditures for local governments in Brazil. The
electoral-cycle result does not seem to capture a systematic causal relation however: the
RDD estimates for total expenditure are also consistent with those for grants, and the coeffi-
cient is statistically highly significant for the constant districts. Hence, aligned districts not
only receive more grants, but also spend more on average compared with unaligned districts
(see Table A7, Panel A).
Looking at local government IGFs, we also find confirmation for our main results for
grants. IGFs increase in national election years and in the year preceding the national elec-
tion year, but reduce in the mid-term of the four-year mandate of the central government
(see Table A6). Similar to the case of grants, there is no significant difference between IGFs
in election years for aligned and unaligned DAs. Again, the RDD estimates for IGFs are
also consistent with those for grants and total expenditure, though results are not significant
for our main sample once we add further controls, and for the full and one-MP samples (see
Table A7, Panel B).
In sum, our main results for intergovernmental grants are consistent across local fiscal
outcomes, showing a significant impact of electoral cycles and political alignment.
Time-differences-in-differences
As a robustness check to the RDD procedure, we follow Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008) and adopt a time-differences-in-differences procedure. We again focus on central
government grants and make use of data for successive terms of office to determine the
effect of variations in political alignment on changes in the amount of central government
grants received by the local government. We do this in two ways: (i) with the average of
central government grants across successive terms of office; and (ii) with central government
grants added up for the last two years of each central government’s term of office divided
by the population of the DA at the beginning of these two-year periods. The use of the latter
set of data is justified by the fact that the incumbent central government’s vested interest in
the last two years of its term is likely to be to win the coming elections (see Solé-Ollé and
Sorribas-Navarro 2008).27 The procedure simply involves estimating a fixed-effect equation
with the variables in differences.
There are three advantages to the use of the time-differences-in-differences procedure.
First, they adequately account for omitted-variable biases in the case of the control variables
and other fixed individual characteristics of the DAs. Second, in the case of Ghana, we
27Evidence of this is shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the dummies for the
election year and the year preceding the election year in our estimation results.
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are less likely to suffer from changes in political alignment at the DA level during a term,
e.g. through by-elections. These are extremely rare occurrences. Third, the homogeneous
nature of DAs and Ghana’s national elections across DAs provides relatively stable electoral
features from one term of office to another, hence reducing the possibility of a correlation
between changes in electoral features and changes in alignment status. On the downside, we
can only consider time-differences-in-differences across successive terms for the constant
districts sample, as new districts may only enter the full sample for one or two terms. This
severely limits the statistical power of the estimations.
Using data for both the average and end-two-year real per capita grant for the constant
districts, the coefficient of the alignment dummy is statistically insignificant (see Table A8
of the Appendix). This implies that there is no clear effect of changes in alignment on
central government grants over successive terms of office and between the end periods of
any two successive terms of office. However, it is worth noting that the direction of the
effect determined here is similar to that found in the RDD estimation, i.e. positive.
5.6 Results on crowd-in or crowd-out effects
How do grants affect local government expenditure and IGFs? We now turn to the results for
the crowd-in effect in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. In each table of results, Column 1 represents the
results for the OLS estimation when grants are not instrumented; columns 2 and 3 represent
the 2SLS results with the alignment dummy only as instruments; and columns 4 and 5
refer to the 2SLS results with the alignment dummy as well as the fourth-order polynomial
function in Margin as instruments. The test statistics for the validity of the instruments used
and the reliability of the results do not reject that our instruments are valid and reliable. Our
estimations pass the tests of under-identification and weak identification, and the Hansen test
for instrument validity in all cases. The F-statistic from the first-stage regression is below the
rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 in three out of four cases, but there seems no glaring problem
of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997).
5.6.1 Expenditure per capita
The results for total expenditure are given in Table 5.4. In the OLS estimations, we find
evidence of a crowd-in effect, with an increase in central government transfers linked to
more local government spending. The estimated magnitude shows each cedi of grants is
associated with up to 1.16 cedis (column 3) in per capita expenditure. This suggests grants
are associated with approximately one-for-one increases in spending per capita. The esti-
mated effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are confirmed in both
2SLS estimations. When we instrument grants with the alignment dummy only, we find that
local government expenditures increase by more than the proportionate increase in central
government grants. In sum, there is consistent evidence of a crowd-in effect of central gov-
ernment grants on local government total expenditure per capita; this is the ’flypaper effect’
suggested within the literature. Our finding is consistent with most of the empirical literature
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(e.g., Dahlberg et al. 2008), but contradicts Knight (2002) and Bracco et al. (2015). 28
Table 5.4: Crowd-in effect: Expenditure per capita
OLS 2SLS Baseline Model 2SLS Polynomial function
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Grants Expenditure Grants Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grants 0.988*** 1.158*** 0.930***
(0.004) (0.087) (0.0417)
Population 0.167*** 2.078*** -0.175 1.665*** 0.273**
(0.049) (0.425) (0.196) (0.375) (0.109)
Private 0.023 -0.896*** 0.169** -0.784*** 0.006
(0.020) (0.127) (0.083) (0.175) (0.045)
Align -1.077*** -0.459
(0.345) (0.509)
Margin (4th poly) Yes
Margin (1st poly) No
Observations 1,099 1,099 1,099 366 366
R-squared 0.976 0.949 0.961
F-statistic 9.73 7.69
K-P(under) 9.73 9.733 24.10 24.098
(0.002) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0001)
C-D (weak) 9.73 9.58 5.33 5.335
K-P(weak) 9.58 9.731 7.69 7.688
Hansen 3.582(0.310)
Note: All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors
clustered at the district level. K-P(under), C-D(weak), K-P(weak), and Hansen represent Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic (underidentification), Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic for weak identification, Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald D statistic for weak identification, and Hansen J statistic respectively. All fiscal variables are measured
in real per capita terms. ***(**)(*) statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.
5.6.2 IGF per capita
We find in Table 5.5 that central government grants crowd-in locally-generated revenues on
average. The evidence for crowding-in is consistent whether or not grants are instrumented,
and whether or not the instruments include a polynomial function. In terms of the magnitude
of the effect, each cedi of grants is associated with up to approximately 1.02 cedi per capita
IGF (column 1). The OLS results show the largest effect, implying the coefficient of grants
is biased upwards when we do not instrument central government grants. Hence, there is
28As a robustness check, we make use of a second measure of expenditure, i.e. real per capita local govern-
ment expenditure less central government grants Expenditure2. Expenditure2 in effect shows local government
expenditure out of own revenues. The effect of grants on real per capita local government expenditure out of
own revenues is qualitatively similar to the one here, confirming evidence of a crowd-in or flypaper effect. The
results are available upon request.
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strong evidence that an increase in central government grants is associated with an increase
in locally-generated revenues, which contradicts the reduction in locally-generated revenues
predicted by the median-voter model. We therefore find evidence of a crowd-in effect similar
to Dahlberg et al. (2008).
Our results differ from the findings of Mogues and Benin (2012), who showed that cen-
tral government grants crowd-out locally-generated revenues in Ghana. We argue that our
results are more robust as we consider longer periods of study and address endogeneity con-
cerns. The finding here is quite important, as the biggest part of central government transfers,
the DACF, has in its criteria for allocation built-in incentives for raising own funds. 29 The
implication is that where central government unconditional grants have built-in incentives
to increase locally-generated revenues, an increase in central government grants can indeed
be associated with an increase in locally-generated revenues.
29This is a small incentive to improve on IGF in the form of a very small criteria weight (has been 5% for
most years) for the so-called ‘responsiveness factor’ known as ‘percentage increase in IGF’ and is set to zero
for DAs that do not have an increase (see Banful 2011; Mogues and Benin 2012).
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Table 5.5: Crowd-in effect: IGF per capita
OLS 2SLS Baseline Model 2SLS Polynomial function
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Grants IGF Grants IGF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grants 1.015*** 0.836*** 0.998***
(0.00655) (0.0636) (0.0460)
Population 0.421*** 1.665*** 0.713*** 1.656*** 0.274**
(0.0774) (0.307) (0.151) (0.372) (0.117)
Private 0.404*** 0.712*** 0.281*** -0.773*** 0.605***
(0.0319) (0.110) (0.0571) (0.172) (0.0561)
Align -1.262*** -0.441
(0.324) (0.498)
Margin (4th poly) Yes
Margin (1st poly) No
Observations 1,478 1478 1,478 373 373
R-squared 0.949 0.922 0.950
F-statistic 15.17 7.93
K-P(under) 14.79 14.789 24.97 24.970
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
C-D (weak) 17.7 17.704 5.58 5.582
K-P(weak) 15.17 15.169 7.93 7.932
Hansen 6.609(0.0855)
Note: All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors
clustered at the district level. K-P(under), C-D(weak), K-P(weak), and Hansen represent Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic (underidentification), Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic for weak identification, Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald D statistic for weak identification, and Hansen J statistic respectively. All fiscal variables are measured
in real per capita terms. ***(**)(*) represent statistical significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.
5.7 Conclusions
The present paper examines the effect of political alignment on subnational fiscal outcomes
in Ghana, which has a complex system prone to peculiar political pressures at the local
district level. The paper also examines the crowd-in or flypaper effect. We use a new dataset
for Ghana on central government grants to local governments, district budgets, and election
outcomes spanning the years 1994-2014 and five national elections.
We find evidence of electoral cycle effects: grant allocations, district expenditure and
IGFs are lower in the mid-term of the government’s four-year mandate; increase in the year
preceding the next national election year; and peak in election years. However, these elec-
toral cycles manifest across districts, with no evidence of political alignment effects. We
then apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) by exploiting the discontinuity in par-
liamentary vote margins of winning and losing parties at the threshold of zero (0), which al-
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lows alignment to be as good as randomly assigned. In our main RDD results for a balanced
sample of constant districts for the whole period, we find evidence of political targeting of
core supporters not only in intergovernmental transfers, but also in districts’ expenditure
patterns.
Finally, we show that there is a crowd-in effect of grants for both expenditure (a fly-
paper effect) and own revenues, using the instrumental variables (IV) approach proposed
by Bracco et al. (2015) to identify causality. The evidence of a crowd-in effect for local
governments’ own revenues suggests that built-in incentives to increase IGF that are found
in the main intergovernmental transfers, the District Assembly Common Fund, can in fact
have the intended effect.
There has been an ongoing process of municipal fragmentation in Ghana since the cur-
rent Constitution was adopted in 1992, which has led to an increase in the number of districts
from 110 in 1994, to 216 at the end of our sample period. While our results are consis-
tent when we vary the sample size - including all districts in the sample and districts with
only one MP where it is easier to assign alignment - they are much weaker. This suggests
that despite worries of politically-motivated municipal fragmentation and gerrymandering
in Ghana, the process has in fact (probably inadvertently) watered-down any attempts at
targeted intergovernmental transfers – and moreover done so more successfully than the ob-
stacles to party favoritism that are built in to the decentralized system. Whether this persists
in the future remains to be seen.
Appendix







Note: OLS regressions with align and the control function as independent variables. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level. Regressions include constant term. The joint
F-statistic is 0.54 wit a p-value of 0.46.
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Note: RDD estimations. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust Standard errors clustered at the district
level. Regressions include a linear control function.
Table A4.3: Testing for the continuity of the covariates









Note: Chi-square tests results from a test of discontinuity in the covariates for the constant districts. A Seem-
ingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure is used similar to by Lee and Lemieux (2010) and implemented
by Bracco et al. (2015).
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Note: RDD estimations for districts with 0 < margin ≤ 10; swing districts-bandwidth h(10), and sensitiv-
ity analysis for bandwidth h(15), h(20), h(25), h(30), and h(35). Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level. ** represent statistical significant at 5 per cent levels respec-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4.7: RDD estimations for expenditure and IGFs
Constant districts Full sample One MP districts
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: Expenditure
RDEstimate 5.052*** 6.510* 0.897 0.247 1.564 -0.0651
(2.184) (3.725) (1.163) (1.714) (1.298) (1.693)
Observations 175 101 615 369 499 321
Panel B: IGF
RDEstimate 5.452*** 6.297 1.228 (0.0157) 1.912 -0.902
(2.106) (4.026) (1.235) (1.658) (1.344) (1.607)
Observations 175 101 624 373 507 324
Note: Estimations are done using the fourth order polynomial. All regressions include a constant term. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured in real per capita terms. ***(**)(*)
represent statistical significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. Columns numbered 1 and 2 represent
results for two variations of the RDD specifications namely, RDD with year dummies and RDD with year
dummies and controls.
Table A4.8: Time-differences-in-differences estimation












Note: Estimations done with all variables in first-difference. All regressions include a constant term. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured in real per capita terms. ***(**)(*)
represent statistical significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. ‘Constant’ refers to estimations using
average real per capita grants across successive terms of office for the constant districts and ‘Constant in Term’





The thesis examines the political economy of public finance at both the national and local
government levels. There are four chapters of empirical essays with the first three empirical
essays closely related. The first empirical essay examines the determinants and interrela-
tionship of different types of government expenditure. The results show foreign aid receipts
and urbanization have raised total expenditure, but external debt stocks have reduced total
expenditure. There is a substituting relationship between expenditures on social protec-
tion and pure public goods, and education and defence, but complementary relationship be-
tween all other categories of government expenditure. The second empirical essay examines
the relationship between economic globalisation and government spending for the ‘hyper-
globalisation’ period of the 1990s and 2000s. The results suggest that hyper-globalisation
has had divergent and conflicting effects on consumption spending: while the globalisation
of trade has tended to raise spending, the globalisation of finance and foreign investment
has tended to reduce it. However, the size of the effects is quite small, and there is no ev-
idence that spending has risen by more in countries which are particularly prone to terms
of trade shocks. In the third empirical essay, I examine the mediating effect of democracy
in explaining the relationship between decentralization and government size for the period
1970-2013. The main finding is that fiscal decentralization and democracy in themselves
are effective tools to ‘starve the beast’ as they lead to reduced government size, with the
former suggesting support for the Leviathan hypothesis. There is evidence of the mediat-
ing effect of democracy in the relationship between decentralization and government size; a
positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term with the effect size largest
for participatory democracy. There is no non-linear relationship between decentralization
and government size. The final empirical essay explores how local governments’ political
alignment with the central government affects subnational fiscal outcomes. The results show
that districts with an aligned Member of Parliament and District Chief Executive (DCE) re-
ceive more transfers and have higher expenditures. Ghana’s changeable voting patterns may
hinder identification of swing voters, and/or DCEs who fail to pull their districts towards the
central government may be punished. Marginally aligned districts also raise more own rev-
enues. In a second step, we instrument transfers and estimate a flypaper effect for Ghanaian
districts.
Notwithstanding the strengths of thesis, there are limitations worth noting. In the first
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empirical essay, I omit tax revenue due to data availability issues which could be included
in future research. The use of annual observations in a pooled FE estimation with both time
variant and time invariant variables may in itself be limiting. Further, future research may
consider going beyond applying an OECD interaction term in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to using
more detailed country groupings for not only the variables of interest but all other variables
where necessary. Moreover, I believe examining the growth effect of globalization may
also be relevant for future research. Finally, future research may consider examining polit-
ical alignment and local government outcomes using a panel or cross-section of countries
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